



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WEST PAKISTAN



PAKISTAN and its Neighbors



EAST PAKISTAN

Dorothy deFontaine

PAKISTAN

Birth and Growth
of a Muslim Nation

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PAKISTAN

Birth and Growth of a Muslim Nation

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by

RICHARD V. WEEKES

MAP BY DOROTHY DE FONTAINE



This book be read by a mature mind and age as it is Jewish in nature & gives a superficial information & tries to create a mis-understanding against Pakistan and Islam & muslims of the world. The writer does not know the deep currents running under the muslim world.

It is a prejudiced book
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PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

For the first traveler in the family,

MY FATHER

Foreword

To anyone who has visited Pakistan for even a day, this book will seem incomplete. The people who live there are so varied in dress, language, and ways of living that no single description in less than several thousand pages can hope to do them justice. Perhaps this is just as well. The reader can more easily embellish the lines that follow from his own experiences. After all, no person's generalizations about people are much better than anyone else's, whether about Pakistanis or Americans.

For those who have not visited Pakistan, this book is meant to convey a brief idea of the nature of the country and its people. Hopefully, it will encourage them to look further and peer more deeply into the various subjects which follow. There are many scholarly books about Pakistan covering history, religion, politics, economics, and anthropology. They expand greatly on the complexities of Pakistan which here may seem oversimplified.

Throughout the book, Pakistan is called a "South Asian" country. This is a wholly arbitrary designation on the author's part, although there is increasing use of the term in the United States. South Asia refers to the countries of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, which have also been placed in the "Indian subcontinent," a term no Pakistani would use. Educated West Pakistanis like to think of their country as part of the Middle East. Educated East Pakistanis call themselves Asians. Neither considers Pakistan

part of India, even before 1947. Then, they say, the subcontinent was "British India," "undivided India," "pre-partition India," or the "Indo-Pakistani subcontinent." "South Asia" seems much simpler.

With any English language discussion of a people who write in a non-Roman script, transliteration of words creates annoying problems. There are several systems for spelling in English the words of Urdu or Bengali. The Middle East scholar usually draws on traditions for transliterating Arabic. The Asian scholar follows British practice, which reflects British accent in speaking. The author has generally tried to use the style most commonly used by Pakistanis.

A word of warning should be given regarding statistics. Few of them are as accurate as those from Western countries. In any country with a high illiteracy rate and with underdeveloped techniques of gathering data, figures are at best only approximate. Averages, too, are sometimes misleading in a society in which extremes—of wealth and poverty, of desert and jungle, educated and illiterate—are so common. Above all, there is no "average" Pakistani any more than there is an "average" American.

The author, who must take the responsibility for the statements and opinions in the book, nevertheless has had the help of several talented friends in preparing these few pages about Pakistan. Stephen Oren was most helpful in corroborating the facts and figures from his extensive and recent studies of Pakistan. Edward Metcalf, and particularly Ava Weekes, assisted immeasurably in editing the manuscript, reducing academic jargon and hopefully making the book more readable.

RICHARD V. WEEKES

June 1964

Contents

1. *The People and Their Lands*

> Not Afghans, Turks or sons of Tartary,
> But of one garden, and one trunk, are we;
> Shun the criterion of scent and hue—
> We all the nurslings of one springtime be.
>
> *Mohammed Iqbal*

In 1947 the subcontinent of South Asia was host to violence as had not befallen the land since the great Indian uprising ninety years before. Neighbor fell upon neighbor, trainloads of families perished in massacre, villages were burned and their inhabitants slaughtered. Within six months, more than half a million people perished brutally by the hand of man. Amidst the carnage Pakistan was born.

The years since then have witnessed the 100,000,000 people of Pakistan struggle for survival against continuing, but less devastating odds. Floods and droughts have destroyed their crops, neighboring countries have encouraged their disunity, and their own leaders have sometimes failed them.

Yet Pakistan has survived and her people have achieved the purpose for which they joined in 1947: an independent homeland for South Asia's Muslims.

The motivation for Pakistan was Islam, a religion founded more than thirteen centuries ago in Arabia. In undivided India in 1947, about 25 per cent of its 437,000,000 inhabitants were Muslims, believers in Islam. Most of the rest were Hindus. It was for Muslims that the leaders of the Pakistan movement claimed to speak during the drive for independ-

ence. Led by a brilliant lawyer named Mohammed Ali Jinnah, they sought a nation of their own in order to avoid living as a religious minority, a nation in which they might develop an Islamic society.

Perhaps under different circumstances the Muslims and Hindus of India could have continued to live together as citizens of one secularly ruled nation. In the previous centuries people in the South Asian subcontinent with varied patterns of living had often dwelt amicably side by side. But the tensions created by the struggle for power during the move toward independence from Great Britain prior to 1947 emphasized differences almost to the point of civil war.

Religion lay at the root of these differences and surface manifestations of it appeared throughout the society. In villages Hindus and Muslims lived next to each other, but not together. Intermarriage was rare. Religious practices were not only different, they were often conflicting. With only a little stimulation, submerged fears that one group would attack the other rose to the surface and erupted.

Among educated Muslims, the "need" for self-determination was felt even more strongly than among the villagers. Social intercourse between educated Muslims and Hindus was the exception, not the rule. In government and industry, Muslims could not advance as rapidly as Hindus. Because of their religion and traditions, these Muslims could not accept the permanent status of "minority."

With the reluctant acquiescence of British and Hindu leaders, Mohammed Ali Jinnah and his followers pieced together Pakistan out of those areas in the subcontinent that were predominantly Muslim. In the west, these included the provinces of Sind and the Northwest Frontier, the western part of the Punjab, the vast Baluchistan Agency, and, finally, the small princely states of Amb, Bahawalpur, Chitral, Dir, Kharan, Khaipur, Kalat, Las Bela, Makran and Swat. In addition,

certain Pathan tribes along the Afghanistan border gave their allegiance to the new government. In 1955, all of these were merged into the single province of West Pakistan, although certain tribal groups retained a special relationship with the central government. The area, some 311,000 square miles, is the size of Texas and Louisiana combined; its population in 1964 is more than 44,000,000, over four times that of Texas.

In the east, the areas comprising Pakistan include the eastern half of Bengal Province, a portion of Assam around the city of Sylhet, and the tribal territories of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. More densely populated than West Pakistan, the area of 54,000 square miles—about the size of Wisconsin—contains 53,000,000 in 1964, five and a half times that of Texas. Together, East and West Pakistan form the sixth most populous country in the world.

Pakistan has been called a "double" country. East and West Pakistan are separated by 1,000 miles of India and are as different from each other as Florida and Nevada. Western Pakistan, with its deserts, mountains and the vital Indus River, sits on India's western shoulder, snuggling into the side of Afghanistan and a portion of Iran in the west, touching Communist China along the northern Himalayas, and stretching south to the Arabian Sea. The average rainfall is less than 20 inches, but this statistic is deceiving. West Pakistanis may experience long and harsh dry spells, which suddenly end with torrential rains. Most of their agriculture depends upon irrigation, and along the Indus River the United States, in cooperation with other Western countries, is helping Pakistan to build a giant irrigation and flood control system.

East Pakistan, with its jungles and an alluvial plain which includes nearly 80 per cent of the province, borders India, Burma, and the Bay of Bengal. Here the climate is just the opposite from West Pakistan. Rainfall ranges from 50 inches

a year in the western areas to more than 200 inches in Sylhet district. But as in West Pakistan, rainfall is uneven—as much as 70 per cent of the rain falls in the monsoon months between June and September, creating violent floods on the deltaic plains along the Brahmaputra and Ganges rivers.

Neither province differs significantly from the lands on the other side of its borders. Only rarely do rivers or mountains form natural boundaries between Pakistan and its neighbors.

The name, Pakistan, was suggested by a student, Rahmat Ali, in 1931. The first syllable, *pak,* is the Persian word for "pure." *Stan* means "land." In addition, "P" stands for the former province of (P)unjab, "A" for the (A)fghan area of the northwestern frontier dominated by Pathan tribes, "K" for (K)ashmir, the mountainous land of Muslims ruled by India, "S" for the former (S)ind province and "TAN" for Baluchis(TAN). Bengalis, however, are quick to point out that this description omits more than one-half of the country's population.

Most Pakistanis are farmers and live where water is most accessible. In West Pakistan, all but a scattered few live in the area irrigated by the Indus River and its tributaries which flow 1,000 miles, from the Himalayas in the north to the Arabian Sea in the south. East Pakistan is both blessed and cursed by the abundant waters of the Brahmaputra and Ganges rivers which also rise in the Himalayas and flow together in the center of the province to empty into the Bay of Bengal. Like the Indus, they give and they take away—a source of life, but in rampant flood, also a source of death for the millions who live along their banks.

Fewer than 15,000,000 Pakistanis—about 15 per cent—live in urban areas larger than 5,000 population. In East Pakistan, fewer than 6 per cent live in cities. Yet these relatively few produce the political leaders, government officials, scientists, teachers, doctors and other trained personnel who steer the

society. The city dwellers most enjoy the benefits of progress —education, public health and material prosperity.

Like villagers everywhere else in the world, rural Pakistanis are as warm and hospitable to know as they are parochial and conservative in their ways. The changes that have taken place in Asia over the past centuries have largely passed them by, leaving them illiterate and poor, ill-clothed, ill-housed and in ill health. Fewer than 15 per cent can read or write. Their average annual income is estimated at less than $70 a year. Malnutrition is common. Few villagers receive as much as 2,000 calories a day.

A villager's family, which includes numerous relatives beyond his wife and children, is vitally important to him and plays a far greater role in life than families in more urban societies. Indeed, the world of the rural Pakistani is his family and his tribe or village. He is affected chiefly by events that take place within a day's journey from his home. The laws that rule him are mainly the traditions of his immediate society, not those that come to him from the city. To the exasperation of the westernized and educated "man with a plan," who indeed is now very active in Pakistan, change seems to creep into the lives of most rural Pakistanis with the speed of a somnambulant camel.

Encouraging change, yet controlling it, is one of the aims of Pakistan's leaders. Like their counterparts in other relatively new countries, they seek to develop their society rapidly, yet peacefully. "Development" is a popular word. Since 1947, many have worked diligently and successfully towards Pakistan's advancement through programs to improve agriculture, raise the quality of education and welfare services, improve nutrition and health, promote investment in industry and strengthen government administration. Advancement, however, has not been uniform; some areas have progressed

faster than others, a reflection usually of how willing the people are to change their ways of doing things.

Pakistan is a land of great variety. Just as there are sandy deserts and steaming jungles, wide plains and soaring mountains, so, too, are the people varied in speech, looks and behavior. It is remarkable that they could be joined together in one nation. Linguists have counted thirty-two different languages. Anthropologists have found five major religions and many sects and cults. There are Sindis and Baluchis, Pathans and Punjabis, Brahuis and Chitralis, Bengalis and Kashmiris. Most are Muslim, but others are Christian, Hindu, Buddhist and Zoroastrian. Not all of them give the nation of Pakistan their first loyalty. Although unity is the aim of their leaders, diversity is a fountainhead of strength as well as a source of many problems. To know something of each major group of people in Pakistan, whether it is distinguished by language, religion, or origin, is to know something about the country's dynamics.

The Bengalis

Most Pakistanis are Bengalis, inhabitants of East Pakistan. They are acutely aware that they constitute slightly more than half the population of the country. Long before there was any thought of Pakistan in the subcontinent, Bengalis had established a national awareness. Their ethnic sensitivity creates the foremost internal political problem in Pakistan.

Twenty-four out of every twenty-five Bengalis dwell in villages and rural homesteads, tied to the land by tradition, following ancient patterns of living. In arable areas their population density exceeds 1,500 people per square mile. For East Pakistan as a whole, the density is 922 per square mile, higher than the density of Japan. To exacerbate an already serious problem, many villagers are migrating to East Pakistan's few

cities, swelling the ranks of the unemployed and bloating the slums.

Bengalis are often called a "riverine" people because of the extensive river system in East Pakistan. The climate is so wet during the summer monsoons that urban Bengalis are seldom without umbrellas. Soaked by rains and swollen rivers, the land can grow abundant crops of rice, tea and jute, the fiber from which burlap is made. Homes are built of bamboo and often are so isolated by water that the boat is to a Bengali what a donkey is to a Punjabi. Boiled rice is the food staple; fish and meat are luxuries.

To their advantage, most East Pakistanis speak the same language—Bengali, an Indo-Iranian tongue of which the intellectuals are exceedingly proud. For centuries it was the language of India's most gifted poets and, despite its distinct dialects, it is a potent political symbol. Its written form derives from a fifth century script. Sharing with Urdu the designation as an official language of the country, Bengali is also spoken by some 25,000,000 people outside East Pakistan across the border in India.

Not all Bengalis are Muslims. There are also 10,000,000 caste Hindus and "untouchables," termed "Scheduled Castes." Many are landowners, proprietors of textile mills, bankers and merchants. Most "untouchables" share the extreme poverty of Muslim Bengalis. Violent antagonism between the communities—called communalism—which is based primarily on religious sensitivities, sometimes causes great concern in Pakistan and India.

One ethnic variation among East Pakistanis is the quarter of a million tribesmen who live in the Chittagong Hill Tracts along the Burmese border. Here among the forested hills live twelve different tribal groups completely unrelated racially or linguistically to the average Bengali. Primarily Buddhist, but including some Muslims, Hindus and Christians, they

follow a sedentary life as cultivators, usually of tea. Hunting is popular, but for food, not for the sport of shooting the famous Bengal tigers which still inhabit the forests. They speak variations of the Tibeto-Burman languages and have more Mongoloid features than their fellow Bengalis.

When compared as a group to West Pakistanis, Bengalis are more literate, and have a greater degree of political sophistication. Without broad traditions of a landed Muslim aristocracy, they have experience in democratic processes, although not in administration. But they are also among the poorest Pakistanis. Famine and epidemic, often the result of floods and cyclones, are frequent visitors in East Pakistan. In the crowded homesteads, villages, and towns, malaria saps the strength of the workers who, when healthy, have trouble enough providing for their usually large—and always expanding—families. While the jute grown by the farmers earns most of Pakistan's foreign exchange, they receive little for it. Their overall advancement has been slow, although there have been gains in some areas. For instance, near Comilla, home of East Pakistan's Academy for Rural Development, experiments in creating rural cooperatives and introducing modern farming techniques have been quite successful. So, too, has the work of the Water and Power Development Authority in creating projects for controlling floods, providing irrigation and generating power.

The major Bengali city in East Pakistan is Dacca, its capital and seat of the Pakistan National Assembly. It is an old and crowded city of more than half a million people located 150 miles east of Calcutta. In centuries past, Dacca was the capital of several Bengali empires. In the recent past, Dacca was only one of many small towns in this densely populated land, living on the income from jute, fruit, and rice shipped by river barge to its wharves. Nearly all industry was in Calcutta, which remained in India after 1947. Today, Dacca is

an administrative and intellectual hub with dozens of new government offices and a fast-developing university. Nearby, new jute mills provide employment. To the south, Chittagong and Chalna are thriving commercial ports. In other parts of the province Rajshahi, Bogra, Rangpur, Sylhet, Mymensingh and Comilla are developing centers of trade, education and industry. All will soon be linked by commercial helicopter service.

The Punjabis

The Punjab—"land of five rivers"—is the home of Pakistan's second largest group, the largest in West Pakistan. Not only are Punjabis more numerous—26,000,000 against a combined total of 16,000,000 in all other West Pakistani groups—but from the Punjab come most of West Pakistan's intellectual and political leaders. To the dismay of other West Pakistanis, particularly the Pathans, the Punjabis have usually controlled the provincial government from their capital of Lahore.

Before partition, the Punjab was a large province in northwestern India. While most people spoke a dialect of Punjabi, an Indo-Iranian language akin to Urdu, they were far from being united. Many were Muslims, especially in the west, while others were Sikhs, Hindus and Christians, each having distinctive traditions and beliefs. Nearly all were farmers who tilled the soil made fertile by the Ravi, Sutlej, Jhelum, Chenab and Beas rivers that flow out of the mountains to meet the Indus.

From India's earliest days, the Punjab was one of the subcontinent's richest sources of food. In the late nineteenth century, the British created there the largest irrigation system the world had ever known.

At the time of partition, the Punjab suffered great stress. West Pakistan's boundary had been drawn through the heart of the province, bisecting irrigation systems, rivers and even

villages. While most Punjabi Muslims lived west of the boundary, many also lived in non-Muslim areas to the east. At the same time, many Hindus and Sikhs lived in western Muslim areas where they were the best farmers and most skillful workers. In a frenzy of fear and anger during 1947, more than 4,500,000 Sikhs and Hindus in the west fled to the east, while approximately 6,500,000 Muslims in the east fled westward. Frequently, as their paths crossed, they fell at each others' throats. In the great cross-migration, the largest in modern times, some 11,000,000 people left their homes to settle on strange lands and to clog city slums.

The resettling of new farmers, mostly unskilled, and the accommodation of refugees in the Punjabi cities of Lahore, Sialkot and Multan were among the monumental tasks facing the new nation. The problems were complicated by continuing antagonisms with India.

Yet Pakistan's Punjabi leaders found an incidental blessing in the tragedy of migration. When people move their homes, they become more susceptible to adopting new ways of living and working. With the aid of technicians from Europe and America, Punjabis have undertaken land reform and village development programs that hold out hope for a better life.

A Punjabi's life is simple, filled with the everyday problems of raising a family, plowing the soil and reaping a harvest of cotton, grain or sugar cane. With his oxen, camel, donkey, or horse, his few sheep and goats, and perhaps a milk cow or buffalo, he earns a living that allows him few luxuries. His thatched-roofed, mud-brick home provides shelter for his animals as well as his wife, children and, if he is getting on in age, his children's children. He lives in a village of several hundred people, all of them of the same religion—usually Islam—and many of them related. To get to town, he must walk, ride on an animal or in a cart, the most common being the two-wheeled *tonga*. He must travel for many hours along

a rutted dirt road. He may be lucky enough to live near a railroad or a main highway, in which case he can, if he can afford it, ride a train or bus.

The greatest of all Punjabi cities is Lahore, a center of commerce, learning and government in northern Pakistan. With its university, newspapers, railroad terminal and romantic history, it is a more significant city to the people of West Pakistan than is Islamabad, Pakistan's new capital-under-construction 150 miles to the northwest. Lahore is an ancient capital on the Ravi River which, since partition, has become modernized with new bazaars, apartment buildings and housing developments.

The Pathans

West of the Punjabis live the Pathans, a tribally-oriented people who are second to none in their spirit of independence. They are sometimes called Paktuns, or Pashtuns, after their Indo-Iranian language, Pashto, which, however, stems from a different branch than Urdu, Bengali, and Sindi. They are the rigidly-Islamic warriors who so intrigued Rudyard Kipling. Blessed for centuries with good, if erratic, leaders, Pathans have made and unmade rulers in Afghanistan and India and, by their very aggressiveness, have become involved in international affairs. The Russians, Germans, and British have competed for Pathan allegiance in days gone by. The governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan seek their loyalty today.

The land of the Pathans is the Suleiman Mountains, a spur of the great Himalayas. Its barren peaks and fertile valleys form a major physical barrier between central Asia and the subcontinent. Across its passes—among them, the Khyber, Tochi and Gomas—invaders have repeatedly fought to gain entrance onto the lush plains of India. Control of the passes and the proud Pathans who inhabit them has been the object

of all of India's rulers. Such control remains of vital concern today.

Pathans inhabit both sides of Pakistan's northwestern border with Afghanistan. They number some 11,000,000, half of whom live in Pakistan east of what is called the Durand Line, a boundary drawn on a map by an English colonel and officially accepted by the Afghan king, in 1893. Pakistani Pathans live in two different areas. One, primarily on the plains, is controlled by the West Pakistan government. The other is mostly in the highlands along the Durand Line and is called the Tribal Area, responsibility for which resides in the central government. In most Tribal Area matters, the government defers to the wishes of the tribes. Most Pathans not living in Pakistan live in Afghanistan and include among their leaders the ruling family of King Zahir Shah.

As tribesmen, Pathans extend their loyalty beyond their immediate families to groups of related *kheyls,* family systems that comprise a tribe. Often, members of a tribe are distinguishable from those of another tribe by their dress, dialect, occupation or the area in which they live. Their tribal leader, called *khan* or *malik,* performs a role similar to that of a local governor, but the realm of his responsibility is tribal rather than geographical. Although not elected by secret ballot, the leader derives his authority from the support of his tribal followers. While some leaders acquire their position through family or tribal influence, nearly all of them base their strength on the voluntary support of their people.

The major tribal groups among Pathans are the Khattak, Yusufzai, Mohmand, Mahsud, Shinwari, Afridi, Wazir, Orakzai, Bangash and Ghilzai. The Ghilzai Pathans live primarily in Afghanistan, but, when the borders are open, thousands of them, called *powindahs,* or nomads, cross into Pakistan to graze their animals and seek work.

Pathan tribal society has its own laws, which do not always conform to the formal laws of the Pakistan government. Called *pashtunwali,* they cover both moral and criminal matters. One of the most compelling is *badal,* the law of revenge which leads to innumerable blood feuds among Pathans. *Melmastia,* protection, requires that Pathans provide asylum to anyone seeking haven from an enemy, whoever he might be. By the same token, Pathans have made hospitality to strangers almost a fetish.

According to pashtunwali, a Pathan is a man of courage whose warrior-like acts are greatly admired. In Pathan society the *jirga* interprets pashtunwali. Jirga is an assembly of elders which not only conciliates disputes, but also acts as the political representative body of the tribe.

The power of pashtunwali and the jirga over a particular Pathan is largely based upon how tribally-oriented he is. Among the more isolated Pathans in the Tribal Area, tribal laws and loyalty are strong; they accept the laws of the Pakistan government only incidentally. But to its credit, the government has in the past been remarkably sensitive to Pathan feelings and has permitted these Pathans considerable latitude in self-government. The High Court of West Pakistan is prohibited by the constitution from interfering in tribal affairs and the central government's representatives act more as ambassadors than rulers.

Among the lowland Pathans, those living in the province of West Pakistan who have entered to some degree into the mainstream of national life, tribal ties and traditions are proportionately weaker and the influence of government is stronger. Among all Pathans, however, the rifle is an important symbol of manhood and independence.

Regardless of their country of residence, many Pathans are intensely loyal to their tribe and Pathan way of life. This attitude has led some Pathans, and particularly the ruling

family of Afghanistan, to promote the growth of Pathan nationalism. The movement seeks to create an independent Pathan country, to be called Pashtunistan, which would include all of Pakistan's northwestern frontier and much of the former province of Baluchistan. The Pashtunistan movement, which has often exacerbated relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, has not been successful. One reason is that the divisions between the tribes, their own lack of unity, are more overpowering than the existence of a national consciousness. Many Pathans have pledged their loyalty to Pakistan and have been a source of strength to the new country. They have given Pakistan some of its most dynamic personalities, among them Abdul Ghaffar Khan; his brother, the late Dr. Khan Sahib; and Abdul Qayyum Khan.

The failure of the drive for Pashtunistan and the extensive, though sometimes tenuous, loyalty of Pathans to Pakistan is one of the greatest achievements of Pakistan's successive governments. Beginning with Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who immediately after partition removed "foreign" troops from the tribal areas, each government leader has generally respected the distinctiveness of the Pathans. This respect has been supplemented by considerable government subsidy. With few exceptions, Pathans have been allowed to rule themselves, even to manning thir own frontier militia and to developing their economy and social programs at their own speed and with their own talent. The result is that no other group has advanced in education, health, and general prosperity so rapidly as the Pathans.

Nowhere is their advancement more apparent than in the city of Peshawar. A trading center on the land frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan, this Pathan city has been prized for centuries as the citadel of the Khyber Pass. It is a growing city of 200,000, with new industry and a flourishing university. The Kabul River, flowing through the Peshawar

Valley, provides by its new Warsak Dam an increasingly important source of electric power for factories and water for expanding irrigation systems. Other major Pathan cities are Dera Ismail Khan, Kohat and Bannu.

The Sindis

The Sindis may well be the oldest group in Pakistan. In the heart of their land lies the dusty ruins of Mohenjo Daro, inhabited over 4,000 years ago, although the ties between these ancient people and the Sindis of today are obscure. At any rate there are few Pakistanis so primitive in their ways or so backward in their economic development.

The southern sandy shore of West Pakistan is hundreds of miles wide. On this infertile dry plain known as the Sind Desert, after the Indus River that flows through it, more than 5,000,000 villagers live a bleak and monotonous life. Here where temperatures reach 130° in the shade in summertime and raging sandstorms obliterate the brightest of days, life's most vital problem is control of the water supply, which usually derives from the irrigation systems of the great Indus River or a few wells. Beyond the irrigated reaches, the Sind becomes pure desert, one of the hottest and cruelest in the world.

Once the Sind was a thriving little empire, at least, the portions of it along the Indus River. When an Arab adventurer named Mohammed bin Qasim arrived there in 710 A.D., he found busy towns trading cotton and dyes with the rest of the world. Bin Qasim was among the first to bring Islam to the subcontinent. Later, a dynasty arose under the Talpur Mirs, who ruled the towns until the British conquered the area in 1843, in the course of a war with Afghanistan. Today, crumbling remnants of tombs and monuments attest to the prosperity of the rulers, if not of their subjects.

Sindis, who speak a distinctive Indo-Iranian language, are farmers who till lands generally belonging to city-dwelling landlords. Little of the land reform movements in the past decade have reached them. For those who have been "liberated" from landlords, the dry earth still provides only scanty crops of cotton, wheat or sugar cane.

Sindis are a hospitable, but shy people. They usually wear black clothes but brighten their garb with red turbans or sashes. They also paint elaborate and colorful designs on their furniture.

While a few Hindus live in the Sind—before partition they held considerable power there—most Sindis today are Muslims of various sects. They include in their religion a strong belief in folk spirits. Far from major currents in Pakistani life, they know little of Pakistan and even less of the efforts being made by their leaders to help them. A few have established a reputation as brigands.

The cities of Sind, such as Hyderabad, Sukkur and Larkana, live off the land around them as trading centers. And being within the irrigation system of the Indus, their inhabitants are able to grow beautiful gardens which, unfortunately for visitors, they usually surround with high mud walls.

Karachi, the largest city of Pakistan, was once primarily a Sindi city. Formerly a small port on the Arabian Sea involved mainly with exporting Sindi cotton and importing foreign goods for other Sindi cities, Karachi has become the major commercial center of the country, tied to the north by rail. Its population before partition was fewer than half a million. When Mohammed Ali Jinnah selected it as Pakistan's new capital, refugees poured into its quiet streets and government clerks crowded into its few office buildings. Today, it has approximately 2,000,000 people and, while no longer the official capital, it boasts of luxury hotels, elaborate embassies, busy wharves, fishing fleets and many new industries.

The Baluchis

To the west, toward Afghanistan and Iran, live the Baluchis, a tribal people who toil a land even less hospitable than that of their Sindi neighbors. No major river flows through Baluchistan, only seasonal creeks. Speaking a language all their own, but with the same Indo-Iranian roots as Pashto, they are divided into tribes that live not only in Pakistan but also in southern Afghanistan and Iran; the Baluchis in Pakistan number some 300,000. A proud people, they have in the recent past shown a belligerent concern for their independence. Amid the barren lowlands or pine-scrub hills, these tribesmen have for unchanging generations herded their flocks of goats and sheep, scratched patches of wheat, tended fruit trees and fought off foreign intruders. In Pakistan, they form one of the least advanced groups in terms of economic development.

Living alongside the Baluchis are some 250,000 Brahuis who speak a language affiliated with the ancient tongues of southern India, not the more recent Indo-Iranian languages of the Baluchis or Pathans. In the past these people led a nomadic life as herdsmen. They are slowly becoming integrated into the more sedentary society of the Baluchis.

Quetta is the center of trade and commerce in Baluchistan. Situated 5,490 feet above sea level, it is a cool haven for those living on the hot desert below. It was to Quetta in the heat of the summer that the British often brought—and many Pakistanis now bring—their families from Karachi. In the surrounding hills, Pakistani and foreign prospectors search for minerals that will hopefully bring prosperity to the area. On the cooler slopes above, farmers cultivate one of the world's major sources of juniper, whose berry provides the oil that gives flavor to gin. Baluchi fruits are superb.

Other Pakistanis

Another distinctive and important group in Pakistan are Christians of mixed English-Indian ancestry. They are often better educated than most Pakistanis because of the influence of foreign missionaries and British administrators. At the time of partition, they were a source of skilled manpower for Pakistan and they remain influential in many industries and in government service. One of their most prominent leaders is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, A. R. Cornelius.

One important segment of Pakistan's population is composed of descendants of Persians who fled many years ago from persecution in their homeland because of their minority religion—Zoroastrianism. Called Parsees (after their place of origin, Persia), they number fewer than 15,000. In Karachi, where most of them live, they participate actively in the commerce and industry of the country.

Although not ethnically nor religiously different, another distinctive group within Pakistan's population are the refugees or *muhajireen* who migrated from other parts of the subcontinent after the summer of 1947. While many traveled from West to East Bengal or East to West Punjab, and therefore had much in common with their Bengali or Punjabi brothers, others came from greater distances and brought with them cultural variety. Some of Pakistan's intellectual and political leaders, even some of the very founders of the nation, came from Bombay, Calcutta and New Delhi, possessing academic degrees from the world's greatest universities. Most spoke English well, but nearly all spoke Urdu, an Indo-Iranian language similar to Hindustani, but written from right to left in the Persian script. While the educated muhajireen were few among the total number—an estimated 6,000,000 to 9,000,000—they acquired a place of importance

in the early political, economic and social life of the country. Their lack of identification with any of the political areas which comprised Pakistan after 1947 permitted them to assume roles of mediators in the rivalries that emerged as Pakistan began its new life.

Essentially, then, the development of Pakistan is the process of welding together these individuals—from family, tribe, ethnic, and religious group—into a single force working toward collective betterment. While religion was the magnet which brought them together, Pakistanis have found that the differences among them run deep and unity has been difficult to achieve.

In 1947, many Europeans and Americans who were sympathetic to the Indian independence movement proclaimed loudly that the partitioning of the vast subcontinent with its great variety of people would never work. The skeptics failed to understand the depth of religious feeling among South Asian Muslims. Pakistan's leaders went doggedly forward to create a South Asian nation which Muslims could call their own.

2. *The Forces of Religion*

No single element in the lives of Pakistanis plays a more pervasive role than religion. It affects the way they work, their adjustment to hardship, the course of their government. Religion helps determine what they eat, whom they marry, what they learn in school and how they develop their society. For millions, religion is the very reason they are Pakistanis at all, rather than Indians.

Religion was responsible for the creation of Pakistan and contributed greatly to its success in remaining independent and united. Economics played a part as did the personal ambitions of some politicians. But religion lay at the heart of the Pakistan movement in the years before 1947, creating the drive and longing necessary to tear apart the popular dreams of a united Indian subcontinent.

The influence of religion might have been less had circumstances been different in the years between 1900 and 1947. Mahatma Gandhi and other Indian leaders, many of them Muslims, who sought independence from the British, were emphatic that Muslims and Hindus could live under one government. However, among the millions of farmers and urban workers religion was not a sometime thing. It closely affected their lives and proved grist for the mills of politicians. During the subcontinent's struggle for independence, the harmony that often existed between religious groups withered away. Differences loomed so large that they overpowered brotherly love, which both religions preached.

Religion was effective in creating Pakistan in two ways—one negative, the other positive. On the one hand, Muslims came to fear domination by Hindus. "Islam in Danger!" became a widening cry. On the other hand, many educated Muslims sought Pakistan in order to develop their community into what they believed a true Islamic society should be. "Pakistan an Islamic State!" also gained appeal.

The apprehension of subcontinent Muslims was based on both theological and socio-economic grounds. Among villagers religion was an emotional subject. Religious laws were to be strictly followed or at least followed as defined by the religious leaders of the villages. Threats or rumor of threats to Islam could touch sparks of anger among Muslims. Among Hindus, Muslims were always suspected of plotting to violate their Hindu mores. Each came to mistrust the other.

Among India's more educated, urban groups, religion's role was expressed more in terms of social and economic behavior than in the Muslim mosque or Hindu temple. Muslim families befriended other Muslim families. Social clubs catered to either group, seldom both. Economically, Muslims found it difficult to advance in certain kinds of business—the textile industry, banking, finance, and above all, government service. As independence drew near, Hindus felt confident of their future role as leaders of the majority. Muslims were apprehensive.

Religion thus produced the high-pitched enthusiasm which carried Pakistan into existence and kept it going when the world believed it would soon collapse. It was a bulwark to sustain a burdened people, many bereft of their homes and facing extreme poverty in the wake of floods and droughts. For all their diverse languages and cultures, Pakistan's Muslims shared a common creed that cemented them in common action.

Islam

Along with Judaism and Christianity, Islam is one of the great monotheistic religions of the world, having more than 400,000,000 adherents. Distinct from Judaism and Christianity, it nevertheless has many common beliefs which Muslims ascribe to the same single God and the same prophets, with the addition of Mohammed. Indeed, Muslims group themselves with Jews and Christians as "People of the Book," those whose beliefs are said to follow the revealed word of God and are recorded in testaments. The Muslim "bible" is the Koran.

Islam was formally established in 622 A.D. when an Arab merchant named Mohammed ibn Abdullah, after several years of declaring that he had received divine revelations, fled from his home city of Mecca to temporary haven in Medina. These messages were later compiled in the Koran. This book provides the basis of Islam, a word meaning "submission" (to the will of God). Followers of Mohammed also recorded his way of life, his deeds and ideas, which are called the *sunnah*, or Traditions. The sunnah is expounded in a vast collection of short narratives called the *hadith*, which supplement the Koran in providing guidance to Muslims.

To the many-sected Christians, and Jews and pagans of Arabia in Mohammed's day, his simple messages, coupled with political events, had considerable appeal. Mohammed's following grew and within a few years, thousands had affirmed their belief in the new religion. Supported by militant tribesmen seeking new lands, Muslim Arabs quickly extended their influence beyond the Arabian peninsula. They soon ruled from central Asia to Spain. Today, they live in many lands from the Philippines to West Africa. Pakistan is second to Indonesia as the largest Muslim nation—85,000,000, or 88 per cent of the population.

The actual tenets of Islam are few, although interpretation

is endless. Muslims believe that there is only one indivisible God who is immutable and omnipotent, vengeful yet compassionate. Mohammed was an ordinary mortal through whom God (Allah) presented to erring man the scriptures through which he could gain immortality in Paradise. Orthodox Muslims believe that while God had previously revealed "the way," the scriptures as revealed through Mohammed are the truest of all—and the last. Indeed, to be a Muslim a person need only say—and believe—the *shahadah,* the profession of faith:

"There is no God but God, Mohammed is the Apostle (or Messenger) of God."

Islam proclaims the doctrine of the Last Judgment, Grace, the existence of Angels and the Devil, and the truths of prophets, the most important of whom, next to Mohammed, are Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses and Jesus. Muslims accept the Virgin Birth and the Immaculate Conception of Jesus, but not the concept of Christ's divinity.

Islam encourages its believers to have a sense of membership in a vast community of Muslims, all equal in the eyes of God. In the mosque everyone prays together; in the courts, all receive equal justice. No man has more religious authority than another. Each is free to develop his own character. Many orthodox Muslims go farther and believe that the community of Muslims is divinely inspired and that all actions within it are determined by the laws of Islam—called *shari'a.* All aspects of community life are as much a part of religion as praying in a mosque. The community is a religious community seven days a week and the Koran provides instructions for proper living. Some are personal laws, others apply to the community as a whole. Through Mohammed, God provided directions for business, for relations between man and wife, for government and for worship. To suggest that a court of

law can be non-religious in theory is to suggest that a mosque is a secular institution.

Upon this sense of brotherhood and Islamic interpretation, Muslims in pre-partition India were able to develop and justify the existence of "a second nation" within the country. Among the leaders of Pakistan, many educated in secular British universities and trained in English law, the problem of reconciling classical Muslim philosophy with twentieth-century liberalism in government has been one of major proportions. As of 1964, the influence of modern secularism has been greater in Pakistan's government than Islamic orthodoxy.

To most Pakistani Muslims, however, religious practices and the demonstration of faith are of more concern than theological doctrine. These practices are described in the Koran and, with some minor variations, are consistent throughout the Muslim world.

The most common—and important—duties of a Muslim are those called "the five pillars of the faith." The first requires recitation of the shahadah, followed by prayer, fasting, almsgiving and a *hadj* (pilgrimage) to Mecca, the holiest of cities for orthdox Muslims.

A devout Muslim prays five times daily, always facing Mecca, with each prayer performed in a prescribed way from various standing, bowing, kneeling and prostrate positions. It is a simple, quiet, unaccompanied ceremony, the only sound often being the muffled chant of the *imam* who leads the prayers. Following prayers on Friday, the holy day of the week, a religious leader will usually preach a sermon. Most prayers are verses from the Koran, spoken in Arabic which many Pakistanis do not understand. It is preferable for Muslims to pray in congregation to emphasize the community nature of the religion.

Muslims fast during the month of Ramazan (or Ramadan), the ninth month in the Muslim calendar which, being based

on lunar months of less than thirty days, comes at varying seasons of the year. The fasting period is from sunrise to sunset during which neither food nor drink may enter the faster's mouth. During hot days, when Ramazan occurs in the summer, tempers tend to grow short among the fasters. In some countries, especially Tunisia and Turkey, political leaders have supported moderation in the fast because of the decreased efficiency of the population. But in Pakistan, nearly all Muslims observe the fast.

The Koran requires each Muslim to show charity. *Zakat*—giving away part of one's possessions each year—has in the past been a religious substitute in Muslim countries for the income tax, and in Pakistan some leaders still advocate it as a basis for the country's fiscal system. When he gives zakat, the remainder of a man's possessions become *pak* or purified.

Not everyone is expected to make the hadj to Mecca, but the person who does acquires Grace as well as prestige. He is entitled to prefix his name with "hadji." It is not unusual for a Pakistani to dye his hair and beard red following a hadj.

There are other practices in Islam which play or have played in recent years, an important role in a Pakistani Muslim's life. Among these is *jihad,* meaning "exertion," which has been understood at times to mean holy war against nonbelievers. Many Muslims called for jihad against India to free the state of Kashmir from Indian control. The most frequent use today of jihad is to demonstrate a continuing effort to propagate the faith.

The dietary practices of Muslims are a combination of tradition and Koranic law. Pork is shunned and the Koran several times mentions the evils of drinking alcohol.

The Koran prohibits *riba,* or usury, the taking of interest on money loans. This injunction has been a problem to Muslim society in the modern business world, and in pre-partition

India, most of the moneylending was handled by Hindus and, in urban areas, foreigners. Although Muslims have been moneylenders, particularly the Pathans, most have been so away from their home districts. When Pakistan came into existence, few Muslims were trained in banking. While Pakistan's constitution calls for the elimination of riba, few Pakistanis know just how this can be done.

What the Jews and Christians consider God's commandment to Moses regarding monotheism and idolatry applies equally for Muslims. Many orthodox Muslims believe that representation of humans in any way, such as in statues or paintings, violates this injunction. They are especially sensitive when paintings or films depict Mohammed.

Throughout their history, Muslim artists have generally confined their skills to design and they adorn buildings and religious paraphernalia with elaborate Arabic and Persian script. Artists who paint the human figure—and many do in Pakistan as a result of Persian and Moghul influence—must go against orthodox tradition.

Islam has developed rules in regard to women which reflect the traditional view of their responsibilities within the family. While theoretically equal to men, they play a subordinate role which limits their opportunities to participate in modern society outside the home.

Initially, Islam was a boon to women. Before Mohammed, polygamy was uncontrolled, wives had no inheritance rights nor protection from divorce. Islam limited a husband to four wives provided he could treat them equally, gave daughters half the inheritance rights of sons, and required husbands to divorce their wives in front of a witness. In Pakistan today, polygamy is diminishing, women have increasing inheritance rights and wives have more protection in divorce, but the changes in recent years have benefited relatively few.

The practice of *purdah,* the seclusion of women, is widespread in Pakistan. To a great extent, it is a cultural manifestation, not religious, although the Koran prescribes modesty. Veiling of women is commonplace and it is a usual sight to see women walking the streets draped from head to toe in a white or black tent-like *burqa,* looking much like a large inverted badminton shuttlecock. Many of these women will go through life without ever showing their faces to anyone outside their family. Village women do not veil themselves so much as city women and poorer women veil themselves less than the wealthy.

While Muslims of all societies accept certain basic dogma of Islam and share a common belief, the degree to which any Muslim observes the letter of orthodox theology depends upon many circumstances and to this extent, there is little difference between Muslims and non-Muslims throughout the world. "Unorthodox" practices abound in Pakistan, particularly among illiterate Muslims who have lived intimately among Hindus, as in Sind and East Pakistan. To those who believe them, these adulterations are as much "religion" as the written word of the Koran. Some of the unorthodoxies among Pakistani Muslims also derive from the Hinduism of their converted forebears.

A folk belief prevalent in Pakistan—and not uncommon elsewhere—is the existence of an "evil eye" which, when focused on an individual, can bring harm. This "eye" may be any place, but it is often associated with strangers, especially if they are carrying cameras. To ward off the effects of the "evil eye," charms of all sorts are available. It is common to see donkeys, camels and even automobiles and trucks decorated with blue pendants to protect the owner's means of transportation. Infants wear amulets, frequently containing words from the Koran, around their necks to assure safe passage through childhood.

Muslim Leadership

Islam is essentially an equalitarian religion in which all members of the faith are equal in rights, privileges and authority. It has no organized church and no formal hierarchy of priests. Because each Muslim is responsible individually to God, Islam does not provide for either saints or earthly representatives. Yet the worship of Muslim saints flourishes in Pakistan.

Certain individuals in Muslim society do exert varying degrees of religious leadership. They acquire this through study and knowledge of Islam or through experience in religious matters. In some countries, such as Afghanistan, they are appointed by the government. In villages, some men ordain themselves as religious leaders and obtain acknowledgement from villagers through their piety. Frequently, a man (rarely a woman) acquires religious authority by inheritance, following his father's footsteps.

The most common religious leader in Pakistan is the *mullah*. He may have a small following, as in a village, or a large following in a city. Generally, he is associated with a particular mosque in which he preaches and otherwise ministers to his flock, assisting in births, weddings, funerals and other celebrations in which a religious connotation is desired. Mullahs usually need another job in order to live.

A Pakistani who is quite learned in religion acquires the title of *maulana* or *maulvi*. Scholars and judges of Islamic law, they form a *ulema* to consider religious questions. The ulema, with its collective learning and experience, has come to speak for the community on religious—and sometimes secular—affairs. A conservative group, it has acted as a brake on Pakistan's social and political reformers.

Two functional titles common in Pakistan are *imam* and *muezzin*. The imam, as used here, is the individual who pre-

sides over prayers in the mosque. He may be anyone of the congregation, but more often he is the local mullah or, if the ceremony is important, a visiting maulana or maulvi. He is usually paid by his congregation or by income from property owned by the mosque which has been given to it by a benefactor. The muezzin is another paid employee of the mosque who calls the faithful to prayer five times a day from one of the minarets of the mosque. A *khatib,* another functionary, is a man who reads—or more accurately, chants—from the Koran in the mosque.

Another group of religious figures in Pakistan are the *pirs,* unorthodox Muslims who acquire a close personal following among villagers and tribesmen. On his death, a pir is often revered as a saint and his tomb becomes an attraction to pilgrims. A pir need not have formal religious training, but he displays great devotion and knowledge of mystical experiences which he shares with his followers. Most pirs perform nothing other than religious duties, for which their followers reward them. Bengalis tend to ascribe superhuman powers to most of their historical warriors, called *ghazi,* and use the terms pir and ghazi interchangeably.

A particularly effective and personal mullah can be venerated as a pir upon his death. A lower-grade pir with less religious endowment is sometimes called a *fakir.* Other terms for pirs are *ghau* and *wali.*

In recent times, it is not uncommon for a pir or fakir with a large following to engage in politics. One such was the late Fakir of Ipi, a Pathan who was active in starting the Pashtunistan movement. Another was the Pir of Manki Sherif who encouraged Pathans to support Pakistan in 1947. Pirship may be inherited as well as earned, a practice common in the former Sind province where, among many pirs, the Pir Pigaro of the Hurs is the most famous. To many, he is a living saint.

Other Muslims may acquire respect and influence by being descended from Mohammed. They prefix their names with *sayyid*.

Muslim Sects

As in other religions, Islam has schisms. Some are small in the total picture; others are important and vitally affect life in Pakistan. Most divisions began in politics.

Mohammed had been dead only a few years before quarrels erupted over who was to succeed him as leader of the faithful. Some said that the caliph, or successor, should be selected by Mohammed's tribe, the Qureysh, and then approved by the entire community. This group predominated and have come to be known as Sunnites, those who follow the sunnah, the traditions of the Prophet.

Others felt that leadership was hereditary and that only Ali, Mohammed's cousin and son-in-law, was the true caliph. Those who supported this position were called "partisans of Ali" or Shi'at Ali, later simply called Shi'ites.

Three-fourths of the world's Muslims today are Sunnites. In Pakistan, they comprise more than 90 per cent of the Muslim community and are usually considered the "orthodox" Muslims, although within the community there are all kinds of religious opinion ranging from conservative to liberal. Shi'ites, themselves divided, comprise most of the rest, but not all.

The existence of a large religious minority Muslim group has not made unification of Pakistan any simpler. Shi'ites, although observing many of the same tenets and practices as Sunnites, reject the orthodox sunnah, have different traditions and ceremonies and feel themselves a distinct group. They have more than once felt the ire of Sunnites because of their differences.

Shi'ites, who are a large majority of Iran's population, be-

lieve that Ali was the true successor to Mohammed. Most Pakistani Shi'ites also believe Ali was the first of twelve succeeding Imams, spiritual leaders considered to have divine authority. The twelfth Imam disappeared as a young man and the faithful believe he will return as a *mahdi,* or messiah. Most Shi'ites are also called "Twelvers" to distinguish them from others who do not recognize all twelve Imams.

Shi'ism is a more passionate expression of Islam than is orthodox Sunnism. Some scholars say this results from the quantity of martyrs within the history of the sect, which in the past has suffered the discrimination of any religious minority. Foremost among their martyrs was Hussein, Ali's son, who was killed in 680 at Karbala (in present-day Iraq) by the troops of the Sunni caliph, Yazid.

Another Muslim minority is also Shi'ite, but its followers disagree over the identity of the seventh Imam. Called "Seveners," they are also known as Ismailis. They have recognized a succession of Imams down through history, and today the Imam is known to the world as the Aga Khan. The Ismailis of Pakistan—as in other countries—are well organized and relatively more educated and prosperous. They are adept at caring for their own people, seeing that schools are available for Ismaili children and that welfare institutions minister to the community's poor.

While a minority religion, Shi'ism has given Pakistan many of its leaders, although they have not been identified very strongly with religion. Among them are Pakistan's founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, former President Iskander Mirza and a former Prime Minister, the late Ismail I. Chundrigar.

The Ahmadiyas are a third Muslim minority and the subject of considerable controversy. They number about 200,000, but weigh more in terms of influence. Founded in 1901 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908), a wealthy Muslim from the village of Qadian in the Punjab, Ahmadiyism is an at-

tempt to "purify" existing beliefs and practices. Ahmad claimed to have had revelations and declared himself a prophet, although some of his followers did not accept his prophethood, which they felt was contrary to the teachings of Islam.

Ahmadiyas have revived a missionary spirit among Muslims and their proselytizing has spread into Africa and Asia where they preach orthodox Islam with a touch of mysticism, asceticism and modern liberalism. In Pakistan they, like the Ismailis, have become a close-knit community with their own schools and welfare institutions. Better educated than most groups, they have acquired positions of importance in the government, a circumstance that fed the fires of riot in Pakistan's early days. One of their prominent leaders is Mohammed Zafrulla Khan, a former foreign minister, ambassador, and, in 1964, a justice of the International Court of Justice.

Through all Muslim groups in Pakistan, regardless of sect, there runs a thread of mysticism that lends a warm, and often poetic element to what is otherwise a fairly unemotional religion. Called *sufism,* it is an inspirational approach to knowledge of God and is widespread in Iraq and Iran. Those influenced by sufism feel that the individual is able to reach a personal communion with God through meditation, physical exertion in a frantic sort of way (for example, in what Westerners call "whirling dervishes"), pious asceticism, recitation of poetry, or chanting of music.

Religious fraternities have grown up in the Muslim world that have usually developed from the leadership of a particularly saintly sufi. Each order has its own litany and ceremony designed to assist the communicant to reach a mystical state. In Pakistan, the four major fraternities are called Chishtiya, Suhrawardia, Qadiriya and Naaqshbandiya. Some scholars estimate that more than half of Pakistan's Muslims, especially in East Pakistan, are influenced to some degree by

sufism. Most of Pakistan's pirs are sufi, while many outstanding poets and musicians have attributed their inspiration to sufism.

Over the centuries, Sunni scholars have tried to codify the laws of the Koran and sunnah. Four major schools of law exist today, each named after its founder: The Hanafite, Hanbalite, Shafi'ite and Malekite. They are all agreed that the four principle sources of law are the Koran, the sunnah, the consensus of the community (*ijma*) and analytical deduction of the intent of the principle sources. They differ only in the degree of emphasis given to each course. In Pakistan, the Hanafite school predominates. Founded in the eighth century by Abu Hanafah, it places major emphasis on deduction of intent rather than on the literal instructions of the primary sources. Consequently, the development of shari'a law in the subcontinent has been accompanied by considerable debate over what is and is not proper Muslim behavior.

In the first ten years of Pakistan's existence, lives were lost and blood was spilled in the streets of Lahore and Karachi in the dramatic search for an "Islamic constitution." To conservative Sunnites, their shari'a was the only law and those who did not accept it were heretics. In the resulting short-lived constitution of 1956, Pakistan was declared an "Islamic Republic" based on the Koran and orthodox sunnah.

In promulgating a new constitution in 1962, President Ayub dropped the "Islamic" designation of the republic and tried to avoid making decisions in regard to shari'a. The constitution did not mention the sunnah at all, instead calling the "way" of Islam the "Islamiat." But the religious forces were too great and in the first amendment to the constitution, passed by the parliament—and approved by the President—in December, 1963, Pakistan once again became an "Islamic Republic."

According to the 1962 constitution, Pakistan is a "demo-

cratic state based on Islamic principles of social justice." These are generalized as follows: All citizens are equal before the law and may freely express their opinions, associate peacefully, move about the country, acquire property, follow any vocation and practice any religion. They may not engage in slavery or forced labor.

Certain other features of the constitution reflect shari'a. The head of the state must be a Muslim and religious instruction should be compulsory for Muslim children. Riba, usury, should be eliminated and the use of alcoholic beverages discouraged. Above all, no law should be passed that is "repugnant to Islam."

To guide Pakistan's government on Islamic affairs, the constitution establishes an Advisory Council on Islamic Theology consisting of leading theologians and lawyers appointed by the President. It is this council which is intended to suggest how Muslims may live in accordance with Islamic concepts and to decide which laws passed by the National Assembly violate Muslim principles.

The constitution also recognizes the Islamic Research Institute, an organization established by prominent Islamic scholars to study problems of constructing a Muslim society.

The formalities of the constitution in regard to Islam primarily concern the lawyers, students of religion and mullahs. They have little effect upon the lives of Pakistan's ordinary Muslim citizens, who follow the rules of custom and tradition as developed within a Muslim society.

Ceremonies

Muslim ceremonies are important in Pakistan. They occur in accordance with the twelve-month Muslim calendar which is based on the cycles of the moon. While Pakistan's official calendar is Gregorian, as in the West, villagers and religious celebrants live by the Muslim calendar.

In their frequency, Muslim ceremonies demonstrate the proximity of religion in everyday life of Pakistanis. In the intensity with which they are observed, they demonstrate the depth of religion in the ordinary person. Among them all, Pakistanis enjoy the ceremonies as the only recesses in what is normally a colorless, monotonous life.

For most, the observance of Ramazan, the holy month of fasting, is the major "ceremony" of the year, although many city Muslims observe the fast more through token abstinence. Two weeks before Ramazan, villagers celebrate the Shab-i-Barat, during which God is supposed to fix the destinies of all for the coming year.

The most joyous holiday is Id-ul-Fitr, the end of Ramazan. On this day, new clothing appears on even the poorest backs, friends exchange gifts and food is served in amounts far in excess of what the host can afford. It is a day when friends embrace and dance in the streets. At noon, nearly everyone goes to the mosque for a ceremonial prayer.

Perhaps the most important ceremony in the religious sense is the observance of Id-ul-Zuah, also called Bakr-al-Id, which celebrates Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son, Isaac. Those who can afford it sacrifice an animal, usually a goat or a calf, by cutting its throat. One-third of the animal goes to charity; the rest is prepared for the year's major banquet. Id-ul-Zuah takes place on the tenth day of Zulhijjah, the twelfth month.

Id-i-Milad celebrates the birth of the Prophet Mohammed and occurs on the twelfth day of Rabi al-Awwal, the third month. The day is marked with special prayers and a feast.

The first day of the year, the first of Muharrum, is celebrated by all Muslims, usually with a feast and a vacation. For Shi'ites, it marks the beginning of ten days of mourning over the martyrdom of Hussein and his brother, Hassan. The Sunni caliph, Yazid, is hanged in effigy. The ceremony ends

with a procession of mourners who dance with increasing frenzy, often drawing blood from their bodies with swords brandished in symbolic gestures. Feeling between Sunnites and Shi'ites is frequently tense and rioting is not uncommon. In 1963, more than 100 people were killed in Muharrum riots.

Hinduism

There are an estimated 10,500,000 Hindus in Pakistan, most of whom are called caste Hindus, although many are "untouchables," designated as Scheduled Castes. About 95 per cent of them live in East Pakistan. The rest live mainly in Sind and Kalat, where one Hindu group numbers 18,000. To the extent that Hinduism allows generalizations, East Pakistani Hindus follow the same religion as Indian Hindus, particularly those living in West Bengal.

To Hindus, the Sanskrit equivalent of the word "religion" is *dharma,* meaning "duty" or "law." Simultaneously, it is a theology, a philosophy, a way of life. It exerts far more influence over the daily lives of ordinary Hindus than Islam over most Muslims or Christianity over most Christians.

Unlike Islam or Christianity, Hinduism has no single source of theology. It has no fixed creed or dogma. In fact, scholars say that Hinduism is composed of as many religions as there are people professing Hinduism. It has no founder, as in Islam or Christianity, and its beginnings are lost in time.

Hinduism developed after central Asian tribes, today called Aryans, settled in the subcontinent over 2,000 years before Christ. They left written records, called the *Vedas,* which show how ancient Aryan cults incorporated indigenous beliefs. As time passed, other literature, much of it mythological and symbolic, added to the content of the religion. The *Upanishads,* a collection of philosophical treatises, were written toward the end of the Vedic period (ca. 1400 B.C.). The years to about 800 B.C. form the "Epic Age" during which

Hinduism's great epic poems, the *Ramayana* (The Book of Rama) and the *Mahabharata* (Great India), with its beloved poem, the "Bhagavad-Gita" (Song of God), were produced. A combination of history and legend, like most of the early Greek and Biblical literature, they tell of an ancient kingdom —called Bharata—whose heroes and villains are today part of the family of Hindu gods. Rama, the hero of the *Ramayana* and ruler of Bharata, and Krishna of the *Bhagavad-Gita,* are considered by most Hindus to be *avatars,* incarnations, of Vishnu, one of the Hindu trinity. While there are no beliefs which are essential to Hinduism, most Hindus venerate this literature and take guidance from it. Many pious Hindus pray for the return of the golden age of *Ram Raj,* the Rule of Rama. Pakistani Muslims often derisively called modern India "Bharat."

At a philosophical level, many Hindus recognize God as the only reality. The visible universe is all *maya,* an illusion, a projection of the mind. As there is spirituality, then, in everything, it follows that man has a dual nature; an outer, visible self and a divine soul or inner self, called *atman.* To many Hindus, man's highest aim is *moksha,* the mystical union with God when man becomes aware of true reality, sheds his outer self and is free from mundane existence. Buddhists call this union *nirvana.*

The individual Hindu is free to decide for himself what kind of God he worships and with whom he seeks moksha. Many educated Hindus see God as one Supreme Reality, an impersonal spirit, called *Brahman.* Others view Him as a personal God. Others recognize no god at all. To most Hindus, the villagers, there are many personal gods, each with different realms of responsibility.

The principal gods are the triple manifestation of Brahman, which appears primarily as Brahma, the Creator; Vishnu, the Preserver and Shiva, the Destroyer. Shiva, one of the most re-

vered gods, is also worshipped as the god of asceticism, fertility and death. The lives of the many gods and their multiple personalities are the subjects for most Hindu folk ballads and contribute richly to the color and imagination of Hindu art forms.

Idols abound in Hindu temples and homes, and worshippers make obeisance and sacrifice before them. To the modern intellectual, idols are the symbolic conception of the images of God. Many village Hindus take the idols for the deities themselves. In contrast to Muslim worship which is congregational, Hindus generally worship individually or in family units, a practice which reflects the individual rather than the community emphasis of the religion.

Shaktas and Vaishnavas are prominent Hindu sects in East Pakistan. The former worship Shiva and the goddess, Shakti, who is also personified as Kali and Durga. The latter worship Krishna, the incarnation of Vishnu, and his consort, Radha. Kali is represented as an angry dancer symbolizing the destructive forces of nature and the destroyer of evil. Durga is presented as a multi-armed goddess slaying a buffalo demon with one hand and bestowing blessing, hope, plenty and protection with the others. Among Vaishnavas, the longing of Radha for union with Krishna and the drama of their love-making symbolizes the relation which every believer should have with the Supreme Deity, Vishnu. Around this love affair Bengali poets and singers have created a large body of literature, much of it erotic. Students of Islamic theology also believe that the Hindu tradition of mystical Vaishnavism influenced the development of sufism in Bengal.

There are several ways to achieve moksha, but the most common are those outlined in the philosophy of *yoga*. Union with God may be achieved through knowledge (*jnana yoga*), love and devotion (*bhakti yoga*), physical discipline of one's body (*hatha yoga*), action or deeds (*karma yoga*) and the best,

a combination of the others in their advanced stages propelled by concentrated will (*raja yoga*). The various forms of yoga are major values and ideals of human conduct which guide Hindus.

The stages along the paths to moksha are the repeated lives a person lives in the process of birth and re-birth. Man, according to the theory of reincarnation commonly accepted by Hindus, is reborn to a higher and better existence if he lives his life properly; if he lives improperly, he is re-born into a lower existence. The right-living man will eventually achieve moksha and freedom from this miserable life. What is proper living? Yoga provides the answer to many people. For millions, it means especially *karma,* acting righteously and fulfilling one's dharma as prescribed by the caste system.

One of the most common elements in the Hindu way of life is the division of society into many castes. The more modernized Hindu philosophers see caste as a purely social manifestation growing out of a past in which occupational distinctions developed into higher and lower social orders. For the millions of uneducated Hindus, the rationale of the caste system is the joint doctrine of karma and reincarnation.

The roots of the caste system lie deep in history, dating from the Aryan invasions of the subcontinent. Originally disdainful of the natives, the Aryans did not intermarry nor mix socially with them. Although intermingling occurred eventually, distinctions continued, supported by the divisions of labor. Society was divided into four major groups: the *Brahmins,* or priests and teachers; the *Kshatriyas,* or rulers and warriors; the *Vaisyas,* or tradesmen; and *Sudras,* the farmers and laborers. These divisions—called *varna,* meaning "color" in Sanskrit—became, in time, infinitely sub-divided, hereditary and, within Hinduism, endowed with religious sanctity. They became the castes into which Hindus are born today.

Many village Hindus believe that an infant at birth is

entering his caste either as a reward or penalty for his actions in previous life. He must live, marry and die within his caste and perform the duties ascribed by tradition to members of that caste. Each caste has rules about acceptance of food and water from lower castes, conventions of speech and deportment toward other castes and, above all, shunning the "untouchables." Some Hindus are believed to have led such unrighteous lives that they are at the bottom of the caste hierarchy. Mahatma Gandhi called these "untouchables," so numerous in East Pakistan, *harijan,* "Children of God." It was the existence of so many lower and non-caste Hindus in Bengal centuries ago and the prolonged period of Muslim rule there that permitted Islam, which offered equal opportunity to all the faithful, to gain so many converts in Bengal.

The many areas of variance between Hinduism and Islam helped in the development of Muslim society in the subcontinent and created many of the fears and antagonisms that led to the making of Pakistan. The caste system is the most obvious tradition distinguishing Hinduism from Islam. While Hinduism places an individual in a better or worse relationship to others at birth, Islam decrees equality. While one permits the worshipping of idols, the other abhors it. While Hinduism is what each worshipper generally wishes it to be, Islam is dogmatic in what a Muslim must be. Hinduism is intellectually and religiously tolerant; Islam allows little room for compromise. Most Hindus do not accept a single, revealed source of religion; Muslims are "People of the Book."

On a personal level, many Hindus revere all kinds of life and do not eat meat of any kind; Muslims have fewer restrictions. Hindus accompany their devotions with music and ritual; Muslims worship in comparative quiet. Each of the differences, while not prohibiting close and amicable relationships between Hindus and Muslims, is nevertheless a potential point of intellectual or physical friction.

Ceremonies

The celebrations of Hinduism are colorful, religiously oriented and often excited. The major *puja,* or festival, in East Pakistan is in the autumn and commemorates Durga's slaying of the buffalo demon and her joyous visit to her father's house. One of Durga's daughters is Lakshmi, the goddess of wealth and prosperity. Shortly after the homage to Durga, Hindus celebrate Lakshmi Puja.

A third festival comes twenty days after Durga Puja and is dedicated to Kali. It is a festival of lights when every house is illuminated and men carry torches to the water in remembrance of the dead.

In January, Hindus, especially students, celebrate Saraswati Puja in honor of the goddess of learning. Her image appears in almost all Hindu schools in East Pakistan.

Another festival celebrates the coming of spring and is dedicated to Vishnu, Krishna (sometimes called Narayan) and Radha. Steeped in fertility rites, the festival is called Holi (or Dol Yatra) and is a time of gaiety, when celebrants throw colored water and powder over everyone in sight.

In summer, Bengali Hindus pay homage through fairs and festivals to the Car of Jagannath, the Lord of the World. Its most famous centers are Dhamrai, a village near Dacca, and Comilla.

The Hindus of East Pakistan are represented in political life by the Pakistan National Congress, a surviving remnant of the All-India National Congress of pre-partition days and which now is the leading political party of India. The Scheduled Castes Federation represents the non-caste Hindus. East Pakistani Hindus have special government-supported schools and cultural organizations, foremost of which is the Varendra Research Society and the Rama Krishna Mission, founded by followers of a nineteenth century saint. Among prominent

Hindu leaders are Mrs. Neli Sengupta, Dhirendranath Dutta, and Shrischandra Chatterji.

The 1962 constitution of Pakistan states as a "principle of policy" that "steps should be taken to bring on terms of equality with other persons, the members of under-privileged castes, races, tribes and groups. . . ." Hindu leaders express hope that President Ayub will be able to carry out this policy because in 1964 the vast majority of Hindus in Pakistan are among the poorest and least socially advanced of all Pakistanis.

Buddhism

There are approximately 400,000 Buddhists in Pakistan, nearly all of whom live in the vicinity of Chittagong. Many are tribesmen who have intermixed the Buddhist religion with varying degrees of animist cults and folk superstitions.

Buddhism was once the dominant religion of the subcontinent, but its influence waned after the fourth century A.D. It is the major religion in many Asian countries, including Burma and Ceylon.

Buddhism grew out of a protest in the fifth century B.C. by a reformer named Gautama Siddhartha (ca. 563–483 B.C.) who objected to the rigid controls of the Brahmin Hindu priests. Buddha, "The Enlightened One" as his later followers called him, did not criticize the religion itself so much as the way it was practiced.

In his boyhood, Gautama was distressed by the suffering of mankind. He left his princely home, his young wife and baby son to find a solution for overcoming these sufferings. After meditating nine years, he discovered that through renunciation of all desires one could achieve nirvana while still in this life. Transmigration, the travel of the soul from stage to stage (not necessarily through re-birth), can bring a person to the point of identification with the Cosmos. Buddha did not

preach any god or gospel, but spoke against artificial ceremonies, rituals and idol worship for one's progress.

Popular Buddhism in Bengal has come to include a galaxy of gods. The Buddhist shrine is the center of village life. The most devout Buddhists become monks in the many monasteries around Chittagong.

Buddhist festivals generally commemorate different episodes in Buddha's life. The most important is Baisakhi Purnima, in late spring, which celebrates the Buddha's birth and his attainment of nirvana. The festival coincides with a great Buddhist fair, held near Chittagong, when Buddhists from all parts of Pakistan assemble to pay homage to Buddha.

Christianity

Nearly a million Pakistanis are Christians who live in both provinces, but chiefly in the Punjab. They are about evenly divided between Roman Catholics and Protestants.

Christianity first came to South Asia with the Apostle St. Thomas, who is said to have preached in southern India. Roman Catholicism was permanently established in Goa in the sixteenth century when the Portuguese founded colonies there. Other Portuguese missionaries settled in Chittagong, Dacca, and Karachi. The leading Roman Catholic today is Valerian Cardinal Gracias, a native of Karachi who lives in India. Most other Roman Catholic clergy are foreigners.

The first Protestant sects arrived with the British in the seventeenth century. In Bengal the Baptist Mission, active since 1801, the Oxford Missions and others have worked successfully among low caste Hindus and among tribal peoples in Mymensingh and Sylhet districts. In West Pakistan, the Seventh Day Adventists and Presbyterians are strong. The Punjab has been particularly important to the American Presbyterian Mission, established in 1834. Forman Christian College in Lahore is one of the subcontinent's outstanding

educational institutions, while the Seventh Day Adventist Hospital in Karachi provides one of the few centers in Pakistan for modern American medicine.

Foreign Christian missionaries, whom Pakistanis associate with the Western non-communist world, have been allowed to teach in their own schools and to practice medicine, but periodic waves of Muslim emotion have sometimes curtailed their activities. In May, 1962, more than 200 Muslim students of Forman Christian College demonstrated against alleged interference by college authorities in their religious activities, accusing them of having an anti-Muslim bias. Such demonstrations occur every few years.

Religion and Government

In their constitution, Pakistanis have included a declaration of religious freedom. The constitution states:

"No law should (a) prevent the members of a religious community or denomination from professing, practicing or propagating, or from providing instruction in, their religion, or from conducting institutions for the purpose of or in connection with their religion; (b) require any person to receive religious instruction, or to attend a religious ceremony or religious worship, relating to a religion other than his own; (c) impose on any person a tax the proceeds of which are to be applied for the purpose of a religion other than his own; (d) discriminate between religious institutions in the granting of exemptions or concessions in relation to any tax; or (e) authorize the expenditure of public moneys for the benefit of a particular religious community or denomination except moneys raised for that purpose."

The constitution attacks "untouchability" in any form. It further states that "the legitimate rights and interests of the minorities should be safeguarded, and the members of minor-

ities should be given due opportunity to enter the service of Pakistan."

Religious prejudice does exist in Pakistan, as it does in every country. Discrimination can also be found, particularly against Hindus, perhaps the most economically depressed group in the country. The tensions of partition in 1947 are still alive, whetted periodically by the undulating relations between Pakistan and India, especially over Kashmir. Both India and Pakistan accuse each other of permitting communal riots. In May, 1962, Muslim refugees from West Bengal reported more than 1,000 deaths in Malda. In early 1964, riots occurred in Kashmir over the theft of a religious relic from a Muslim mosque. In East Pakistan, infuriated Muslims attacked and killed many Hindus. In retaliation, Hindus in India began killing Muslims.

Yet the official policies of both India and Pakistan are clearly opposed to religious discrimination. How these policies affect the daily lives of Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and Christians, however, depends upon the people themselves.

Except among the few educated people, religion in Pakistan is a mixture of folk superstition and formal principles. In the manner of many societies of poor, illiterate villagers, religion is a means of adjustment to nature, which, in their ignorance, they see as largely uncontrollable. Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism in Pakistan reflect the circumstances of a man's life. A poverty-stricken Hindu or Buddhist must find hope for release from his misery—hence, he is prone to believe in reincarnation. In the next life, things will not be so miserable. To a poor Muslim or Christian, release is found in the hope of immortality, in Heaven. While a Muslim may blame fate (*Kizmet*) for a crop-destroying flood, a Hindu will blame the anger of a particular god. Both resist the notion that man himself can change fate or a god's revenge. To the educated government worker, seeking to mobi-

lize village initiative in development schemes such as flood control dams, the folk beliefs of both Hindus and Muslims mitigate against him. Man-made change violates the sanctity of nature and threatens the very religion by which the villager explains nature.

The development of Pakistan in achieving political stability and economic well-being depends largely on how its leaders utilize the ethical and moral teachings of religion as a guide to public policy, yet overcome the inertia which religion places so firmly in the path of the country's progress.

3. *The Distant Beginning*

The people of Pakistan came to identify themselves as Pakistanis only shortly before, and in some cases, only after partition in 1947. Yet many can trace their ancestry back hundreds of years while scholars are able to surmise that their cultural and ethnic origins pre-date 2000 B.C. Politically new, Pakistan is culturally very old.

The immediate ancestors of those South Asians who were to become involved in the creation of Pakistan were, with exceptions, settled in their pre-partition homes, adherents of Islam, Hinduism or Sikhism, and speaking their present-day languages by 1858, the year the British government formally established its rule over India. Where these ancestors came from, how they got there and how they acquired their religions and languages is a story not yet completely written. But the bits that can be pieced together indicate that no story could be more colorful, fascinating, or vital to understanding Pakistan.

Only in recent decades have scholars tried systematically to understand the origins of South Asians. With outstanding exceptions, these historians have been Europeans and Americans. South Asian scholars themselves have generally devoted their intellectual energy toward other subjects, particularly politics and philosophy.

To a large extent, the dearth of knowledge of South Asia's past is the fault of that very element which distinguishes the people of the subcontinent—religion. For hundreds of years religion has dominated scholarship in India. The intellectual's

emphasis was upon the development of the spirit, the philosophy of existence. Hindu-oriented history, whose earliest records, the *Vedas,* appeared 3,000 years ago, tells much about the origins of ideas and philosophies; it tells little of the day-to-day development of society. Muslim-oriented history, while more concerned with man's cultural growth and the chronological reign of kings and conquerors, nevertheless begins only in the tenth century. To the ancient Muslim scholar, the years before Islam were periods of darkness and evil and thus unworthy of scholarly attention. Early Muslim schools, *madrassahs* and *maktabs,* were institutions for the study of Islam.

Ancient Civilizations

Modern Pakistani historians like to date the origins of the people from Mohenjo Daro, a city which some 4,000 years ago flourished on the banks of the Indus River as it flowed through the Sind desert. Here, today, amid sun-baked ruins, is evidence of a civilization emerging from the Bronze Age and similar in development to those in ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt. Vessels of copper and bronze, kiln-baked pottery and elaborately-built public baths testify to the existence of an early urban society. In Harappa in the Punjab, similar ruins add to the belief that the subcontinent may some day yield up secrets of an antiquity equal to that of any other part of the world.

At the time of Mohenjo Daro (or shortly thereafter—scholars disagree) the northern lands of the subcontinent were inhabited by a short, dark-skinned people living in villages and a few towns and dependent primarily upon agriculture and trade. These people would be to South Asia what the Indians were to the North American continent centuries later.

Some time around 2000 B.C., in known-history's first great migration, a tribal people emerged out of central Asia, crossed the Hindu Kush and poured onto the plains of present-day

Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Whether or not these tribesmen were the first "invaders" of the south is not really important to the story of Pakistan—they were certainly the first significant ones. They are known as Aryans, after a Sanskrit word meaning a tiller of the soil. They brought with them a new language, a different social system and a body of religious beliefs which they forced upon the inhabitants they found on the fertile lands along the Indus. They laid the foundations upon which modern man developed in the subcontinent.

The Aryan invasions are important to the understanding of Pakistan. Although they took place 4,000 years ago, the effects are apparent today. Through their language, the Aryans tied together the peoples of Europe and Asia. The classical Hindu language of Sanskrit was an Aryan tongue. The chief languages of Europe, as with Urdu, Persian, Pashto and Bengali, all belong to the Aryan-based linguistic family called Indo-European. The Hindu religion developed from Aryan beliefs.

To Aryan descendants, these origins are significant. Afghanistan's national airline is called Aryana Airlines. The word "Iran" itself means "land of Aryans." Pakistani political leaders occasionally propose the idea of an "Aryan Federation" composed of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, similar in political structure to new Malaysia in Southeast Asia or the Mahgreb plan among Arab-speaking nations in North Africa.

From the Vedas and other accounts of life handed down by the Aryans, scholars see only glimpses of the origins of modern-day society.

The Vedic family was patriarchal—in contrast to the society of Mohenjo Daro, which apparently gave dominance to the maternal side of the family. The family, while doubtlessly nomadic in the beginning, became settled and earned its livelihood from cultivating the soil and herding animals. Groups of families, living in villages, developed a sense of community

organization. Representatives of the various families met together to solve their common problems and determine courses of action primarily, it appears, in defense of their villages. These ancient "committees" or assemblies have become basic to subcontinent villages. They are known as *panchayats,* "assemblies of five," a word as well as an idea used today throughout South Asia. The village assembly was the predecessor of Pakistan's Union Councils.

By 500 B.C. the Aryans had expanded their civilization throughout most of the subcontinent, reaching into what is now Bengal in the east, Mysore in the south, always pushing the "darker" people before them. The subcontinent became a kaleidoscope of small kingdoms which rose, merged, fell and rose again in such confusion that historians have yet to unravel their identity or chronology. The religion of Hinduism spread across the land and the priestly Brahmins acquired great power over the people, demanding respect for the Sacred Law and the chief Vedic gods.

Religious tyranny often breeds reform and about 540 B.C. South Asia's first great reformer, Gautama Siddhartha, began protesting the restrictive practices of the Brahmins. Through his efforts he laid the foundations for Buddhism.

During the Buddha's lifetime another great change was taking place. By 550 B.C. the tribes of Aryan descendants living on the Iranian plateau had formed the first great Aryan empire, called the Achaemenid. Their capital was Persepolis, near what is now the Iranian city of Shiraz. In 538, King Cyrus pushed an army across the Hindu Kush. A short time later, Darius, his successor, reached the Indus River. The bas-relief sculpture in Persepolis records the tribute brought from the subcontinent to help support Darius' wars against the Greeks. Henceforth, control of the wealthy and strategic lands watered by the Indus would be the aim of many rulers

west of the Suleiman Mountains, from Alexander the Great to Napoleon, Hitler, and Stalin.

The story is told, by a Greek historian who was there, that when Alexander the Great invaded the Punjab in 325 B.C., he was met by a native general who asked the Macedonian's cooperation in defeating a mighty empire farther east—in Magada. Alexander and his tired, rebellious army refused and headed home by boat down the Indus, leaving behind a few Greek soldiers. The general, named Chandragupta Maurya, incited the Punjabis to overthrow the Greeks and with new strength went on to conquer Magada himself. He established an empire that lasted more than a century. The Mauryan dynasty produced Asoka, the first great king of the subcontinent.

Asoka ruled from 275 to 232 B.C. In his youth, he was a ruthless warrior who led his Mauryan troops to great military victories in central India. In his middle years, however, he was introduced to the gentle philosophies of Buddhism and a great change came over him. Compassion and piety replaced the carnage and depredation which had characterized his earlier life. Throughout his empire he erected pillars of stone on which were written edicts commanding love and peace.

"Work I must," Asoka vowed, "for the welfare of all the people."

He transformed his army officers and ambassadors into missionaries who, in turn, spread the ideas of Buddha among South Asians. In the northwestern Greek-dominated areas, Buddhist *stupas* (temples) appeared in great profusion and statues of the Buddha within bore a strong resemblance to those of Greece's classical age.

Apparently South Asia was not yet ready for the kind of life advocated by Asoka. After he died attacks came from all

sides. Provinces broke away. By 185 B.C. the "Kingdom of Love" was dead.

The people of the northwest—what is now West Pakistan—knew little peace after Asoka's death. First, Greeks from Bactria, north of the Hindu Kush, conquered the local rulers of Sind and Punjab. They in turn were driven out by the Sakas, who fell to the Parthians and they, ultimately, to the Kushans, all from central Asia. None contributed much to the culture.

While many of the conquerors left South Asia with their booty, many more of their soldiers remained to be absorbed into the great assimilative population of the subcontinent. Scholars today discuss what influence they had on society. Greek methods of sculpture and coinage certainly caught hold, and perhaps even Greek science. It is possible that the Greeks absorbed new philosophies from the Vedic Hindus. Near Peshawar, in the ancient province of Gandhara, a Greco-Buddhist architectural style was set that lasted for centuries. But whatever these invaders gave to South Asia, it did not prevail. Hinduism and its peripheral influences rose to supremacy under the subcontinent's second great indigenous rulers—the Guptas.

Like the Mauryan Empire before it, the Gupta Empire began in bloodshed and oppression under its first two leaders, but reached great heights of law and order under its third, Chandragupta II. He administered his vast kingdom through appointed provincial governors. He encouraged the development of literature and art. Sanskrit became the language of learning. Hinduism was in ascendancy and the caste system became an integral part of Hinduism. To many Indians today, the period from 320 to 500 A.D. was "The Golden Age of Civilization."

After Chandragupta's death the governors began fighting among themselves. From central Asia, new invaders, particularly the White Huns, crossed the passes of the Suleiman

Mountains and bore down onto the plains of the Punjab. In Kashmir, a separate kingdom arose which helped establish that land as a politically-distinct part of the subcontinent. In Bengal, a Buddhist dynasty called the Pala inaugurated a period of prosperity that for several centuries produced a culture honored by Bengalis today. South of the Punjab, a group of warriors declared themselves Rajputs—"Sons of Kings"—and claimed tribal membership in the Hindu Kshatriya, or warrior, caste.

Islam Arrives

Islam first came to the subcontinent through its port towns not long after the Prophet Mohammed conquered the Arabian peninsula in the seventh century. Arab sailors and traders brought the new religion as they plied the ancient sea lanes of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. In 710, Mohammed bin Qasim conquered Sind. Then came new warriors, bent as much on looting the riches of the Punjab and Kashmir, like the invaders before them, as in carrying out jihad to convert the idol-worshippers.

Four different groups of Muslims implanted Islam into the soil of the subcontinent. First came the Turks from central Asia; second were the Pathans from Afghanistan and the Suleiman Mountains; third were the Moghuls—part Turk, part Mongol—also from central Asia. With each conqueror came Muslim missionaries from all parts of the Middle East. Among Buddhists and low caste Hindus they made thousands of converts.

Some of the conquerors gave new directions to the growth of Islam. Mahmud of Ghazni, once a Turkish slave, led the first true invasion of the northwest in 1000 A.D. His soldiers destroyed thousands of Buddhist and Hindu temples. At Ghazni, in what is now Afghanistan, he built a university which supported great scholars such as the historian al Biruni

and Khwaja Abdullah Ansari, a poet quoted today in the teahouses of Pakistan. After Mahmud came Mohammed of Ghor who by 1200 established the Muslims' capital in Delhi. With few interruptions, Muslims ruled the subcontinent from Delhi until the British replaced them some 658 years later.

A century or so later, Timur, descendant of Genghis Khan, marched across the Punjab. His sack of Delhi in 1398 was so complete that one witness wrote, in moving poetic phrase, that after Timur's departure: "Not a bird moved a wing in the city for two whole months."

Timur, sometimes called Tamerlane (Timur-i-lang, or Timur the Lame) did not enter South Asia easily. By the fourteenth century, the Pathans had gained control of the Suleiman Mountains. Descended from Aryans, although their own genealogies often claim descent from the children of Israel, the Pathans—who were then (and sometimes still are) called Afghans—had developed in rugged isolation from other groups. From such strongholds as Bannu and Kohat they fought Timur and all other central Asian invaders, as well as the Turkish sultans of Delhi, with considerable ferocity.

It was not difficult for these aggressive tribesmen to move into Delhi amid the wreckage left by Timur of the Turkish Sultanate. One Pathan chief, Bahlol Lodi, brought to the throne the tribal concept of rule by one chief, but with the accord of other tribal chiefs. The entire Pathan population pledged allegiance to him and many tribes moved out of the highlands of the Suleiman Mountains and onto the northwestern plains of what is now West Pakistan.

Pathan rule extended Islam even farther into the Hindu-controlled lands of the subcontinent, but like its predecessors, the Pathan dynasty weakened from internal strains. It became an easy victim of Babur, "the Tiger," history's next invader from central Asia and the founder of the Moghul Empire.

The 200 years of Turkish-Pathan rule established in the

subcontinent forever the existence of two major cultural streams—Hindu and Muslim. Other streams appeared during the time, Sikhism for one, and others disappeared, such as Buddhism. But Islam came to stay. It was not conducive to assimilation, as Greek culture, nor to retreat. Dogmatic and non-mystical, it left little room for compromise on such principles as the existence of one God, the authority of Mohammed's revelations and the sinfulness of image-worship. The warriors and missionaries who brought Islam sought converts, not compatibility. They were contemptuous of the caste restrictions of Hinduism.

Islam even brought its own languages. Turks, Persians and Arabs composed most of the armies that invaded from the west. The "foreign" rulers in Delhi surrounded themselves with Persian scholars, while religious teachers taught Arabic, the language of the Koran. Local South Asian languages, derived from Sanskrit, were the bases onto which these "foreign" languages built. The eventual result in much of the northern areas was Urdu, written in Arabic-Persian script, heavily laden with Persian, Turkish and Arabic words, but intelligible to speakers of Hindi, the language of Hindus living in the same area.

Thus Islam, nurtured by its believers, guarded by its leaders and sometimes enthusiastically propagated by its missionaries, avoided absorption. It was eventually able to grow and Muslims to multiply within Hindu culture, particularly, of course, where Muslim kings held power. Foreign soldiers married Hindu girls, who then adopted the religion of their husbands. For low caste Hindus, Islam offered salvation without the caste indignities prescribed by the Hindu Brahmins. The tribal and extended family system of the society made possible the conversion of many more. If one leader adopted the new religion, many of his relatives followed. One encouragement to conversion was a tax, called *jizya,* which many Muslim rul-

ers throughout the world levied on non-Muslims. To avoid the tax, many Hindus became Muslim. While most rulers followed the Turkish practice of utilizing native talent in government, Hindus also found that by becoming Muslim they could sometimes rise much higher in the government.

One early attempt to bring Hinduism and Islam together was made in the latter part of the fifteenth century by a Punjabi mystic named Nanak. He founded Sikhism as a composite of what he considered the best of each religion, such as monotheism from Islam, karma and reincarnation from Hinduism. Although Sikhism endured, it never spread beyond the Punjab.

By the time Babur defeated the Pathan Sultan of Delhi, Ibrahim Lodi, at Panipat in 1526, Islam had taken firm root in the subcontinent's soil. It had also begun to reflect some of the color of its environment, despite its resistance to compromise. Babur, himself a pious Muslim who considerately left behind a well-written diary, noted the Muslims' peculiar "Hindustani way." Here Muslims developed practices that contrasted with the Islam which had arrived from Arabia and these differences remain today to distinguish the Islam of Pakistan from that of Saudi Arabia.

For instance, although Islam by doctrine is emphatically opposed to the Hindu caste system, many convert Hindus continue to observe caste identification. In Pakistan today, many Muslims will not consider marriage with any of darker color nor associate with those of certain occupations. Among some Muslim groups, as Babur found, marriage rites are first performed in Hindu style, then in Muslim style. And some Muslims in India still do not eat meat.

More important than these outward manifestations were the ideological interpretations that developed in South Asian Islam from the earliest days. Mysticism and contemplation, dominant in Hinduism, influenced Indian Muslims; the wide-

spread reverence for saints and pirs grew from local non-Islamic customs.

The Moghul Empire

The cultural development of Islam and the emergence of Indian Muslims as a large, separate group were greatly accelerated during the reign of Babur and his Moghul successors. For many Pakistani intellectuals, certain periods during the 330 years of Moghul rule rank as the most glorious in the history of the Muslim peoples in the subcontinent.

Many Indians and Western historians, and some (but not all) Pakistanis, look upon the reign of Akbar from 1556 to 1605 as the greatest of the Moghul period. Coming to power at the age of 15, Akbar was an unusually sensitive ruler, as concerned with the problems of the spirit as with the mechanics of building and governing an empire. Like Asoka long before him, he was distressed at the growing religious antagonisms. His solution was to expound a new religion called "The Divine Faith," of which he was the sole interpreter. He abolished the taxes on non-Muslims and brought many Hindus into the higher ranks of government. Many Pakistanis consider Akbar's concessions to Hinduism as little less than heresy.

Under Akbar, many administrative practices introduced by earlier rulers were refined. The system was based upon authoritarian power in the hands of a few who ruled the apathetic masses. Moghul rulers wished first to maintain order. Consequently, the army and police were vital arms of government, carefully treated, protected and well-trained. The rulers sought wealth from within the existing agricultural system and adopted the land-taxing system of previous Hindu rulers. They employed Hindus to administer the treasury. Islamic law predominated and Muslim courts dispensed Moghul justice, frequently violating Hindu caste require-

ments. Akbar introduced a professional civil service which was a precedent for that introduced by the British and which, in turn, stood Pakistan and India in good stead after 1947. Akbar also concerned himself with social reform. He opposed child marriage and the Hindu practice of *suttee,* the sacrificing of living wives with their dead husbands. He encouraged his Persian and Turkish followers to marry local Indians at all levels and to seek some popular support. Akbar's rule, nevertheless, was autocratic. The masses had no part in the business of governing.

Tolerant and judicious rulers such as Asoka and Akbar appear only rarely in any country's history. None of Akbar's successors matched his genius, although some made contributions to the development of Islam in the subcontinent.

Corresponding with the era of King James I in England, Selim, called Jahengir, or "Conqueror of the World," followed Akbar in 1605 and ruled until 1627. He had both Hindu and Muslim wives, the most powerful of whom was Nur Jahan, a Persian who encouraged the culture of her homeland in the court. It was to Jahengir's court that England sent its first diplomatic mission and established formal trade ties. Moghul days were then numbered.

Europeans arrived like the Arabs, by sea. Portugal was the first to gain a foothold with the arrival of Vasco da Gama, who sailed around the Cape of Good Hope and anchored off India's west coast in 1498. Not long afterwards, the Duke of Albuquerque defeated Arab sea power and for the rest of the sixteenth century the Portuguese monopolized South Asian trade.

Portuguese motives varied, like those of most invaders. They desired trade and found lucrative commercial resources at Goa. Many Portuguese possessed a fervent missionary spirit and wherever a trading post appeared Christianity followed, generally to stay. Finally, the Portuguese dreamed of empire,

and it was not long before they and the Dutch, French and British were fighting over who would control South Asia. The British won.

Britain's interest in South Asia began formally in 1599 when a group of businessmen in London formed the East India Company to "trade with the orient." The next year, Queen Elizabeth gave them a charter which permitted them a monopoly on British trade in the east. The charter gave the company the right to acquire territory, coin money, defend its property with arms, administer justice within its property, collect income from the land—in other words, to behave like a sovereign power if it could get away with it.

Jahengir unwittingly let the East India Company assume control and for the next 347 years no South Asian leader was able to prevent Britain's domination of the subcontinent. In 1614, the East India Company established its first trading center in Surat, near what is now Bombay; other posts appeared near Madras in 1616 and in Bengal in 1633. In 1650 the British built a major fort—Fort William—on the Hooghly River near present-day Calcutta.

At first the advent of the new foreigners had little effect upon the "Muslim stream" in the subcontinent. Other influences pertained, Persian and Indian. Under both Jahengir and his son, Shah Jahan, the intellectual traditions of their ancestors flourished. Persian scholars and artists flocked to their courts. New institutions of learning appeared in Delhi and also in provincial capitals such as Jullundur, Hyderabad and especially Lahore, where, like their predecessors, the rulers frequently established their court. Persian remained the language of literature and learning, its influence seeping deeply into the Urdu language of the common Muslim people. Even Hindu poets began writing in Persian and Urdu. Both rulers had a passion for extravagant monuments and their architects built some of South Asia's most notable structures,

among them the Taj Mahal in Agra, and the royal palace and the lovely Shalimar Gardens in Lahore.

These intellectual attainments diminished after Shah Jahan was imprisoned by his son, Aurangzeb, who made himself king in 1658. Aurangzeb was rigidly orthodox and attempted to practice literally the various political and economic instructions of the Koran and sunnah. He re-established taxation of non-Muslims, pressed for conversion of Hindus, and supported expansion of Muslim ownership of Hindu lands. In Lahore, he built the giant Badshahi Mosque.

The great Moghul Empire, which incorporated territory from Kabul to Chittagong and Kashmir to Mysore, had reached its zenith, and now, under Aurangzeb (who died in 1707), it began to disintegrate. Throughout their reign, the Moghuls kept up a continual rivalry with the Persians, the former wishing to keep the northwestern door shut, the latter, like so many others, to keep it open. The Pathans sat in the middle.

Akbar was able to control these independent-minded frontiersmen by first subduing the Yusufzai tribes and then paying the Afridi and Orakzai tribes to keep the Khyber Pass under their control. On Aurangzeb's orders, the Moghul governor of Kabul bribed various other tribes in an effort to stimulate internal Pathan strife, preventing them from joining forces. This policy destroyed whatever chance there may have been for the development of a united spirit among the Pathans of the Suleiman Mountains. The British continued the same policy of fostering disunity.

One Pathan group, however, grew strong despite Moghul efforts. This group, the Ghilzai, invaded Persia and captured Isfahan. The great Persian leader, Nadir Shah, drove them back, captured Kabul and in 1739 reached and plundered the Moghul capital itself.

The fragmentation of the subcontinent begun in Aurangzeb's time continued even faster with the sacking of Delhi. In Bengal, the Muslim governor, the Nawab of Dacca, became virtual monarch and acquired a great fortune selling land to the East India Company. Hyderabad in central India gained independence under a Muslim ruler, the Nizam, as did the southern province of Mysore under its Muslim sultans, Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan. In Sind, the Talpur Mirs established virtual independence.

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the French were vying with the British for trade rights on the subcontinent. Their first foothold was near Madras in 1670 and in following decades they established themselves in Pondicherry and Bengal, not far from the British near Calcutta. British-French rivalry, reflecting their struggle for supremacy in Europe, reached its peak in 1756. The Nawab of Dacca, Siraj-u-Dowla, with French backing, captured Fort William in Calcutta. The subsequent imprisonment of the British led to stories in England of the "Black Hole" of Calcutta in which many British soldiers, packed together in a tiny cell, were supposed to have perished.

Public reaction to the news in England was immediate and intense. Robert Clive, an obscure clerk in the East India Company who rose in the military service through sheer ingenuity, led troops against the French up and down the eastern coast. In the Battle of Plassey in 1757, he defeated the Nawab of Dacca, recaptured Calcutta and inaugurated a new period of British control over Bengal and, gradually, the entire subcontinent. The French lost forever their opportunity for dominance.

The long and colorful story of British imperialism in South Asia more properly belongs in a history of India than of Pakistan. As the British gradually overthrew centers of Muslim

power, they replaced it with either their own or Hindu strength except in a few, significant places. For the 190 years after the Battle of Plassey, the development of Muslim culture and political thought was confined to certain areas and was important only at certain times. Although these developments, such as in the Punjab and Bengal, were part of the whole subcontinent's move toward independence from the British, they were more specifically important to the development of Pakistan.

The Punjab

The Punjab's capital, Lahore, had long been a symbol to conquerors arriving from the west. Having fought through the Pathan tribesmen, invading armies usually established their major encampments in the Punjab, where they could gather and feed their forces before forging eastward. By the same token, rulers in Delhi used Lahore as their major forward post for protecting the empire from Pathans and other unfriendly visitors from beyond the Suleiman Mountains.

As a meeting ground for invaders and defenders as well as a land of relative prosperity, the Punjab spawned a large variety of ideas and political experiments. It was here, for instance, that Sikhism was born and developed into a militant faith.

In 1845 the British, with the aid of such minor chieftains as Gulab Singh, the ruler of Jammu, defeated the Sikh army and stationed a garrison in Lahore. In 1846 they sold Jammu and Kashmir to Gulab Singh as a reward for his help. Three years later, the Sikhs rose again, but were again and finally defeated at the Battle of Chillianwalla, and the Punjab was annexed in the name of the East India Company. Until 1947, Sikh princes owned considerable amounts of land and numerous small Punjabi states remained in Sikh hands.

Islam in Bengal

Developments in Bengal were also of particular importance in the creation of Pakistan. It was here that the first real Muslim movements toward a common national purpose began.

Bengal's geography contributed to its distinctive development. Mountains and rivers limited the area's accessibility to the sea and through two major gateways in the north—the valleys of the Brahmaputra and Ganges rivers. Mass migrations, which affected so much of the subcontinent, generally missed Bengal where transportation was so hampered. But the Aryans reached Bengal to intermix with earlier inhabitants—called Pundras—and contribute to the language and religion. Buddhism flourished under Asoka. Toward the end of the Gupta era, the great Pala Buddhist kingdom arose in Bengal to unite the people for the first time. While Buddhism in the rest of South Asia (except Ceylon) declined before the rejuvenation of Hinduism and the introduction of Islam, it remained strong in Bengal until the twelfth century and the rise of the Hindu Sena dynasty (1100 to 1204).

The first Muslim visitors to Bengal were probably Arabs, traders seeking the tea, rice and spices of the east. The first documented invasion by a Muslim was that of the Turkish general, Bakhtiyar Khalji, in 1204. He replaced Hindu power in the name of the Sultan of Delhi and brought with him teachers and missionaries to spread the gospel of Islam.

A century later, a Bengali warrior named Shamsuddin Ilyas Shah affirmed his independence from Delhi and set up a small empire of his own in Bengal. The Bengali Sultanate permanently established Islam in Bengal and laid the foundation for the changes that would occur there in 1947. Among the people, these newcomers were not unwelcome. Bengalis were largely Hindus, but members of the lowest castes. Buddhism had degenerated under tyrannical Hindu rulers. As in

the Sind and the Punjab a few centuries earlier, conditions provided an opportunity for Islam. Thousands were converted to the new religion.

With the encouragement, patronage and subsidy—in land and cash—of the Bengal sultans, Muslim pirs and sufis came to Bengal from Arabia, Persia, and other parts of South Asia. It was said at the time that there was not a single town or village in Bengal without a Muslim priest. Madrassahs, mosques, and *khanqahs* (missionary centers) arose in numbers, usually and cleverly on the site of a revered Buddhist or Hindu shrine.

New races with new languages arrived to affect the composition of Bengal society. Some, like the Chinese, were fleeing tribal uprisings north of Assam. Many refugees fled to Bengal, accounting for traces of Turk, Persian and Punjabi in the origins of Bengalis. Imported Abyssinian slaves once occupied the Bengal throne.

In 1538 the Moghul emperor, Sher Shah, reconquered Bengal, putting an end to the independent sultanate. During this time, many Pathans migrated to Bengal and gained control of the government, despite the objections of Akbar. Bengalis themselves developed a resentment against these "foreign," albeit Muslim, intruders that continued to modern times.

In the two centuries following the demise of the Bengal Sultanate the province had little unity. Rebellion and piracy flourished and members of the Muslim aristocracy gave loyalty to no one. Finally Robert Clive's victory in 1757 brought Bengal under the control of the British.

Changes then occurred in the province. Hindus replaced Muslims in government and the subsidies to Muslim educational institutions decreased, although a school in Calcutta continued to educate "sons of Muslim gentlemen for reasonable and lucrative offices in the government and to produce competent officers for courts of justice." A new English gov-

ernor of Bengal, cooperating with Hindu merchants loyal to the East India Company, literally denuded the province of its economic wealth.

Under Warren Hastings and Lord Cornwallis, fresh from his military campaigns in America, new land programs came into being. Hindu money-lenders became the new landowners. British capital supported Calcutta's Hindu entrepreneurs who transformed the economy of Bengal, to the disadvantage of the old Muslim gentry. Commerce in such cash crops as indigo and the importation of British textiles destroyed the ancient agricultural and weaving economy that had supported millions of Bengalis.

Culturally, Bengal rose to importance as Hindus found new opportunities for self-expression. Western scholars followed the East India Company to Calcutta, where they translated Hindu and Muslim works into English. Charles Wilkins invented type for the Bengali language. The Asiatic Society of Bengal, founded in 1748, began serious study of Sanskrit. In 1800, Lord Wellesley founded Fort William College, where demands for the first time were made for textbooks in Hindi and Urdu. Spreading out from Bengal, English replaced Persian as the official and cultural language of the subcontinent. Throughout the nineteenth century, Bengali literature, with increasing emphasis on English and Hindu scholarship and ideas, was important in nearly all of India.

British expansion in all the subcontinent followed much the same pattern of Bengal and the Punjab. Muslim strength diminished, local rulers fought among themselves and the British stepped in. In rapid succession, they conquered Sind, lower Burma, the kingdoms of Oudh and Nagpur, and they stationed garrisons in many other states. Resistance grew accordingly and, by 1857, the stage was set for the first major rebellion against British control.

The causes, actions and results of the uprising of 1857—the British call it a "mutiny," Pakistanis and Indians call it a "war of independence"—are many and varied. It began among a few Muslim princes still loyal to the Moghul emperor, among mullahs seeking revival of Muslim life at the expense of growing Christian influence, among former Hindu rulers and among the East India Company's Muslim and Hindu soldiers who had been subverted. Later, the villagers joined, their fears aroused by Muslim and Hindu agitators.

Disorganized and without foreign help, the rebels were no match for the British with their superior generalship and arms. The British found allies among the Sikhs, always ready to fight against Muslim ascendancy, and those Muslim and Hindu rulers who from the start had confidence in a British victory. The rebels captured Delhi, but they soon lost it. In less than a year, the uprising collapsed, the last Moghul emperor, Bahadur Shah, was exiled to Burma and the British government replaced the East India Company as ruler of South Asia.

Henceforth, British, Hindus, and Muslims would each seek a separate destiny.

4. *Toward Nationhood*

Centuries ago Emperor Asoka, the tolerant Mauryan, tried to unite Hindus and Buddhists to form an empire based on justice and peace. His succesors failed him. Later, Emperor Akbar, the pious Moghul, tried to unite Hindus and Muslims to form an empire based on justice and peace. His successors failed him also. In 1858, the British assumed the role of peacemaker.

The story of British failure to unite Indians is the story of Pakistan's success. It begins with the uprising of 1857, two significant results of which affected Muslims. First, the British government formally replaced the East India Company and the Moghul emperor as ruler of the subcontinent. Under the India Act of 1858, the British Cabinet, through a Secretary of State for India, became responsible for appointing the Viceroy of British India whose power, in turn, extended through all the provinces and all government services. Many princely states—Muslim, Hindu and Sikh—maintained nominal sovereignty except in foreign affairs and certain other matters only so long as they cooperated with the British.

Secondly, the British, who blamed the Muslims for the uprising, turned increasingly against them. Following the pattern begun in Bengal after the Battle of Plassey in 1757, the British gave preference to Hindus in government, education and business. In succeeding decades, Muslim influence waned, even in the army as the British, while relying heavily on Pathan and Muslim Punjabi soldiery, stopped forming all-

Muslim units. English systems of law continued to replace Muslim law and Hindus held most of the financial and administrative posts not held by foreigners.

Sir William Hunter, who wrote of Indian Muslims after the uprising, reported that there was only one Muslim among the 240 Indian lawyers admitted to the Calcutta bar between 1852 and 1868 and there was not a single Muslim High Court Judge. Of 1,338 civil service appointments in Bengal, Muslims received only 92.

The Muslim community, already bitter, withdrew further from the mainstream of intellectual, economic and political activity.

In taking on the rule of India, the British assumed a gigantic task. Millions of people who worshipped different gods in countless different ways and who spoke hundreds of different languages and dialects were sorted into scores of different provinces and states, the latter often ruled by despotic princes little concerned with the well-being of their subjects. Poverty, hunger, corruption, and cruelty were common. The British sought to bring order to the chaos and re-fashion the complex political structure. Like the Moghuls before them, they wished only to rule a peaceful society, develop the economy to support the British trade system and administer the law.

History records the work of many conscientious British individuals and many progressive actions in India. In the Punjab, John Lawrence created a province with a strong economic base. New penal codes brought a new era to Indian law. Schools brought education to the upper class children so they could fill the administrative needs of government. The English language brought modernization in scholarship.

But the British were authoritarian in the tradition of Indian rulers and colonizers everywhere. With few exceptions,

top jobs in government were closed to Indians. In local councils, British governors appointed the membership. Indians were barred from British clubs and felt the effects of racial discrimination.

In 1885, a few Europeans and Indians in Bombay organized the Indian National Congress. Their objective: social reform under "the blessings of British rule." Before long, this objective was lost and a new one took its place: parliamentary government. Indian nationalism found its first real vehicle to drive to independence. But it was a Hindu-driven machine.

Nature, always heavy-handed in India, spurred the Indian National Congress into action. In 1895 a severe famine, accompanied by plague, ravaged the villages around Bombay. More than 1,000,000 people died and the conciliatory attitude of the Bombay reformers turned to anger. Two Englishmen were murdered. The Congress began to speak more militantly.

The British compounded the work of nature and at the same time gave Muslims an opportunity to experience the heady brew of Muslim nationalism. In 1905, they partitioned Bengal.

The purpose of partition was reasonable and without malice. The province, its capital in Calcutta, covered more than what is today just East and West Bengal. It included Bihar and Orissa and had a population of 80,000,000, far too many to administer efficiently. The British established a new province of East Bengal and Assam under a lieutenant-governor, whose capital was Dacca, the ancient Muslim capital of the Bengal Sultanate.

Many Muslims were overjoyed. Nearly all Bengali Muslims lived in the eastern sector, yet since 1757 they had been governed by English and Hindus from Calcutta, in the western part. To these Muslims, partition held out hope for social and economic emancipation.

The Muslim Re-awakening

The partition of Bengal was a climax in the development of Islam in the subcontinent. It ended a long period of aimless intellectual wandering and gave new direction in the search for self-determination.

Nurtured by Turkish, Pathan, and Moghul patronage, Muslim scholarship in previous centuries had been more vibrant than anywhere else in the Islamic world. Its content was largely theological, but in Muslim life everywhere politics is never far away from the Koran. Reform movements easily developed into political action.

The lines of Muslim thought that extend today into the idea and substance of Pakistan took identifiable form in the reform movements of the eighteenth century. They began with a scholar named Shah Wali-ullah who brought a measure of harmony between Shi'ites and Sunnites. He was followed by a more aggressive reformer named Sayyid Ahmad Shahid, whose movement led to a jihad against the Sikhs. Sikh-Muslim antagonism was never allowed to abate.

Long before the Hindu nationalists began their drive against the British, Muslims sought to expel the foreigners who had usurped their own tenuous authority in province after province. The center of trouble was in Bengal and Patna where Muslim leaders such as Sayyid Ahmad Shahid declared India to be *dar-ul-harb,* or "place of war" (against Islam). Muslims, they said, could never live in a country ruled by non-Muslims. Until their homeland was *dar-ul-Islam,* they would resist. The British called them "Hindustani fanatics," but their influence was great. Eventually, they helped rouse Muslim villagers to support the uprising of 1857.

The effectiveness of these Muslim leaders and thinkers diminished after 1858. They became even more bitter against

Europeans and sought to shield Islam from all modern influences.

One man stood out in his sharp dissent. His name was Sayyid Ahmed Khan. Born in 1817, he was the son of a greatly-respected religious recluse descended, as the name "sayyid" denotes, from the Prophet Mohammed. He grew up, however, in the home of his more secular-minded grandfather, a mathematician in the East India Company who dabbled in local politics. Thus, Sayyid Ahmed Khan became a writer of religious tracts on the one hand, and a sub-judge under the British on the other. During the uprising he not only remained loyal to the British, but helped save British lives in Bijna.

In a book addressed to the British entitled *The Causes of the Indian Mutiny,* Sayyid Ahmed Khan stated that the way to avoid future mutinies was for the British to permit Indians —Hindu and Muslim—to participate in law-making. He also pleaded with Muslims to join in the modernization of India and said that so long as Muslims stood apart they would be relegated to inferior positions. Although he sought Hindu-Muslim cooperation, he felt that there was a fundamental difference between the two groups.

Despite the enmity of his more orthodox contemporaries, Sayyid Ahmed Khan, with British help, opened schools and welcomed both Muslims and Hindus, emphasizing the secular curriculum of the Europeans. In 1873, with the backing of the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Amir of Afghanistan, he founded the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College, which later became Aligarh University. The British rewarded him with knighthood.

Slowly, students of Aligarh and other Muslim intellectuals began to identify themselves with the "progressive" movement of Sir Sayyid. Among them were Sir Sayyid's successors as chancellors of Aligarh, Mohsin ul-Mulk (1837–1907) and

Viqar ul-Mulk (1841–1917), as well as the theologian, Maulvi Chiragh Ali. Nasir Ahmed (1936–1912), a civil servant, wrote extensively on social reform among Muslims, while Altaf Hussein Hali (1837–1914), a poet, was influential in awakening a group consciousness among Muslim villagers and city masses. He became known as India's first Muslim "national poet." Wrote Hali:

> Why do you idly stand, my countrymen?
> Arise and lend a hand, my countrymen.
> If you are men, help others in some way,
> Or simply eat and drink and pass away.

Others not directly connected with Aligarh sought to move Muslims forward. In Bengal, Nawab Abdul Latif (1828–1893) organized the Mohammedan Literary and Scientific Society in 1863 in an attempt to counteract the conservative influences there. An English-educated judge, Sayyid Amir Ali (1849–1938) was more critical of Europeans in India and more of a revivalist in religion, but nevertheless spoke out for modernization of the Muslim intellectual. Unfortunately, he wrote mostly in English so his influence among Muslims was limited.

The Punjab, too, saw renewed intellectual activity among Muslims in the birth of Ahmadiyism. Ahmadiyism was founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1839–1908) in 1901, and the movement's followers were active missionaries and zealous teachers. They, more than any other single Muslim group, attacked illiteracy and poverty among villagers.

Muslim traditionalists were not idle. Their main center of influence was in the town of Deoband near Dehli. The Deoband movement rejected government support for education and tried to isolate itself from the general stream of secular progress. Its social and political ideal was the life led by Muslims under the seventh century caliphs. The ideas of this school were best voiced by Hussein Rizvi Akbar (1846–1921),

a renowned poet from Allahabad who satirically attacked Aligarh's educational policies.

Another conservative trend developed in the Pan-Islamic movement, which sought to bind Indian Muslims more closely to the political and intellectual activities of Muslims in the Middle East. For centuries the question of unity had involved Sunni Muslims of the subcontinent through the recognition or non-recognition of the various caliphs, the leaders of the faithful. The caliphate had shifted frequently—from Arabia to Damascus to Baghdad to Cairo and, eventually, to Constantinople with the rise of the Ottoman Empire. Some subcontinent Muslim emperors recognized the reigning caliph, requiring that his name be mentioned in the calls to prayer and other religions ceremonies. Others, such as Akbar, ignored the western caliphate and claimed it for themselves.

Pan-Islam became important after the fall of the last Moghul emperor because orthodox Muslims had no person to turn to for religious leadership—or, symbolically, to mention in Friday prayers—other than the Ottoman Sultan. They received encouragement from Jamal al-din al-Afghani, a Muslim nationalist in the Arab world who visited India—in exile—from 1878 to 1882. Pleading for Pan-Islamic unity and the revival of glories that were once Islam's, al-Afghani denounced Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan's pro-European movement as well as his "progressive" attitudes toward religion. Sir Sayyid's insistence that the truth of Islam was its "conformity to Nature," he said, was "the root of corruption, the source of untouchable evils."

A particularly effective conservative spokesman was Maulana Shibli, and although he graduated from Aligarh, he encouraged support of the Ottoman caliphate. He was later decorated by the Ottoman Sultan, Abdul Hamid II.

In 1893, Shibli and a group of Muslim divines organized a movement called the Nadva-tul-Ulema which joined the Deo-

band school in attacking Aligarh. Among its followers was Maulana Abul Kalam Azad who called Aligarh "a slave factory." Azad later became the foremost Muslim opponent of Pakistan. He was India's first Minister of Education. It was the plan of Shibli and others to have the Nadva assume the political leadership of Muslims.

By the end of the nineteenth century, both conservative and liberal schools of Muslim thought in India had contributed to some religious and intellectual re-awakening of Muslims in the subcontinent. Indeed, one European scholar, W. S. Blunt, wrote that "India is the most important land where the Mohammedan faith is found." He added: "It may safely be affirmed that the course of events in India will determine more than anything else the destiny of Mohammedanism in the immediate future of this and the next generation."

With the partitioning of Bengal in 1905 it was apparent to many Muslim leaders that the time had come to have a political instrument of their own. In 1906 they met in Dacca to discuss the subject. Out of the meeting came the All-India Muslim League, "to promote the feeling of loyalty to the British, to protect and advance the political rights of Muslims and to prevent the rise of hostility among Muslims toward other communities." Mohsin ul-Mulk and Viqar ul-Mulk of Aligarh were made secretaries. The Aga Khan, leader of the world's Ismaili Muslims, was elected permanent president.

These leaders went a step further. They called for British acceptance of the principle of "separate electorates." Such acceptance would mean recognizing the existence in India of two separate communities. It would also mean a negation of European parliamentary democracy based on majority rule.

India's Muslims feared Western democracy. Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan had pinpointed this fear by writing: "Now suppose that all the English . . . were to leave India . . . then who would be the rulers of India? Is it possible that

under these circumstances, two nations—the Mohammedan and Hindu—could sit on the same throne and remain equal in power? Most certainly not. It is necessary that one of them should conquer the other and thrust it down. To hope that both could remain equal is to desire the impossible and the inconceivable."

The only solution, these Muslims felt, was to allocate a certain number of seats in each legislative body to each religious group. Each would have its own voters, candidates and representatives.

In 1909, Viceroy Minto and Lord Morley, Secretary of State for India, formulated an India Councils Act which for the first time permitted elections above the local level. It also recognized the principle of separate electorates. Known as the Minto-Morley Reforms, the move started a roulette of religious politics that caused alternate moments of anguish and elation until it ended in the creation of Pakistan. Indians claim that the British granted separate electorates in order to divide the people and weaken opposition to their rule.

Elation was the mood among Muslims in the first decade of the twentieth century. Bengal was partitioned. The All-India Muslim League and the award of separate electorates assured Muslims of increasing influence. It was a brief moment, however. In 1911, the British revoked the partition.

Jinnah: Ambassador of Unity

What started as a love affair between the British and Muslims, each seeking from the other assistance against the Indian Hindu nationalists, turned suddenly to a bitter quarrel. Muslims began supporting the Indian National Congress against the British. Events abroad fed their antagonism. Maulana Shibli called the Italian-Turkish War of 1911 another Christian Crusade against Muslims. As World War I began, more and more Indian Muslims, led by Abul Kalam Azad and other

religious conservatives, supported the Ottoman Empire against the British. News of the British defeat at Gallipoli, where many Indian Muslims served in the British-Indian army, set off rounds of celebration in India. The British, in what seemed almost a spite measure, built a railway line through the principal mosque in the city of Cawnpore.

One prominent Muslim, one of the few Muslim Leaguers who also belonged to the Indian National Congress, felt that Congress and the League should work together toward Indian self-government, each suppressing its religious bias. His name was Mohammed Ali Jinnah. He was later known as the "Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity," and the person most responsible for the creation of Pakistan after "unity" proved impossible. He became Pakistan's first governor-general.

Jinnah was born in Karachi on Christmas Day in 1876, the year Disraeli gained for Queen Victoria the title of "Kaisar-i-Hind"—Empress of India. He was the son of a prosperous hides merchant, a member of the Khoja sect of Ismaili Muslims and descended from Hindu converts. An excellent student, he was sent at the age of sixteen to study law in England. The traditions of English society, so contrasting to the ways of the crowded port town of his native Karachi, impressed him. He adopted English fashions, even to the detail of a monocle. When he returned to India in 1896 to begin practicing law in Bombay, he was more English than Indian, stiffly proper and unable to speak any language well except English.

Jinnah's bearing and idiosyncrasies left him open to criticism throughout his life—he was called arrogant, uncompromising, cold, aloof, egotistical. At times he displayed all of these characteristics and he made many enemies. But his integrity was seldom questioned, by Muslims, Hindus, or foreigners. If his tongue was sharp, it was without personal

malice. And if he lacked warmth, he worked indefatigably to better the lot of his people.

Jinnah was a lonely man. His parents bound him in marriage before he was fifteen, but his wife died soon after. His close friends were few, as were his pleasures. When he later re-married, it was to a Parsee twenty years his junior. The marriage did not last.

Jinnah's genius in dialectics, his unbending resolve to move Muslims forward along constitutional lines, won for him at a very early stage in his career a high reputation among British and Indian officials, despite his unapproachable demeanor. When the British government enlarged the Legislative Council in the India Councils Act of 1909, Jinnah, at the age of thirty-three, was elected to it by the Muslims of Bombay. In this forum he boldly pleaded the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity and Indian self-government. His concern was not so much religion as constitutionalism. He became a member of the Home Rule League of Mrs. Annie Besant, a group of upper and middle class Indians who, for the first time, joined together to advance the principle of Indian self-government, but within the British empire. In 1913, he joined the Muslim League and, as a member of both League and Congress, sought to bring the two into working harmony.

World War I found Indians in an angry mood. Agitation against the British was sometimes extreme. In Bengal, Muslims responded to the Ottoman caliph's call for jihad against Turkey's Christian enemies. Such leaders as Maulana Mohammed Ali and his brother, Shaukat, and Abul Kalam Azad went to jail amidst rioting. In the Punjab, Sikhs, angered at the killing of fellow Sikhs in Calcutta who were demonstrating against the British, plotted rebellion under the banner of the Ghadr (Mutiny) Party.

Into this scene stepped another London-educated lawyer, Mohandas K. Gandhi, known to the world as Mahatma (Great

Soul) or as Gandhiji to Indians (but as "Mr. Gandhi" to Jinnah). For the next thirty years, Gandhi led the Indian independence movement. He was also the most effective spokesman against the recognition of a "two nation" character of Indian society. To Gandhi, Indians were Indians first, Hindus or Muslims second. To many Muslims, including Jinnah, Gandhi represented Hindu nationalism.

Only a society as heterogeneous as India's could produce such contrasting leaders as Gandhi and Jinnah. Gandhi, while born of prosperous parents, identified himself with the poor and struggling masses, whom he brought into the independence drive. Jinnah had to force himself to leave the cloisters of the intellectual world, and even then could not speak the language of the people. Gandhi was a humanist, a man whose heart was with the suffering. He was emotional, driven by what he called an "inner light." His very presence among them brought Hindu masses to *darshan,* a sense of ecstasy caused by being near a deified person. Jinnah called him a "Hindu revivalist" and said that to stir the masses by way of emotions was wicked. Throughout their many years of rivalry, neither the austere Jinnah nor the humble Gandhi really understood what the other was talking about. They never learned to communicate.

The peak of Hindu-Muslim cooperation came in 1916 when, in Lucknow, Jinnah talked the Congress leaders into supporting the League's stand on separate electorates. This demand, he said, "is not a matter of policy, but a matter of necessity to the Muslims, who require to be roused from the coma and torpor into which they have fallen so long." In the Lucknow Pact, the Congress agreed that Muslims could occupy one-third of the seats in the Central Legislative Council.

The British, concerned with the war in Europe, sought to assuage Indian antagonism through reforms. These were promulgated later in the Government of India Act of 1919—

called the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms—which, in effect, gave India its first constitution. The Act decentralized some of the governor-general's authority, giving more power to provincial governments. It also permitted elected councils to control wider areas of government, especially in education, health, and agriculture. The nationalists claimed the reforms did not go far enough.

Riots and bloodshed swept India as the cycle of "Indian demonstration-British repression-Indian demonstration" began. For example, several thousand people crowded into a city park in Amritsar one day in 1919 to listen to speeches in violation of British orders. The British general in charge ordered his troops to fire. In minutes, more than 300 people were killed and 1,200 wounded. Throughout India, nationalism became more violent.

In response, the British passed the Rowlatt Acts, giving the courts the right to hold secret trials or no trials at all. Jinnah and many others, their sense of law and British justice violated, resigned in protest from the Legislative Council.

Jinnah had more to protest than British injustice; the Indian nationalists began to repel him. Increasingly, the leadership of the nationalist movement seemed to be dominated by Hindus employing religion in their cause. In 1920, he followed Annie Besant in resigning from the Home Rule League because, as she said, it was "so intertwined with religion." Gandhi, only shortly before, had introduced *satyagraha*—mass, non-violent resistance. The word was Sanskrit, the principle was that of *ahimsa,* an ancient Hindu rule of non-violence. The result was bloodshed as riots against the British broke out in Delhi, Bombay and the Punjab. Jinnah was appalled at the use of unconstitutional methods and at the Hindu-Muslim antipathy they produced. He resigned from the Indian National Congress and retired from politics.

In 1921 Muslims joined the general clamor of protest with

an issue of their own—"Islam in Danger!" With the Ottoman Turks defeated in war, the European powers faced the problem of the caliphate. Thousands of Indian Muslims in Sind, the Punjab and the Northwest Frontier marched toward Turkey to flee the "infidel" rule of India and to "save" the caliph. Abul Kalam Azad went to jail again, the marchers returned home, but Muslims throughout India were inflamed. Gandhi, seeking Muslim cooperation against the British, led the formation of the Khilafat (caliphate) movement and called for non-cooperation, including *hartal,* economic boycott. As respect for authority declined across the country, violence increased. When Gandhi called off the movement in 1924, Muslims were resentful and frustrated. Hindus were bitter and an era of communal violence between Hindus and Muslims began which buried the spirit of Jinnah's Lucknow Pact. Henceforth, Muslims would become more anti-Hindu than anti-British, more pro-Muslim than pro-Indian.

Fear increased between members of each religious community, both in rural and urban areas, and they found petty excuses for violence, particularly in neighborhoods where neither could claim a large majority. An insult here, a spoken word there, produced a riot; a Hindu band marching past a Muslim mosque, a Muslim slaughter of a Hindu sacred cow, caused explosions of fury.

In 1928, Indian nationalists proposed a new constitution for India which rejected the principle of separate electorates. The British equivocated and called for conferences in London. The moribund Muslim League was powerless. Jinnah was out of it all, practicing law in England.

Iqbal and Pakistan

Only one voice lent real dynamism to the Muslim cause. It came from a poet-philosopher named Mohammed Iqbal. Since Shah Wali-ullah more than 100 years before, few Mus-

lim thinkers contributed to the development of Muslim culture in the subcontinent as much as this one man.

Iqbal was born in Sialkot in the Punjab in 1873 to a family from Kashmir. His father, a craftsman, was also a sufi. From these beginnings, Iqbal wended his way through the complex of Muslim thought, adopting first one and then another idea, contributing to each with his melodious Persian and Urdu poetry. His following was enormous among intellectuals and as his ideas changed, so did those of his followers.

After a period of study and research in Europe, during which he, like Jinnah, was influenced by British liberalism, Iqbal returned to Lahore to teach and to write. Rejecting sufism, which he condemned as self-abomination, he emphasized the development of the human personality. His orthodox Muslim critics were pacified by his glorification of Muslim life under the first four caliphs, his opposition to the British and his support for Pan-Islamic movements.

Above all, Iqbal became a champion of Muslim rights in India and found a following among the Aligarh modernists because of his support of the Muslim League and the principle of separate electorates.

Iqbal was elected President of the Muslim League in 1930. In his inaugural address at Allahabad, he voiced what he considered the only logical next step in the progress of Muslim-Indian-British relations:

"I would like to see the Punjab, Northwest Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated Northwestern Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of Muslims, at least of North West India. . . ."

Muslims throughout India were shocked—no one of importance had ever suggested Muslim political *and* geographic self-government. A few months later, a Cambridge University

student named Rahmat Ali coined the word "Pakistan" for Iqbal's state.

As Muslim League president, Iqbal traveled to London for the 1930 Round Table Conferences, there to join Jinnah and the Aga Khan in discussions of Indian constitutional reform. By this time, Gandhi was India's most dominant figure and in London he claimed to speak for all Indians, Hindu and Muslim. His claims were rejected. In 1932, the British Prime Minister announced the "Communal Award," separate electorates which would be part and parcel of any future constitutional reform in India. Congress accused the British of "dividing and ruling." Gandhi commenced a fast.

The Communal Award became an integral part of the Government of India Act of 1935, which established the constitution of India as inherited by Pakistan. The Act gave increased autonomy to the eleven Indian provinces in legislative matters. It widened the elective support of government and called for nationwide elections in 1936.

Jinnah was dubious of carrying the idea of separate electorates into a state of Pakistan. He was not certain that it was legal in British constitutional law. However, few Muslim leaders had given serious thought to Iqbal's idea and therefore it was not difficult for Jinnah to accept an invitation to return to India and lead the Muslims as he had once done. The appeal came to him in London in 1933, carried by Liaquat Ali Khan, a Muslim politician from the United Provinces and a graduate of Aligarh. Liaquat, twenty years younger than Jinnah, proved to be a good counter-balance to Jinnah's imperfections. While Jinnah dreaded contact with the uneducated masses, Liaquat courted them, held them spellbound with his oratory and eventually molded their collective thinking after his own. Jinnah finally returned to India, holding stubbornly to the idea that Hindus and Muslims could work together.

Tirelessly, and with Liaquat at his side, Jinnah sought first to unite the Muslims. "The Hindus and Muslims must organize separately," he said, "and once they are organized, they will understand each other better." He became president of the Muslim League Election Board.

His failure was colossal. In the 1936 elections, the National Congress, led by Jawaharlal Nehru, won an overwhelming victory. While Muslims comprised 30 per cent of the electorate, the Muslim League had the support of less than 5 per cent of the Muslim vote. The remainder of Muslim votes went to the various Muslim parties and individuals in the provinces who had rejected the League. In Bengal, Fazlul Haq who, with Hussein S. Suhrawardy, founded the Krishak Praja Party, proved to be the most able Muslim politician. In the Punjab, Fazl-i-Hussein led to victory his Unionist Party, a coalition of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. In the Northwest Frontier Province, Dr. Khan Sahib's Muslim Nationalists allied themselves with Congress to prevent outside Muslim influence. Only in the central Indian provinces, where Hindu majorities were great, did the Muslim League gain any significant votes.

In Bengal and the Punjab, Muslim leaders, although not members of the Muslim League, formed coalition governments with non-Muslims. The Muslim League expected also to join coalition governments in other provinces, but instead was rebuffed by the National Congress, which demanded that Muslims resign from the League if they wished to participate in governments. Indignantly, Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, and other League leaders stormed across India demanding recognition for the League. Their list of grievances grew and with it more support. Bengal's Fazlul Haq and the Punjabi Prime Minister, Sikander Hayat Khan, backed the League.

The League had one major weakness. It was composed of the urban elite and had little contact with the masses. Its

Aligarh graduates represented businessmen, landlords, and professional people who were modernists in religion, but conservative in economics and naive in politics. If anyone had contact with the Muslim masses it was the Deoband conservatives such as Maulana Abu Ala Maududi and his Jama'at-i-Islami (Community of Islam) and Abul Kalam Azad. More sympathetic to the Congress, they rejected the League for its "Aligarh" leadership, and its equivocal stand against the British.

Iqbal saw the problem. He wrote: "I believe that a political organization which gives no promise of improving the lot of the average Muslim cannot attract our masses." Again he wrote: "The League will have to finally decide whether it will remain a body representing the upper classes of Indian Muslims or the Muslim masses, who have so far, with good reason, taken no interest in it."

Nor was Jinnah convinced that Iqbal's two-nation theory meant Pakistan. Iqbal believed that Jinnah would inevitably have a change of heart. The poet stressed his case repeatedly and in 1937 he wrote to Jinnah: "Don't you think the time for such a demand has already arrived?" Iqbal died the next year and still Jinnah resisted Pakistan.

In 1939, war broke out in Europe and the British, without consulting the National Congress, declared India a belligerent and suspended constitutional reform. The Congress ministries in seven of India's eleven provinces resigned in protest. Jinnah called it a "Day of Deliverance" from Hindu rule. With Congress members such as Nehru and Gandhi alternately in and out of jail, the Muslim League grew stronger and Jinnah's authority over party members greater.

The path toward Muslim nationhood was cleared of dialectical and political debris in 1940 at the Muslim League's annual conference in Lahore. Jinnah had finally accepted the

inevitability of Pakistan and the honor fell to Fazlul Haq of Bengal to introduce the "Pakistan Resolution":

"No constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to Muslims unless . . . the areas in which Muslims are numerically in the majority as in the northwest and eastern zones . . . shall be autonomous and sovereign."

A few months later, Jinnah stated: "No power on earth can prevent Pakistan."

He threw himself fiercely into the political maelstrom. He began wearing the *shalwar* and *shamian,* the native dress of educated Muslims. He was sixty-four years old before he felt the effects of popularity; it rejuvenated his spirit and, in return, he rejuvenated the Muslim League. Muslims, high and —finally—low, called him "Quaid-i-Azam," or Great Leader. He organized an All-Indian Muslim Students Federation to attract young people in the Pakistan movement. Fazlul Haq, H. S. Suhrawardy and Liaquat Ali Khan rallied the Muslim masses. League members appeared more frequently in the ministries of the Punjab, Bengal, the Northwest Frontier, Sind and Assam.

Opposition to the League was intense. Nehru called the idea of Pakistan "absurd." Later, Gandhi met with Jinnah and proposed that the League and the Congress unite and achieve independence, *after* which the people of the various areas could vote for the kind of future they wanted. Jinnah replied that he doubted Gandhi's authority to make such a promise and the talks collapsed.

Some Muslim leaders opposed Pakistan and the League. Religious conservatives such as Maulana Maududi believed that nationalism was incompatible with Islam. In the Northwest Frontier Province, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the "Frontier Gandhi," allied his followers with the Indian National Congress. His Khuda-i-Khidmatgars (Servants of God), called "Red Shirts" because of their clothing, believed that Pathans

would be able to retain their separate identity more effectively under a Congress government in Delhi than a Muslim government in Pakistan. In Kashmir, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the most popular Muslim leader in this Hindu-ruled state, felt confident that an independent India led by his close friend, Jawaharlal Nehru, would respect the semi-autonomous status which he hoped Kashmir would have. He linked his Jammu and Kashmir National Conference Party with the Congress and against the League.

At the end of World War II Britain faced with little heart the continued rule of India. It was apparent to all that India must soon be freed. In India, Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs were tense with anticipation, each fearful of their position under a future government. Riots shook Calcutta and the Royal Indian Navy mutinied. Britain's new Labor government called for elections in India in the winter of 1945.

The Muslim League Succeeds

With more vigor than his frail body could stand, Jinnah, accompanied by his lieutenants, began touring northern India, speaking to all the Muslims he could reach. Although he spoke in English, his eloquence, coupled with dramatic gestures with his monocle and an admonishing forefinger, swept his listeners with him. Thousands upon thousands of Muslims thrust their devotion upon a man whose words they could scarcely comprehend.

"Vote for a Muslim Leaguer even if it be a lamp-post," he urged. Many took him literally.

This time, the League had a colossal success. It won all 30 Muslim seats in the Central Legislative Assembly. In provincial parliaments, it won 427 out of 507 Muslim seats. It failed to capture Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's Northwest Frontier and in the Punjab where, although it gained 78 out

of 175 seats, the Unionist Party joined with Congress and the Sikhs to form the government. Nehru's National Congress won the non-Muslim constituencies.

The elections over, the British sent a Cabinet Mission under Sir Stafford Cripps to India to promote "the early realization of self-government." It suggested that an interim government be set up to oversee elections in the provincial legislatures for a constituent assembly which would write India's new constitution. When the Muslim League demanded that Muslim members of the interim government must belong to the Muslim League, Congress refused to join. The British dropped plans for the interim government and called for elections anyway.

Jinnah protested. "Goodbye to constitutional methods," he said.

Muslims felt let down at the failure of the interim government plan. To maintain their confidence and press their claims, the League prepared for demonstrations.

In July, 1946, elections were held in the provincial legislatures. The League won all but 3 of the 79 Muslim seats. However, the future of Pakistan obviously lay in the good intentions of the 292 National Congress members, few of whom had ever accepted the premise of a "divided India" with provinces grouped according to the predominant religion. These intentions were made clear in a remark by Congress President Nehru:

"The big probability is that there will be no grouping (of provinces)."

The angry League took to the streets and sanctioned plans for a Direct Action Day on August 16. Both Britain and the National Congress poured fuel on the fire. On August 8, the Viceroy invited Congress to form an interim government without the League. Muslims were furious. On August 9, the Na-

tional Congress also called for demonstrations. They came at a time when famine was spreading across the land, laborers were striking in the cities, and lawlessness was rampant.

In Calcutta, a tinder box of violence, Muslims on August 16, 1946 marched toward government headquarters on Direct Action Day. Hindus tried to bar their way. Houses were set on fire, shops were looted, hospitals were jammed. After three days, the Great Calcutta Killing cost the lives of more than 5,000 people, mostly Hindus, and more than 20,000 were injured.

Sir Francis Tuker, the British officer then commanding the army in the Eastern Command, reported how events in Calcutta led to violence in Bihar as Hindus sought revenge. There, the death toll exceeded 8,000. Tuker describes a typical day's "unrest":

"On the evening of the 6th of November, 1946, at a side-show run by Muslims, there was a motor-cycling display called 'The Wall of Death.' There was a fair crowd watching when a Muslim performer threw a jest at a Jatni (a person of a racial group called the Jats) woman spectator. . . . A sudden shout went up that a Muslim had insulted a Hindu woman. At once on this alarm a number of small bands of Jats rushed out and, in concerted fashion, set to work to massacre the Muslim stallholders at the *mela* (fair), scattered all about the fair grounds quietly plying their trade. Practically every Muslim man, woman and child was murdered with appalling cruelty. Either here or later even pregnant women were ripped up, their unborn babies torn out and the infants' brains bashed out on walls and on the ground. There was rape, and women and children were seized by the legs by burly fiends and torn apart. These hellions looted and burnt the show, casting the dead and dying into the flames. Most were killed with spears but some of the killings were by strangulation.

. . . The murderers' women stood about, laughing with glee at the burning booths, egging on their menfolk." *

While much of the violence in these days was spontaneous, some was carefully plotted. Each community had its organized, militant battalions. Among Muslims, the League had formed a National Guard with units in Bengal, United Provinces and the Punjab. Extremist Muslims formed the Khaksars, chiefly in the Punjab. Hindus had the R.S.S.S., a militant arm of the extremists with training camps in Bihar and Bengal, and the Congress-run Seva Dal. According to their religion, Sikh men carry swords; they also have traditions of military action and many served in the army. Each Sikh village could thus boast of a body of trained warriors prepared to act in a crisis.

On February 20, 1947, Prime Minister Attlee announced that the British would leave India in June, 1948, and, to direct the operation he sent Lord Louis Mountbatten to India as Viceroy.

The announcement of Britain's impending departure heightened the anxiety, particularly in the Punjab. Up to 1947, most of the blood had flowed in the cities and villages in Bengal, Bihar, and United Provinces. Now it was the Punjab's turn.

In one of its proposals for the future India, the British Cabinet Mission placed the Punjab in one unit, Bengal in another. Whoever controlled the unit controlled the province. Jinnah had accepted this grouping. So had the Congress. Not so the Sikhs of the Punjab or the Hindus of Bengal and Assam. They would be minorities under the Muslims and were as fearful of this possibility as the Muslims were of being a minority in India.

The Sikhs of the Punjab had always opposed the idea of

* Sir Francis Tuker, *While Memory Serves* (London: Cassell & Co., 1950) p. 198.

Pakistan. Most of them lived in the eastern part, but many lived around Lahore. Should the Punjab be declared part of Pakistan, Sikhs would be ruled by their traditional enemy, the Muslims.

Some Sikh leaders preferred to solve the problem by constitutional methods. Others adopted the tradition of the ancient Sikh warriors. Led by war-trained ex-soldiers of the Indian National Army, which fought with the Japanese against the British during World War II, many Sikhs joined private communal armies.

Trouble began in earnest after March, 1947, following the resignation, under Muslim League pressure, of the Unionist Party-Congress Party-Sikh coalition government in the Punjab. Communal riots swept the streets of Lahore, Rawalpindi and Amritsar. British authority at the local level collapsed as marauding bands of Sikhs and Muslims attacked each others' villages mercilessly.

Master Tara Singh, a revered Sikh leader, cried: "There can be no settlement if Muslims want to rule the Punjab."

Said another, Gyani Kartar Singh, president of the Akali Dal: "Our battle-axes shall decide if the Muslims shall rule."

Violence lent urgency to all three parties—British, Congress, and the Muslim League. Nehru demanded that in any partition arrangement the Punjab and Bengal be cut in two. Jinnah accepted, saying: "Better a moth-eaten Pakistan than no Pakistan at all." Lord Mountbatten returned to London and on June 4, 1947, announced suddenly that independence would be given to India *and* Pakistan on August 15. The following month, the British Parliament passed the India Independence Act creating the two new nations.

The very urgency that led to independence—and partition—months before either side expected it, produced chaos as tens of thousands fled from their homes, killing and being killed. Out of the chaos came Pakistan.

5. *The Faltering Start*

Two words, shouted rhythmically, marked the spirit of the new country after August 15, 1947. *"Pakistan Zindebad!" "Pakistan Zindebad!"* (Long live Pakistan.) Near Karachi, a defective tie derailed a train. Dozens of workers shouting "Pakistan Zindebad!" lifted it back onto the tracks within thirty minutes. People who had known little happiness found hope in the cry, "Pakistan Zindebad!" With not much else but spirit and a resolute leader, they set about creating a country.

Mohammed Ali Jinnah had been flown to Karachi a week before independence day, landing amidst a vast sea of people who had come to pay him homage. He was tired and sick, but he smiled as his car moved slowly along the hot Sind desert road to Government House.

"You are free," he told them, and they shouted, "Quaid-i-Azam Zindebad!"

To the discomfort of Sind government officials, Jinnah selected his home town of Karachi as the capital. Lahore was too close to India, and Dacca . . . well, that was in East Bengal. So thousands of strangers, mostly government clerks, descended on the quiet Arabian Sea port from New Delhi and Bombay with authority to take over desks, chairs, telephones and even houses. When Jinnah found the bookshelves of the Sind Governor's mansion empty, he insisted that the governor return the books. He ordered some "borrowed" croquet mallets and wickets sent back from Lahore.

Commissions under Sir Cyril Radcliffe set out to define the borders of the two countries. In Bengal, precedence helped. The partition in 1905, revoked in 1911, set a pattern for the 1947 borders, with West Bengal to include the city of Calcutta. A few sub-districts in Assam around the city of Sylhet became part of Pakistan. Yet many small areas were left undefined to create later controversy with India.

The Punjab was not so easy. Radcliffe's Boundary Commission could make no mark on the map without antagonizing someone. District by district, *tehsil* by *tehsil*, the line was drawn harshly through villages, farmlands and irrigation systems. Both leaders, Nehru and Jinnah, stood valiantly by their agreement to accept the Radcliffe decisions, even as their countrymen howled in protest.

The violence of pre-partition days was only a prologue to the anguish that followed August, 1947. For months before, families had been packing their few belongings and heading toward lands of their faith, where, presumably, they would be safe. Now, with the Punjab partitioned, the roads were clogged with frightened people seeking haven some place beyond. Trains leaving New Delhi for Lahore were jammed with Muslims; many did not get there. Near Amritsar, Sikhs slaughtered entire trainloads of men, women and children. In Lahore and West Punjab villages, Muslims killed great numbers of Sikhs and Hindus.

Within a few months, between 100,000 and 200,000 people died violently. The exact number may never be known. When the thousands who died from starvation and disease are added to these, the estimates exceed 500,000. The number who left their homes to settle in another land was close to 12,000,000. No other population movement in history involved so many people in so short a time. Bitterness was deep.

In cities across Pakistan and India, from Peshawar to Chittagong, hordes of poor and hungry *muhajireen* (refugees)

sought shelter, food and jobs. Karachi, before the war a modest port town of 25,000, suddenly became a swollen and squalid metropolis of nearly 1,000,000. The lucky ones lived in cane-built lean-to's propped against the sides of buildings and in shantytowns. The less fortunate passed their days and nights in the gutters or on the sidewalks. In all the towns of the new country, starvation, exposure, disease and despair marked the cost of partition. In Indian cities, Hindu and Sikh refugees created squalor and unrest no less fearful than in Pakistan.

Colossal Problems

Partition involved more than dividing peoples. Filing cabinets, naval vessels, railway cars, airplanes, bank accounts, and surgical instruments had to be shared. A commission established general rules for dividing the subcontinent's assets, with India getting the larger share. Division of the "spoils" plagued relations between the two countries in succeeding years and remains an aggravating friction.

As if the violent emotions generated by partition were not enough, the realities of economics seemed even more calamitous. Pakistan's two wings had no industry of significance, they had poor transportation, little electric power, and few administrators and technicians. What little economic strength existed was largely sapped by collisions with India and the demands of the refugees.

In 1947, Pakistan's economy depended upon four crops—cotton, wheat, rice, and jute. The population movements in the wheat- and cotton-producing Punjab caused a sharp drop in production and the vital irrigation systems were broken in two. Cotton, the major export product of West Pakistan, lost its Indian market and great mounds of cotton bales rotted on the wharves of Karachi. In East Pakistan, heaps of jute bales sat in Dacca unable to be moved by rail or shipped to the jute mills of Calcutta. A jute war between the two countries, each

side raising its demands and duties against the other, led to a complete economic break between East and West Bengal.

Partition left Pakistan without any industrial wealth to fall back on as its agricultural base deteriorated. What few small factories existed in the Punjab were Hindu- and Sikh-operated and they began to deteriorate when the Hindus left. There was a banking system but no one to operate it and investment capital, except for some funds from Hyderabad State in India, was scarce. Even the traditions of Muslim society worked against industrial progress. Muslims had habitually invested in land and trade, not industry or banking. One group of Muslims, the Ismailis from Bombay, were trained in banking. After partition, many of them migrated to Karachi where they played a vital role in financing the new government.

The formidable task of setting up a government fell to fewer than 100 top Muslim, British-trained administrators, not one of whom was a Bengali. At their side stood three other groups, two Muslim and one non-Muslim. The first was the military, whose dedicated, non-political cadre of leaders, all British-trained and experienced in administration, assured a degree of stability. A second was the judiciary which contained some of India's outstanding legal minds. Islam's emphasis on law had led many Indian Muslims into the legal profession where they attained considerable stature. Pakistan's courts were to be a bulwark in the stormy years ahead.

Another group who gave initial help was the Christian Anglo-Indians. For generations, these people, a part of each culture, yet belonging to neither, had performed a unique role in society. Both English and Indians had confidence enough in them to entrust them with vital responsibilities. While political bombshells burst around them, they kept the trains running, the telephone and telegraph lines open and the police force under control.

But helpful as these dedicated and loyal groups were, Jinnah realized they were inadequate to fill Pakistan's needs. His solution to the manpower problem was in keeping with his realism. He hired the British and, fortunately, there were many former "colonialists" who were willing and able to assist. Throughout the government in its early days, the British held posts requiring special skills and experience.

The government of Pakistan on August 15, 1947, was based on the Government of India Act of 1935 and the India Independence Act of 1947. This "constitution" provided for a parliamentary government along British lines with a Crown-appointed governor and a legislature from which a cabinet was to be selected to carry out executive functions. It divided the responsibilities of government between the central parliament—called the National Assembly—and the parliaments of the various provinces. The central cabinet theoretically had authority over the defense and security of the country—the armed forces, communications, railroads—and finance and foreign affairs. The provincial cabinets controlled health, education, agriculture, local government and law enforcement. The largest administrative units of the provinces were called divisions, headed by an appointed divisional commissioner. Divisions were administered through districts, each with a magistrate or commissioner, whose main functions were to collect taxes and maintain law and order in the tradition of Moghul and British government in the subcontinent. There was no machinery for involving the villagers in government.

Jinnah accepted the Crown appointment of governor-general of Pakistan, while in India Lord Louis Mountbatten assumed this post. Presumably it was a figure-head job, as it was in India, but Jinnah established a precedent. He was boss.

Pakistan's new legislature was composed, with a few exceptions, of Muslim Leaguers elected in 1946 to the Indian Constituent Assembly. Jinnah was also president of the As-

sembly, whose cabinet comprised members of the Muslim League and one Hindu. Liaquat Ali Khan, Jinnah's longtime aide, was prime minister, minister of defense and minister of foreign affairs. (In India, Jawaharlal Nehru became prime minister.) The finance minister was Ghulam Mohammed, a strong-willed Punjabi educated at Aligarh University and one of the few Muslims to rise to the top of the Indian Civil Service. From Bengal, Jinnah selected Fazlur Rahman, a lawyer, and J. N. Mandal, a Hindu "untouchable" who had been president of the Bengal Scheduled Castes Federation.

New Pakistan appeared in the family of nations as an independent state, geographically divided, but constitutionally united. Mohammed Ali Jinnah was its head and his loyal cabinet represented the various parts. In fact, however, Pakistan in late 1947 was a very unstable mixture of provinces and powerful leaders who, amidst the emotions of religion and the harsh realities of politics, joined together under a strong leader to meet an emergency. Each had interests of its own which spread the disease of dissension that threatened Pakistan soon after its birth.

East Bengal had the largest number of special interests. A thousand miles from the capital of Karachi and separated from the western provinces by an enemy as yet unresigned to Pakistan independence, East Bengal felt neglected from the start. Indeed, Bengal's chief minister in early 1947, Hussein S. Suhrawardy, demanded Bengal's complete independence and, on being rebuffed by Jinnah, decided not to live in Pakistan. While he was a member of the Pakistan National Assembly (elected by the East Bengal legislature), he joined Mahatma Gandhi in West Bengal and spent many months attempting to settle communal problems in India. He did not reside permanently in Pakistan until after Jinnah's death.

Suhrawardy's views were indicative of the chauvinistic views of many Bengalis, but in 1947 millions of them were enthusi-

astic about the new "Islamic" state. Besides their religious feelings, many also remembered the elation of partition forty-two years earlier.

East Bengalis entered the nationhood of Pakistan with pride; their beloved leader, Fazlul Haq, had presented the "Pakistan Resolution" to the Muslim League in 1940. They outnumbered West Pakistanis 47,000,000 to 33,000,000. Their agricultural cash crops, jute and tea, earned 70 per cent of Pakistan's foreign exchange. Compared with the West Pakistanis, East Bengalis knew they were better educated, more experienced politically and more united. Independence, as with partition years before, was their hope of solving their poverty and their dependence upon the Hindus of Calcutta. Out of 2,237 large landholders, only 356 were Muslims.

Yet their country's new capital was Karachi, in the province of Sind. In the nation's new parliament, legislators spoke English and Urdu, not Bengali. The power of the Muslim League belonged to Indian refugees, not to East Bengalis. Muslim League spokesmen from Bengal, Fazlur Rahman and Khwaja Nazimuddin, were political conservatives, members of a landlord dynasty who represented urban wealth, not rural poverty. Bengalis felt that their new Pakistan government was neglecting them, particularly when Punjabi troops arrived in Dacca "to keep order" and Punjabi administrators took over government offices (although there were no trained Bengalis to handle these chores).

Each West Pakistan province contained special interests and severe problems, too. The Punjab, largest by far of the western provinces and also the wealthiest, swarmed with powerful leaders, nearly all landlords, each seeking to control provincial governments and, ultimately, the central government. The problems of the Punjab were immense. For a while, refugees descended on Lahore at the rate of 51,000 a day. Dozens of factories stood idle. Agricultural land lay fallow. The head-

waters of West Punjab's great canal system were in the hands of the enemy, India, which intermittently cut off the flow of precious water. The future of the people depended upon prompt attention to the province's agriculture, industry and restless population. Extremist groups such as the Majlis-i-Ahrars and the communists sought to foment revolution.

The Northwest Frontier Province always played a special role in South Asian affairs and its leaders demanded special attention after partition. Pathan nationalism was strong and Pathan loyalty to Pakistan was tenuous. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, loved and respected by many tribesmen, had persuaded his followers to support the Indian National Congress, and his brother, Dr. Khan Sahib, had been chief minister in a Frontier Congress ministry.

The growing appeal of the Pakistan movement had finally found adherents in the Frontier, among them the influential Pir of Manki Sharif and Abdul Quayyum Khan. In July, 1947, Pathans in the "administered" area of the NWFP voted to join Pakistan and in August the Muslim League leaders joined the National Assembly in Karachi. The cooperation of some Pathans was not wholehearted; Jinnah soon ordered Abdul Ghaffar Khan imprisoned and Dr. Khan deposed as chief minister and placed under house detention.

Jinnah knew his people. Immediately after partition, he withdrew Pakistani army units from the Frontier and left the responsibility for law and order in the hands of the Pathans themselves. Eventually such Pathan leaders as Abdul Quayyum Khan and Sardar Rab Nishtar were able to develop among Pathans a sense of identity with Pakistan strong enough to resist Afghan and Indian attempts to stir up demands for Pashtunistan.

Sind Province created no special problems equal to those of Bengal, Punjab or the Frontier. Most Sind politicians—all wealthy landlords—were generally loyal to the Muslim

League, but prone to misconduct and corruption. The first prime minister of Sind was M. A. Khuro, one of the province's largest landlords who, when Jinnah dismissed him in 1948, was charged with sixty-two specific allegations of maladministration. Sind's problems were acutely social and economic, although for a period the existence of the capital in Karachi caused friction between the provincial leaders and government.

Jinnah had proclaimed that Pakistan could succeed only through "unity, faith and discipline," and these were the goals he constantly sought during the one year left to him to lead his people. As the summer heat descended on Karachi in 1948, Jinnah moved his little court to the spruce- and juniper-covered hills above Quetta in a village called Ziarat. Here in the cool heights he lived his last days, issuing orders, fretting over government papers and worrying about the bitter battle between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. On September 11, an airplane flew him back to Karachi on a stretcher. That night, he died.

The invincible leader, then, was gone. For the first time in many years, South Asian Muslims had no single individual to direct their course. Jinnah had held the country together through the sheer force of his will. Admonishing politicians, lecturing civil servants and commanding obedience, he literally ordered Pakistanis to unite. Quaid-i-Azam spoke and his people obeyed.

Jinnah's personality made the position of governor-general important, although its powers were limited by the British constitutional tradition. To fill this post, the Muslim League selected a Bengali landlord, Khwaja Nazimuddin. Liaquat Ali Khan continued as prime minister and upon him fell the mantle of leadership. He had the advantages not only of being Jinnah's chief lieutenant, but he was also a refugee and not identified with any particular province.

Nevertheless, Jinnah's death released a torrent of suppressed ambitions. They fell into two general fields. One involved the controversy over the role of religion in the new country, as expressed specifically in the writing of a new constitution. The other was the struggle by urban politicians for power within the various provinces and among the provinces for control of the central government. Neither issue involved or was meant to include the millions of Pakistani villagers.

Religious Debates

The responsibility for writing a constitution lay with the National Assembly, which had also been designated a Constituent Assembly. In the latter role, the members met on the average of ten days a year during the first six years of Pakistan's existence. They could not produce a constitution. They did stir up considerable argument, however, some of which led to bloodshed.

The arguments over Pakistan's future laws were, in a real sense, a continuation of the reform movements and dialogues over Islam in the subcontinent begun in the eighteenth century. They involved many of the descendants of the early reformers, such as Maulvi Tamizzudin Khan, who was President of the Constituent Assembly. They included movements which had their birth over a century ago. For the first time, the followers of Sayyid Ahmed Khan's Aligarh "progressive" movement met in open debate with the classical and fundamentalist followers of the Deoband school of theology to try and produce a practical constitution for a twentieth century state. Very little of the discourse concerned the people of Pakistan.

The extreme—and loudest—position was led by Maulana Maududi, president of the Jama'at i Islami, who, after partition (which he had opposed) brought his followers to Pakistan in hopes of creating there a true Islamic community. Among the refugees in Lahore, to whom he and his adherents

ministered devotedly in both material aid and spiritual sustenance, he gained many supporters. Students and workers also came under his influence as their frustrations found an outlet in Maududi's religious fundamentalism.

Some of Maududi's demands were that the state should be declared an "agent of God," the basic law should be the shari'a, and only Muslims could hold major offices. Maududi did not consider Ahmadiyas true Muslims. The economic system and social structure would be that revealed by the Koran and sunnah. Maududi called for an Islamic revolution to re-create the life of Arabia 1,325 years ago.

A less reactionary position was held by the ulema of respected Muslim divines, the Jama'at-i-Ulema-i-Islam, led originally by Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani (who died in 1949). Maulana Usmani was a member of the Muslim League and a partisan of an "Islamic" state. He once wrote: "The mullah does not want to rule, he only wants the rulers to be somewhat like the mullah."

To the academicians and politicians went the task of presenting the various degrees of secularism. They included conservative landlords, students of British liberalism and Muslims still enamored by the ruthless, but effective leadership of Kemal Ataturk who brought secular government to Turkey after World War I. They were joined by members of religious minorities—Hindus, Christians, Parsees, as well as Shi'ites and Ahmadiyas—who were apprehensive of their positions in a state based solely on Islamic law as interpreted by Maulana Maududi and Maulana Usmani.

Their fears were heightened by religious riots, aimed mainly at the Ahmadiyas. Serious agitation against this minority Muslim sect began in 1952 as debate of the Islamic constitution reached an emotional pitch. The Ahmadiyas represented to many Sunnites the epitome of heresy. Even more galling was that Mohammed Zafrulla Khan, the foreign minister, was an

Ahmadiya. Accusing him of packing the foreign ministry with Ahmadiyas, Maulana Maududi and other Muslim groups, especially the Ahrars in the Punjab, called for his resignation and demonstrated in the streets. In Lahore and Karachi, sporadic protests fanned into violence. After the army quelled the riots, a military court sentenced Maududi to death, but the sentence was later commuted. The Ahrars were banned.

Provincialism

Provincialism plagued Pakistan from the start and provided Liaquat Ali Khan with his greatest test of leadership after Jinnah's death. That he passed the test could be attributed to his strong personality and favorable economic conditions brought on by good harvests and the Korean war. He was also aided by public fear of India. While many Pakistani politicians placed their own personal and provincial interests ahead of Pakistan's national interest, they were first of all more anti-Indian than anything else. If the alternative to unity was re-association with India, they would be patriotic Pakistanis.

On October 16, 1951, Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated while making a speech in Rawalpindi. The seeds of disruption burst into full bloom as the Punjabis and Bengalis fought for power. In the next seven years, Pakistan had six prime ministers and one revolution.

To fill the vacancy left by Liaquat's death, the Muslim League selected the Bengali Governor-General, Khwaja Nazimuddin, as prime minister. The Punjabis were able to have the finance minister, Ghulam Mohammed, made governor-general. He, like Jinnah, applied a firm hand in the position. Unlike Jinnah, he was identified in Bengal with the Punjabi partisans who controlled the civil service and the army. He was blamed by Bengalis for Pakistan's refusal in 1949 to devalue its currency in the face of devaluation by India and

Great Britain. At the time, devaluation helped India's jute industry at the expense of East Bengal's.

Nazimuddin was not a forceful person, yet he was surrounded by forceful politicians. Indeed, many members of his own cabinet, although members of the League, formed their own personal followings in the National Assembly. The League became increasingly splintered and, finally, powerless.

The Muslim League had come to life in the sheltered salons of India's more prosperous, educated Muslims. For a few years, Jinnah and Liaquat had drawn support from the Muslim masses, but on their deaths the League forgot them. It returned to the salons from which it came, offering no philosophy, ideal or program to the people of Pakistan.

Nazimuddin was a loyal Muslim Leaguer who, though he was from Bengal, was not a Bengali nationalist. He spoke Urdu himself, and even called upon Bengalis to accept Urdu as *the* only national language. Protests spread through the province and Nazimuddin and the Muslim League lost support. Inability to control the anti-Ahmadiya riots in Lahore and Karachi, continued defeats in the negotiations with India and the United Nations over Kashmir, and serious economic reverses combined to bring about Nazimuddin's downfall. In 1953, the governor-general summarily dismissed him, thereby violating—for the first time, but not the last time—the principles of parliamentary democracy.

The new prime minister was also a Bengali, from Bogra, Mohammed Ali, whose main qualifications for the position were his successful ambassadorship in Washington, D. C. and his lack of involvement in politics. He, too, failed to provide leadership or strength equal to that of Ghulam Mohammed and before long, the specter of Bengal nationalism rose to defeat him. The very fact that he was *not* a politician turned out to be a weakness.

In March, 1954, Bengal held its first elections. Into the fray came the old pre-partition parties—Suhrawardy's Awami League and Fazlul Haq's Krishak Sramik Party, as well as other small groups, including the communists. As a United Front, they overpowered the impotent Muslim League, which gained only 10 out of the 309 seats. Fazlul Haq became provincial chief minister in the midst of labor riots. He exacerbated the situation by calling for an "independent" Bengal. The central government in Karachi, still controlled by the Muslim League, charged Fazlul Haq with treason and ousted him. A new governor was sent to control the rebellious province. His name was Iskander Mirza, an army major-general and longtime civil servant who within days had his army arrest more than 1,000 people.

The collapse of the Muslim League in Bengal and subsequent demonstrations throughout the country, as well as the National Assembly attempt to curb his powers, led Ghulam Mohammed on October 24, 1954 to declare a national state of emergency. He dissolved the National Assembly—many of whose members represented the defunct League in Bengal—only to have the courts declare his move illegal. On other grounds, he declared a new state of emergency and again the courts contradicted him. Rather than call back the old unrepresentative assembly, Ghulam Mohammed, under prodding from the Supreme Court, called for a new parliament. In the summer of 1955, the provincial legislatures elected eighty members to Pakistan's Second National (and Constituent) Assembly. The Muslim League won twenty-six seats.

In the face of Bengal's repudiation of the Muslim League, Mohammed Ali resigned as prime minister. In October, 1955, due as much to illness as politics, Ghulam Mohammed also resigned as governor-general. He died a year later.

The new Assembly politicians called upon General Iskander Mirza to be governor-general. He was a bureaucrat, autocratic

and impatient. He had no hesitation in announcing publicly that what Pakistan needed was a "controlled democracy."

His prime minister was a Punjabi civil servant named Chaudhri Mohammed Ali. One of his first acts was to carry out a plan that Punjabis had been hatching for some time—the unification of West Pakistan. Called the One Unit scheme, the integration of West Pakistan's four provinces and ten small principalities into one unit, with its capital at Lahore, would be economically advantageous and put West Pakistanis on an equal footing with East Pakistanis. Through the Muslim League in West Pakistan, Punjabis expected to control the new province. While their Muslim League-dominated legislatures approved the plan, many Pathans, Sindis and other non-Punjabi groups took a dim view of this development. Bengalis were particularly incensed.

Under Chaudhri Mohammed Ali, Pakistan also acquired its first constitution, which came into effect on March 23, 1956. By late 1955, the ingredients of Pakistan's new constitutional cake were ready for mixing. They had been studied, discussed, fought over and written into numerous documents and proposals, generating considerable political heat. Unfortunately, the cake fell in the baking. It lacked the leavening of reality and opportunity.

The 1956 constitution, which was meant to continue the old parliamentary system, was basically a "foreign" document, imported by British-trained Muslim lawyers who were steeped in British-Indian parliamentary history. It took the British 700 years to develop the basis of British common law and political responsibility. Pakistanis, over 80 per cent illiterate and independent for only nine years, were expected to provide this basis almost overnight. With good leadership, such as Prime Minister Nehru gave to Indians, the system might have worked. But such leadership in Pakistan was lacking

and it had no opportunity to prove itself. Elections were never held under the 1956 constitution.

Many hopes rode on the new government of President Iskander Mirza and his new prime minister, Hussein Suhrawardy. Both were honest men. Mirza supplied administrative talent; Suhrawardy was a genuine and practical Bengali politician, capable of understanding the country's needs. Together, they sought joint electorates for Muslims and Hindus, reversing the very principle of Pakistan's formation. They kept Pakistan's pro-Western alliances strong, even in the face of the tempestuous Suez crisis. But eventually, General Mirza's desire to "control" democracy and his suspicion and contempt of political institutions collided with Suhrawardy's political activity and the two men parted company.

Beginning of Collapse

At the end of its first decade of life, Pakistan was a cauldron of political furor. The Punjabi politicians had begun to fight among themselves as well as with Pathans and Sindis. New parties appeared, old ones re-appeared. Few of them involved the villagers and small tradesmen who played little part in the first ten years of Pakistan's political life. Except in East Pakistan, where such leaders as Fazlul Haq genuinely sought the participation of villagers, politics and self-government was an urban activity limited to the educated few, especially the landlords, industrialists, and lawyers. Stripped of the personalities of their leaders, the political parties were ideologically similar—and empty.

President Mirza joined the political fray and engineered the appointment of the Pathan leader, Dr. Khan Sahib, as chief minister of the new single province of West Pakistan. Many prominent Punjabi politicians, members of the Muslim Leaguers, protested bitterly, especially when Dr. Khan Sahib

formed the new Republican Party in 1956 with President Mirza's backing. Each side found support from feuding landlord families across the province. The National Awami Party, led by a Sindi, G. M. Syed, and some Pathan followers of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, held the balance of power in the National Assembly between the League and the Republicans. Its major platform: dismantling the One Unit scheme.

In East Pakistan, disunity was no less intense. The United Front of Suhrawardy and Fazlul Haq collapsed, Suhrawardy's Awami Party rivaled Haq's Krishak Sramik Party, each seeking aid from the seventy-two Hindu and other minority members of the provincial assembly.

Across the country, moral standards seemed to deteriorate. Wealthy families and wholesale merchants hoarded food and smuggled gold. Food riots broke out in East Pakistan and a new movement began there with successionist claims. Smuggling between East Pakistan and West Bengal in India reached such proportions that the army inaugurated a campaign, called "Operation Close Door" to stop it. Labor strikes closed vital industries and Pakistan's foreign exchange reserves plummeted. The continued failure of Pakistan's diplomats to obtain concessions from India over Kashmir kept tempers high and the refugees still slept on the streets, ill and idle. Government officials resigned by the dozens as politicians hampered their work. Others resorted to corruption. In the villages, even the politically-disinterested farmer began to show his resentment. No one knew this better than the army recruiting officers, the few men in government service who had continual contact with Pakistan's rural masses. In the army, normally non-political officers became restless as they saw graft and greed subvert Jinnah's ideals for a Muslim nation.

In 1958, plans were laid for new elections under the 1956 constitution. Intrigue, especially in West Pakistan's legislature

in Lahore, rose to new heights. Dr. Khan Sahib was assassinated. Students in high schools and colleges were organized to electioneer for whichever candidate paid them the most. Landlords' agents toured their villages compelling voters to support their landlord. In East Pakistan's parliament, rivalry reached a violent climax when a fight broke out September 23, 1958. The deputy speaker was injured so badly when struck by a flying piece of furniture that he later died. President Mirza was unable to "control" his rampaging "democracy."

Once before, during the riots of 1955, the governor-general (Ghulam Mohammed) had asked the army's commander, General Mohammed Ayub Khan, to take over the country. General Ayub had refused. The army was solidly built upon British traditions of disassociation from politics; administer, yes, but govern, no. Its leaders had generally stayed out of politics and had done their work efficiently and effectively, gaining a good reputation for the army by quelling various riots in which it had been ordered to act. That it now took action on its own pointed to the low state into which Pakistan's leadership had fallen.

Early in October, 1958, General Ayub confronted President Mirza with the fact that the army was planning a coup d'état. On October 7, at General Ayub's insistence, President Mirza illegally suspended the constitution, abolished the legislatures and ordered political parties disbanded. He declared martial law throughout the country and appointed General Ayub as Chief of the Martial Law Administration.

General Ayub was prepared for the assignment. His troops had been placed quietly and strategically throughout the cities. There was no resistance and Pakistan's government fell peacefully without bloodshed.

At first, President Mirza and General Ayub, colleagues for years, attempted to work as a team. Only a few days passed,

however, before it was obvious to Ayub that Mirza was a liability. His reputation was tarnished, and he appeared to be more of a competitor than a partner. On October 27, Mirza reluctantly flew off to London and General Ayub declared himself "Head of State." Pakistan had become a military dictatorship.

6. *Experimental Democracy*

In October, 1958, many who cared for Asian affairs shrugged their shoulders. Another "underdeveloped country" had fallen to its army in a coup d'état. As had gone Egypt, Burma, Iraq and Syria, so went Pakistan.

"My authority is revolution," General Mohammed Ayub Khan openly admitted. "I have no sanction in law or constitution."

Promptly he began to act. He appointed "experts" to his cabinet—three army generals and eight civilians, four from each province. As minister of rehabilitation, he named General Azam Khan, whose army troops had quelled the Punjab riots of 1953. Mohammed Shoaib, a financier, took over the empty treasury. A lawyer and son of a respected judge, Manzur Qadir, became foreign minister. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a young and brilliant economist and lawyer, became minister of commerce. Behind closed doors, a powerful team of army officers, each in control of vital units of the armed forces, sat in continual conference.

As with many modern-day dictators, General Ayub ordered a literal cleanup of the country and soon Pakistanis were comparing the number of flies in Karachi with fly statistics from Communist China. But General Ayub wanted more than flies. Before the Martial Law Regime was ended on June 8, 1962, more than 1,660 government servants had been dismissed or forcibly retired for misconduct, corruption and inefficiency. Hundreds of businessmen and politicians had gone

to jail for blackmarketeering, hoarding and smuggling. More than two tons of smuggled gold had been uncovered and millions of rupees in unpaid taxes collected. New price controls and police action against hoarders stabilized the food markets. Ayub appointed commissions to study economics, education, health, land reform, and the entire political system. Within a few months these commissions had submitted their recommendations.

The efficiency of dictatorship brought startling results. Ayub was a man of quick decisions. On the advice of his land reform commissioner, Akhtar Hussain, he decreed new changes in land tenure and ownership which stripped power from some of the biggest landowners. He commanded General Azam Khan to settle Karachi's refugees without delay. A new Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, decreed in 1961, tore at the fabric of classical Islam, to the dismay of the mullahs. A Commission on National Education recommended sweeping changes in the educational system.

Many Pakistanis, those who had lost faith in their dream for a Muslim country, found new hope in the pronouncements and actions of Ayub's military government. It was as though Jinnah had returned and the enthusiasm of 1947 was felt anew. Former government servants who had resigned out of discouragement came back to join the move forward. Students who had been studying abroad rushed home.

Like many dictators, General Ayub vowed that his revolution was temporary.

"Let me announce in unequivocal terms," he said, "that our ultimate aim is to restore democracy." Throughout the world and particularly in India, many were skeptical.

Mohammed Ayub Khan was born on May 14, 1907, in Rihana village in the mountainous Hazara district between the former Northwest Frontier Province and the Punjab. Many Muslim military officers have been reared in this area

and, because of their family ties, have sometimes been called Pathans. However, few of them are considered Pathans by those tribesmen living to the west and few can speak good Pashto. For instance, General Ayub does not speak fluent Pashto.

Following modern tradition, Ayub as a young man attended Aligarh University and then entered the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, England. He served with a British regiment for a year, then joined the Fourteenth Punjab Regiment which saw action against the Japanese in Burma during World War II. By 1947, he was one of only thirty-two pre-war Muslim army officers; the rest were wartime recruits. Thus after partition, he rose rapidly in the service. He became a brigadier and led a brigade in the tribal area of Waziristan. Later, he commanded troops in East Pakistan and in 1951 became the first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief of the army, with instructions to re-organize and modernize the military.

A hearty, personable individual, over six feet tall, with a clipped mustache and a precise command of English, General Ayub was the model of British-Indian soldiery. He was an expert horseman. He loved to hunt, fish, and play tennis. His major interests were military history and international affairs. Local politics bored him, as did pompous politicians.

General Ayub was a seemingly reluctant dictator. His influence in the army had been strong for many years, ever since some army officers were implicated in a 1951 conspiracy to overthrow the government. On several occasions, he could have put the army into power—during the Punjab riots in 1953, after Nazimuddin's dismissal the same year, and after the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly in 1955. At that time Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed literally begged him to take over. Ayub may have been tempted to step in earlier, but his training opposed it. Although an impatient person, he was a disciplined soldier. Besides, he had

not completed the modernization of the army. In 1954, he joined the government's cabinet only to quit in disgust in 1956 over the game of politics.

The key to democratic government, said Ayub, lies in the effectiveness of institutions that represent and include the masses of people. Such institutions did exist in Pakistan and had been there for years, but they were stagnant from neglect.

Foremost among these were the panchayats, the village councils whose origins were centuries old. While empire after empire rose and fell, the villagers paid their taxes and, in relative isolation, governed themselves through these institutions. The members of the panchayats were the elders, the venerated religious leaders, the landlord or, later, his agent.

In Pakistan, the panchayats had little opportunity to perform constructive political work. They were not integrated into the framework of government. There was no regular election system. Ignored in West Pakistan, they were controlled by the landlords and the mullahs. They had no resources to undertake constructive action.

East Pakistan was more fortunate than West Pakistan. In the late nineteenth century, British administrators in Bengal established some 4,000 village councils called Union Boards, many based on the panchayats. The boards were primarily local security units which kept law and order and tried minor disputes. Sometimes they concerned themselves with the water supply, sanitation, or other social and political problems. Like the panchayats, however, they were isolated from the general structure of government; they were separate little political arenas often under the thumb of the landlord.

There were also municipal committees and councils throughout the larger towns of East and West Pakistan. These, too, had shown signs of positive action in meeting urban problems but more often than not they were torn with

political rivalries and again isolated from the government structure.

More recently, new village councils came into being through the Village AID (Agriculture and Industrial Development) program. Started in 1953 with the help of American technicians, the councils were more concerned with economics than politics, but they did give villagers an opportunity to work together. Nevertheless, the councils, grown to more than 19,000, also lacked contact with the political structure.

In a democracy, said Ayub, "every man, woman and child must participate to the fullest possible extent." In looking at these village and urban institutions and seeing that under previous parliamentary governments they had had little relationship with the political system, he concluded that they would not work. He said:

"Without going to the hard core of our nation at a really intimate level, every system of democracy in our country is bound to become a farce, as it did in the past. The large majority of our people live in villages. They are mostly uneducated and illiterate and, therefore, unable to exercise their right of vote except at a community or village level. Their personal contacts, and the immediacy and urgency of individual community interests make it practical and possible for them to judge people and elect only those in whom they have full confidence, based on personal knowledge of the candidate's background, temperament, behavior towards other people, and past performances in general. This also applies to the urban areas. . . ."

The institution for making democracy "intimate" was a new system (for Pakistan) called "Basic Democracies." General Ayub had formulated a plan for creating grass roots political institutions before he came to power. A year after his take-over, he promulgated the Basic Democracies order.

Basic Democracies

The "primary constituency" in the Basic Democracies is a group of neighbors numbering about 1,000. All persons in the group, men and women over twenty-one years of age, who are not government employees, may vote for a representative, who must be over twenty-five. This elected individual is called a Basic Democrat.

Basic Democrats are grouped together, like platoons, into councils. The smallest, with ten Basic Democrats and five others appointed by the government, is the Union Council or, in the cities, the Town Committee. There are 4,000 Councils in West Pakistan and 4,200 in East Pakistan, each representing about 10,000 people. After the 1965 elections, the government plans to dispense with appointed members.

The elected chairmen of the councils are members of the next higher group. In West Pakistan this is the Tehsil Council, named after the administrative district established long ago for tax purposes. In East Pakistan, the council is called Thana Council for the same reason. At least half the members of these councils must be Basic Democrats; the rest are appointed.

The next higher body is the District Council, composed of Basic Democrats from the Tehsil and Thana councils and other appointed members, with the latter outnumbering the former. Chairmen of these are members of Divisional councils. Theoretically, there is a Provincial Council, but this step has not yet been taken. Provincial matters are in the hands of Provincial Assemblies, whose members need not be Basic Democrats.

Each council in the chain has judicial, police, and developmental responsibilities. Each has limited taxing and spending authority. It is expected to respond to village needs in health, education, and economic development, initiating "self-

help" projects wherever possible. Its members work with government specialists assigned to its area. Each council chairman is president of a "conciliation court" which attempts to settle village disputes. These frequently involve marriage and divorce or controversies over water and grazing rights. Throughout, however, the government bureaucrats have complete authority over all council actions.

One of the greatest problems in Pakistan's governmental systems has been the ignorance of both the governed and the governing about the activities and needs of each. Through the Union Councils, villagers are expected to learn how and why government officials levy taxes, maintain law and order, operate schools and direct thousands of the experts trained to help with village problems. The villager learns that the government is not omnipotent and is unable to meet all his desires, or even his needs. The bureaucrat, on the other hand, is expected to become familiar with the primary needs and the limitations and strengths of the villagers.

The councils are above all expected to be educational, providing training grounds for future leaders. The government has established training centers so that Basic Democrats may learn how to conduct meetings, maintain correspondence and records, draw up and keep budgets, find new sources of revenue, utilize the skills of government servants, seek advice and obtain financial aid.

General Ayub ordered the first elections in the Basic Democracies program in December, 1959. Touring West Pakistan in a private train called "Pak Jumhuriat Special"—and East Pakistan by airplane—he spoke before thousands of villagers and townsmen, explaining the program and answering hundreds of questions. Student volunteers, radio, films, and pamphlets helped to "sell" the idea.

Government figures report that 67 per cent of the men and 42 per cent of the women of Pakistan voted. They elected

83,245 Basic Democrats, of whom 50,000 were village leaders, 30,000 were shopkeepers and tradesmen, and the remainder were businessmen, journalists, retired civil servants and lawyers. About 10,000 were illiterate. Many Village AID leaders were elected.

The elections were relatively honest, although there were cases of purchased votes. Indeed, one of the problems inherent in the system is that a candidate need secure less than 1,000 votes to be elected.

Other weaknesses appeared. Illiterate villagers did not suddenly acquire a sense of social responsibility overnight. They elected many landlords, mullahs and pirs, the old panchayat leaders who were able to perpetuate their power through the traditional social system. Urban groups, who number only about 15 per cent of the population, yet contain nearly 100 per cent of the educated, professional leaders, lost considerable representation. Non-Muslims elected only 7.5 per cent of the Basic Democrats whereas they comprise 12 per cent of the population.

The concept of the Basic Democracies reflects a soldier's attempt to organize the entire society along military lines. It is an experiment in limited, but expanding, self-government, which requires the test of time before it is proven. It could prove no less effective, however, than the program Pakistan tried half-heartedly during its first ten years.

It was to the 83,000 Basic Democrats that General Ayub turned in early 1960 to confirm his command of the revolution. In an election in which the Basic Democrats were given a choice of General Ayub or no one, 95.6 per cent voted for General Ayub. On February 14, 1960, he took the oath of office as president. A few days later, he appointed a commission of five East and five West Pakistanis to draw up a new constitution.

The Constitution of 1962


President Ayub's call for a new constitution relighted all the old fires of controversy over the meaning of Pakistan. This time, however, the fires were carefully tended by the Pakistan army which, under the Martial Law Regime, effectively controlled the country. Political parties attempted to re-emerge only to be suppressed. Many politicians went to jail.

President Ayub laid down four conditions for his democracy. It should:

1) Be simple to understand, easy to work and cheap to run;
2) Put to the voter only such questions as the voter can understand without external prompting;
3) Ensure the effective participation of all citizens to their full intellectual capacity;
4) Produce reasonably strong and stable governments.

The constitutional commission reported in a little over a year. It said that Pakistan had no deep traditions in parliamentary government. British colonial government in pre-partition India was certainly not "parliamentary" so far as South Asians were concerned. The commission claimed that the failure of parliamentary government after 1947 was not the fault of the system, but an absence of proper elections, undue interference from heads of state, irresponsible political parties and poor leadership. The commission recommended a stronger presidential role, but an equally powerful legislature. President Ayub disagreed and challenged the suitability of the parliamentary system. Behind the scenes, with General Azam Khan and Manzur Qadir, he prepared another version which became the new constitution on March 1, 1962.

In a stroke, the President made Pakistan a republic governed by a single president (no vice-president), a single na-



William R. Simmons

Women stroll in the spacious gardens of the Tomb of Jahengir in Lahore




Tribesmen of the Frontier



A modern office building in Karachi

The Mahabat Khan Mosque at Peshawar





Thelma Johnson

Village children examine dead locusts at the scene of locust spraying operations in the desert area

A staff technician explains X-ray apparatus to students at the TB Control Demonstration and Training Centre

Unations





Girl students from Dacca University

Basic Democracies—polling scene in Karachi





The ancient Persian Wheel is still in use in parts of West Pakistan

Right: A Sindi farmer of the Ghulam Mohammed Barrage area of West Pakistan



Below: Jhoomer—a colorful dance of West Pakistan





Havoc caused by devastating floods in East Pakistan

tional assembly (legislature) and two provincial assemblies, with the position of president dominant. The president and all legislators are elected by an electoral college (the Basic Democrats), not directly by the people.

Unlike the constitution of 1956, President Ayub's constitution did not designate Pakistan as "Islamic." However, on December 25, 1963, in response to pressure by religious interests, the National Assembly amended the constitution and Pakistan became an "Islamic Republic" again. The amendment also restored the bases of all laws as being the Koran and the sunnah.

According to the new constitution, the president, who must be a Muslim, is the sole executive authority of government. He appoints his own ministers, who need not be members of the National Assembly, but if they are, they must then resign. He obtains legislative advice through appointed parliamentary secretaries from the Assembly who serve with each minister at the president's pleasure. He appoints the attorney-general, the judges of the courts, and the governors of the two provinces. He has complete responsibility for the Tribal Areas, which include the states of Amb, Chitral, Dir and Swat as well as the areas bordering Afghanistan and the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The president can control finances and lay down financial policy. He can veto laws passed by the National Assembly and dissolve the Assembly, provided he calls new elections, in which case he himself must seek re-election. Except for President Ayub, who may serve eight years, a president's term is limited to five years, unless a joint session of all three assemblies permits him to continue. When the National Assembly is not in session, the president may declare ordinances, good for six months. If he declares a state of emergency, his ordinances are good indefinitely.

The few restrictions on the president would be difficult to enforce. The Assembly may impeach him if it can obtain a

75 per cent majority. Those who initiate impeachment proceedings must resign if they fail to get a simple majority. The Assembly may override a veto with a two-thirds majority, but if it does, the president may then ask for a referendum among the Basic Democrats to confirm his veto.

The National Assembly, with each province equally represented, consists of 156 members, 150 of whom are elected by the Electoral College plus 3 additional members from each province who must be women. Their terms run for five years, although present members are allowed eight years if they are re-elected in 1965. No one may be a member who works for the government, who is a foreigner, who has been bankrupt or convicted of an offense within five years. The last provision thus eliminates all the politicians indicted under the Martial Law Regime. If a member is absent for thirty consecutive days, he loses his seat.

The National Assembly meets in Dacca under its elected Speaker, who acts for the president when he is out of the country or incapacitated. The Assembly may pass bills on national, but not provincial affairs, and pass on the president's budget, which it then may not alter in succeeding years unless it is to vote an increase. When election time comes, the Assembly, in joint session with the provincial assemblies, selects the presidential candidates, numbering no more than three.

The two provincial assemblies are organized along the lines of the National Assembly. Their relationship to the provincial governors is similar to that of the National Assembly's to the president. The West Pakistan Assembly meets in Lahore, the East Pakistan Assembly in Dacca. Each has 155 members, at least five of whom must be women. The governor, appointed by the president, has a council of ministers in the same manner as the president. The ministers and governors must be

from the provinces they are administering and must resign from the assemblies if they have been elected members.

On paper, the constitution transferred several responsibilities to the provincial governments which had previously been the concern of the central government. Agriculture, water and power development, health, social welfare, and industrial growth were among these and East Pakistan achieved equality with West Pakistan in the authority it presumably could assert in these fields. The transfer of powers, however, has been difficult to achieve in fact. Not only have the provincial governments, especially East Pakistan, not been prepared for assuming greater responsibilities, but the central ministries have been reluctant to give up power they have wielded so long.

Under the new constitution, the judiciary consists of a Supreme Court for the entire nation and High Courts and subsidiaries in the provinces. The president appoints all judges. The High Courts do not have authority in Tribal Areas, where tribesmen administer their own justice through traditional assemblies (among the Pathans called *loy jirgas*). The courts may overrule a president's decree, as they did in 1963 when they defied President Ayub by ordering government ministers to resign from the assemblies to which they had been elected.

The constitution originally contained no "bill of rights" guaranteeing certain basic freedoms and protection to the citizens. But in the amendment passed in December, 1963, such a "bill" was approved. It was limited, however, in that it did not apply to those living in Tribal Areas nor to activities covered in some thirty-one previous laws. Among these, were freedom of speech and the press, which are only as free as the president wishes, depending upon what he considers a danger to the safety of the country.

Other issues dealt with in the constitution include:

—The elimination of riba (usury);
—The capital of Pakistan is to be the new city of Islamabad, with Dacca a "second" capital;
—The national languages are Bengali and Urdu with English acceptable in governmental affairs;
—A two-thirds majority of the National Assembly may amend the constitution with presidential approval.

The role of the Basic Democracies is left vague. The constitution provides no formal link between the Union Councils and higher groups with the centers of power in government. The amount of responsibility they have depends upon the president and his administration. Their influence on the course of government is informal except when the Basic Democrats are asked to vote for members of the assembies, for a president or in a referendum.

Pakistan held its first national elections under the new constitution in April and May of 1962. The voters were Basic Democrats grouped into 300 constituencies for provincial elections and 150 constituencies for the central election. The candidates did not have to be Basic Democrats themselves, but they did have to be approved by an Election Commissioner. Again, the small number of voters per candidate made the cost of influencing them lower than in previous years and there was some illegal persuasion involved. But on the whole, the elections appear to have been relatively free and honest.

The results showed that despite the new constitution the people themselves, as represented by the Basic Democrats and the winning candidates, had not discarded their traditions. To the National Assembly the Basic Democrats sent many old-line, but unindicted politicians, mullahs, pirs, and powerful landlords. Many new faces did appear in the provincial assemblies, however, including village farmers and shopkeepers, urban laborers and tradesmen. Many did not support

President Ayub's constitution or policies, especially in the National Assembly.

Pakistani critics felt that the new experiment produced "government for the people by the bureaucratic elite" and was no different from what had gone before. They asked how a system could be democratic when the top representatives in government were not elected directly by the people.

When the National Assembly met for the first time on June 8, 1962, President Ayub withdrew martial law and Pakistan began the trial run of democratic government, Ayub-style. From the day General Ayub assumed power in October, 1958, to the day he relinquished it to his own constitution, the elapsed time was forty-four months.

Interested Groups

With the rebirth of constitutional government, Pakistan set off on a new course. The old problems remained: ethnic rivalry, Islamic government, provincial autonomy, economic and social distress, Kashmir, India, Pashtunistan and political leadership. Various groups had a vital stake in each issue, but the framework in which they sought to meet these problems was different.

The Military and Civil Service

The most powerful group in the society has been the trained professionals in the executive branch of government, all of whom are responsible to Mohammed Ayub Khan, President, Field Marshal, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defense. At the top are the "superior services," a small group of select, well-trained administrators. Under them is a mass of regular government employees. Beside them stand the military forces. Of these, the most effective are the officers and enlisted men of Pakistan's army, numbering an estimated 170,000. Pakistan's military establishment is the most stable

institution in the country. The Army's enlisted personnel are primarily Punjabi farm boys and young Pathans whose fathers probably also served at one time in the service. Few are Bengali.

The officers of these troops are trained in the British military system. The traditions of their military units derive from years of experience under British commanders. Among these traditions is participation in civil administration, particularly in the areas of West Pakistan where the British in prepartition India used army commanders as local governors. Nearly every major town was flanked by a military encampment called a cantonment and these, today, form a broad network of military power throughout West Pakistan. Most of them, however, are concentrated along the borders of Afghanistan and Kashmir.

In recent years, American influence in the armed forces has increased, particularly in the air force. American-made F104's and F86F jet fighters give the air force a fighter strength unequaled in South Asia. Hundreds of Pakistani pilots have received training in the United States and have proved equal in ability to pilots anywhere in the world.

The Pakistan navy is the country's weakest defense unit. After partition, Pakistan received a few minor warships, the largest being a cruiser. Numbering no more than 10,000, the navy officers and enlisted men are British-trained. Many of them are Bengalis, who have a tradition of the sea.

The morale of the defense personnel is generally high, kept that way through discipline, fair treatment, a fairly high standard of living, and, especially in West Pakistan, public respect. The forces have received as much as 80 per cent of the government's budget, although in recent years, this has fallen to about 60 per cent. Among West Pakistanis, the army has a good reputation and soldiers are treated as national heroes. In East Pakistan, the army often represents control over free-

dom. To many East Pakistanis, the army is a "foreign" force because it is composed chiefly of Punjabis and Pathans. Most military governors in East Pakistan have been from the West.

Another major force in the executive branch is the bureaucracy—the elite "superior services" and thousands of lower functionaries. The structure was laid down by the Moghuls, solidified by the British and continued faithfully by the Pakistanis. A conservative group on the whole, they tend to see their responsibilities as primarily regulatory—keeping the peace, administering justice and collecting taxes, in the manner of their predecessors. Planning for development and sharing responsibility with technical specialists are unfamiliar to them. At the top of the bureaucracy sit the well-educated members of the Civil Service of Pakistan, the Pakistan Foreign Service, Police Service of Pakistan and Accounts and Revenue Service. These services attract the best university graduates, usually members of families already in the services. Many have foreign education and are of outstanding quality. Yet they are a class unto themselves. President Ayub has expressed a desire to abolish the system.

Below this group are the masses of government servants, whose salaries are relatively low, as is their morale. Promotions are limited and based upon time served, not merit. There is little mobility from one level to another. Many second-level bureaucrats often live, work, and die in the same job.

From the highest official to the lowest *patwari* (village clerk), the machinery of government is almost automatic. Lower officials make as few decisions as possible, depending always upon orders from the top. While the system discourages initiative, it does usually assure that once an order is formulated by the president or his ministers action eventually takes place at the bottom.

One of President Ayub's proudest achievements is the reforms he has inaugurated in the field of public administration. In 1960, he established the Pakistan Administrative Staff College in Lahore to improve the quality of senior administrators with more than fourteen years service. National Institutes of Public Administration in Karachi, Lahore, and Dacca seek to upgrade lower level officials, as does the Secretariat Training Institute. The Civil Service Academy trains young university graduates for government service. The Academies for Rural Development in Peshawar and Comilla train administrative supervisory personnel for village aid and other nation building departments. An Institute of Development Economics trains officials in the business of planning.

While not a political action group, members of the executive branch of government have wide vested interests. When the constitutional organs of government weaken, as they have done in the past, both military and civilian groups can apply effective controls over the direction Pakistan moves.

The Bengalis

The largest group with a special interest in President Ayub's "experimental democracy" are the Bengalis, whose strong identification with East Pakistan sometimes overshadows their loyalty to the country as a whole. The 1962 National Assembly had barely convened in Dacca before Bengalis rose to complain about their role in the republic.

President Ayub, quite aware of the problems of East Pakistan, gave increased attention to Bengalis during the Martial Law Regime from 1958 to 1962. His cabinet included Bengalis as ministers of transportation and industry. New irrigation and flood control schemes were started in the province and the budget for water and power development increased 700 per cent. In 1962, East Pakistan gained control over its own railroads and the constitution not only increased pro-

vincial authority but placed the seat of the National Assembly in Dacca. Ayub appointed a Bengali, Abdul Munim Khan, as governor.

Soon after the National Assembly met, President Ayub reluctantly permitted the revival of political parties. In Bengal, Munim Khan and A. T. M. Mustafa led forth the old Muslim League, still claiming the mantle of Mohammed Ali Jinnah and now supporting President Ayub. The League was able to corral about 100 of the 156 members of the East Pakistan Assembly. Like previous Muslim Leaguers, they faced the problem of supporting the central government and at the same time, satisfying their own Bengali demands.

Former Bengali prime minister, Khwaja Nazimuddin, could not go along. He had opposed the One Unit scheme making West Pakistan a single province and he was a strong advocate of the parliamentary system which gives weight to numbers through legislative power. With other old League members, he started a party called the Councillors Muslim League and began seeking support across the country.

Other Bengalis were more vehement in opposition. Among them were Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bashani, the firebrand head of the National Awami (Peoples) Party. Another was H. S. Suhrawardy, the former prime minister who, from a jail cell where President Ayub had put him, resurrected his old Awami League. He did not have long to lead his party, however. Soon after his release from imprisonment, he left Pakistan for foreign countries. He died in 1963.

By 1964, all the old Bengali parties had been revived with most of the same leaders working behind the scenes, except for Fazlul Haq and Suhrawardy, both of whom were gone. Young and new politicians began preaching the cause of Bengal in opposition to the government. They opposed the Basic Democracies, the 1962 constitution and, among some, Pakistan's alliance with the United States. They were particularly

opposed to strong central government at the expense of provincial autonomy, despite the increased federalization in the 1962 constitution. Said one Bengali leader:

"We have been turned into a colony of West Pakistan."

Some observers foresee the eventual break-up of Pakistan as Bengalis seek increased independence from West Pakistan. That Bengali Muslims have not openly sought independence can, in part, be credited to (or blamed on) India. While Kashmir does not greatly concern Bengalis, India and its threat of Hindu domination certainly does. Shortly after partition, there was talk of rejoining West Bengal, but this interest lagged as Bengali Muslims achieved a greater sense of their own unity and strength. Now, most Bengali Muslim leaders fear India more than they dislike disparity with West Pakistan. The extreme alternative is independence, which few Bengalis openly espouse. But increased autonomy appears to be the future Bengali goal.

The Pathans

Pathans are equal to Bengalis in their awareness of ethnic identity. They look to the government to protect their way of life and to prove that it is better to be a Pathan Pakistani than a Pashtunistani. The dissolution of the Northwest Frontier Province in 1955 made those Pathans not living in Tribal Areas subject to the laws of West Pakistan provincial government in which Punjabis predominated. Many Pathans have been angry ever since.

Like the Bengalis, the Pathans entered the political arena with enthusiasm after 1962. President Ayub sought their support and found some among the followers of Khan Pir Mohammed Khan, the Pir of Manki Sharif and Khan Habibullah Khan, whom Ayub brought into his cabinet as minister for Home and Kashmir Affairs. Joining the Muslim League, these

men expressed confidence that the Ayub government would continue to support Pathan interests.

Opposition to President Ayub has been strong, however, among Pathans. Yusuf Khattak from Peshawar, a member of a tribe noted for its literary as well as military talent, joined the Councillors Muslim League. Khan Abdul Wali Khan, son of the frequently-jailed and widely-respected Abdul Ghaffar Khan, joined the National Awami Party. With their Bengali counterparts, Pathan oppositionists seek dissolution of the One Unit Scheme in West Pakistan and decentralization of government.

The Punjabis

The educated and wealthy leaders from the Punjab seek to maintain their dominant influence in provincial affairs. Although the 1962 constitution limits the number of Punjabi representatives in the West Pakistan legislature to less than one-half, Punjabis generally control the government. The One Unit Scheme thus places Punjabis on a level almost equal to that of the Bengalis, who far outnumber them in the population. New spokesmen have appeared among the Punjabis, but behind the scenes such politicians as Firoz Khan Noon, Mian Mumtaz Daultana and Mushtaq Gurmani still bargain for Punjabi strength.

Other regional groups play only a small part in Pakistan's over-all political life. Baluchi nationalism occasionally disturbs the government, as it did in April, 1963, when police arrested Atahullah Khan Mengal, a member of the National Assembly, tribal chieftain and champion of Baluchi autonomy.

As governor of West Pakistan, President Ayub appointed Malik Amir Mohammed Khan, the Nawab of Kalabagh, an area between the Punjab and the former Northwest Frontier Province. It is his difficult task to maintain the precarious bal-

ance between the Punjabis and the Pathans, Baluchis, and Sindis.

Religious Groups

The constitution of 1962, by being vague on Islamic institutions, literally invited a public furor from religious leaders. They do, after all, represent a deep sense of Muslim consciousness throughout the society. No ruling group can safely ignore them for long.

The loudest and most effective of the religious leaders has been the Jama'at-i-Islami's Maulana Maududi, a learned and eloquent theologian. Although frequently arrested and his activities proscribed, Maududi remained in touch with the mullahs and pirs during Martial Law. Subsequently, in the new assemblies and on soapboxes throughout cities and villages, he and his followers have continued to reject Anglo-Saxon law and European influences, such as social mingling of the sexes and women's franchise. Maulana Maududi has considerable appeal among West Pakistani villagers.

Another religious group has re-appeared under the leadership of Maulana Athar Ali. Called Nizam-i-Islami, the party is composed of Muslim scholars and mullahs who seek a more moderate interpretation of Islam than does Maulana Maududi. Former Prime Minister Chaudhri Mohammed Ali, has become one of the party's new leaders.

In the National Assembly, considerable influence on legislation is exerted by the Islamic Democratic Front, headed by Maulana Abdul Bari. Its members, nearly all mullahs, were successful in making Pakistan's constitution more Islamic in the writing of the first amendment.

Lesser, but more extreme religious groups include the Khaksars and the often-banned Ahrars. Their particular strength lies in their ability to inflame passions over Kashmir. In various assemblies certain politicians wearing the mantle of reli-

gious leadership stand ready to espouse religious causes. One Sindi pir, a member of the National Assembly, claims 900,000 followers. The Pir Pigaro of Sind claims to control 18 out of 33 Sindi members of the West Pakistan Assembly.

So long as President Ayub remains in power, it is likely that the strongest official influence in religious affairs will be asserted by the Advisory Council of Islamic Theology. Its members include a lawyer, Justice S. A. M. Akram as chairman, a former Columbia University professor and vice chancellor of Karachi University, I. H. Qureshi, and Maulana Abul Hashim, the director of the Islamic Academy in Dacca. All are repeated targets for conservative religious leaders who claim they are deserting the true path of Islam. Opponents call the Academy "a laboratory of the government to create a new Islam not preached by the Holy Prophet."

Nearly all politicians include religion in their political appeals, just as they did before the revolution. Khwaja Nazimuddin calls for "Islamic socialism" with zakat made compulsory in industry. Khurshid Khalid, head of the militant Khaksars, cries for jihad against India. Thus religious dissension and extremism, some observers feel, are more of a threat to Pakistan's survival than ethnocentrism. Certainly, since to many Muslims the formation of an Islamic state was the whole purpose in creating Pakistan, the subject of religion will be part of the dynamics of the country for many years.

Urban Groups

Two urban groups are important to Pakistan's great experiment. Both are relatively small in number, but large in power. The largest is the labor force: underpaid, restive workers who live in crowded slums. They are only partially organized and disciplined. Like their counterparts in other countries they can influence the course of government, if only because of their common frustrations and accessibility

to the centers of power. Their frustrations are easily exploited by communists and other disruptive elements, especially in the jute and textile mills of East Pakistan. Agitators can, with little effort, stir up a street demonstration or a riot.

The second group is the intellectuals. They do not, as a rule, identify themselves with the bureaucracy, any ethnic group, or religious movement. Many are refugees from India. They are lawyers, newspaper editors, professors and students, a few industrialists and professional men. Articulate and influential, they are often critical of government, whatever kind it is. Lawyers are particularly disturbed by President Ayub's constitution, which diverged from the British system under which they were trained.

Political Parties

In most European and American countries, political parties represent the competing ideologies of various groups within the society. This is not so in Pakistan. For the most part, parties are composed of politicians who have banded together to advance themselves rather than ideologies. Those who vote do so to support the leader, not "the cause." President Ayub's opinion of them has been unequivocal. He said: "Political parties have been our bane in the past."

In 1962 President Ayub permitted political parties to reappear. In one respect, he was responding to public pressure. In another, he became aware that he himself needed a vehicle through which to mobilize mass support for his programs.

In 1964, the major party in Pakistan was the refurbished Muslim League, which called itself Conventionist to distinguish itself from Muslim League splinter groups. Its aim was to support President Ayub, who, in May, 1963, joined the party and later became its president. Its leaders seek to enroll Pakistanis from all walks of life and they have succeeded in gaining more than 2,000,000 members. The League controls

all the legislative assemblies, but not by large majorities, especially in the National Assembly.

Opposition parties are, so far, more irritating than disruptive. Continually splitting and re-forming, they are not often strongly identified with any program except, perhaps, the National Awami Party of Maulana Bashani which stands for neutralism in foreign affairs. In addition to the multiple provincial and Islamic parties, various groupings appear periodically in the assemblies. In the National Assembly, the most important is the Pakistan People's Group, a coalition under the leadership of Yusuf Khattak which seeks a return to the 1956 constitution. The Communist Party and the Islamic fundamentalist Jama'at-i-Islami are banned.

The instruments of political influence have always been limited in number. They now are limited in strength with the absence of direct elections and the weakened position of the legislature. The press, radio and the speakers' platforms are of value in urban areas. They are particularly limited for opponents of the government, which operates all broadcasting facilities and asserts considerable control over the press.

There are some 80 daily newspapers, most of them privately-owned and printed in Urdu and Bengali. A few are in English. Their total circulation is less than 400,000, although each paper may be read aloud several times to non-readers. Perhaps as many as 3,000,000 people thus know roughly what goes on in the country through the press. Within defined limits, the newspapers may print opinions of the editors. These opinions are frequently critical of the government regardless of the party or person in power. They have been quite critical of President Ayub, who has appealed to the press to revise its attitude and "adopt a more objective approach toward national issues." To support his appeal, he has forced newspapers to print only government-approved versions of assembly proceedings, which are usually critical,

to print all government releases fully and to open their financial records to government inspection. Editors charge that the law muzzles criticism. They also cite the case of the Urdu newspaper, *Kohistan,* banned for a month in 1963.

President Ayub has recognized that radio broadcasting is important in a country whose people are over 80 per cent illiterate. Radio reaches perhaps 15 per cent of the area of Pakistan and no more than 5,000,000 people, nearly all urban dwellers. But the government is building new transmitters and distributing radio receivers through the Union Councils and Town Committees and hopes that by the end of 1964 the system will cover 100 per cent of East Pakistan and 25 per cent of West Pakistan. The government owns and operates the only broadcasting facilities, Radio Pakistan.

Public speaking is an effective means of political influence. Passions are easily inflamed and it is not unusual for a quiet political meeting to turn into a riot.

President Ayub has tolerated little extended criticism. As he said in 1963, "mutual suspicion, recriminations and hostility" in Pakistan were even a greater threat to its survival and safety than a hostile and well-armed India. Stability of government, he feels, is essential if his plan to reach the villagers and workers through his Basic Democracies is to succeed.

He obviously feels that the major burden of leadership rests on his shoulders and will continue so in the foreseeable future. He has selected a few followers upon whose advice he increasingly relies. These include Zufikar Ali Bhutto in foreign affairs, Mohammed Shoiab in finance and economics, and West Pakistan's Governor Mohammed Khan in political affairs. But he does not, he says, see anyone around to succeed him who can appeal to both East and West Pakistanis. Indeed, absence of a strong Bengali leader to support him is one of President Ayub's major political deficiencies.

Those who shrugged their shoulders in 1958 when Pakistan fell to a military dictator are watching Ayub's great experiment with interest. Pakistan's problems are similar to those of many underdeveloped nations, although none can claim the handicap of being split so far in two.

What the world thinks, however, will not particularly disturb Pakistanis. Their search is for their own unity, the need is for their own discipline. They can only hope that their struggling economy does not drag them down before the great experiment has a chance to succeed.

7. *Planning a Livelihood*

Pakistan's people work hard and earn little. Few are trained for industry or modern agriculture and their methods are old-fashioned. The realities of life, most of which have to do with the business of keeping alive, take precedence over their interests in politics, debates over religion, speeches on constitutional law and alarms over Kashmir.

In more industrialized countries, millions of people work at many different tasks. Each task is related to the work of others. Together they support their entire society. In Pakistan, millions of people work at a few tasks and little of the work of one man is related to that of another. One of the characteristics of an "underdeveloped country" is the unorganized nature of its economy. Each man or working unit labors pretty much alone. Farmers and their families are nearly self-sufficient except when floods or droughts wipe out their crops.

At times, being unorganized is an advantage. After partition, Pakistan's economy, according to economists from developed countries, was chaotic. There was not enough food. There were few markets for cash crops, and transportation was disrupted. There was little industry or money. Yet Pakistanis survived, partially because of their disorganization. While economic malnutrition struck one part of the country's body, it was isolated from the rest. Each little unit worked on, relatively unaffected by the disorder around it.

But at all times, hunger and poverty are curses and Pakistan's unorganized agricultural economy has given her people

very little other than life itself. Economists guess—statistics are never reliable for an underdeveloped economy—that the average income of a Pakistani in 1949 was $50 a year. In 1964, the most generous economists estimate that the average Pakistani earns no more than $70 a year. While production has increased, so too, has the population, which grows at the rate of about 2,500,000 people annually.

From the start, Pakistan's leaders have sought to improve the economy by "organizing" agriculture, creating industries and strengthening the many related fields to support them. "Development" has become the key word in the vocabulary of government and economists have prepared numerous plans.

The first Six Year Plan died before its birth for want of money and trained guidance. A First Five Year Plan was to begin in 1955, but did not get started until two years later. Under this plan, some $2,800,000,000 was expended with priority given to projects for power, irrigation and industry. Some attention was paid to agriculture, particularly through the Village AID (Agricultural and Industrial Development) program, established in 1953. While many worthwhile projects were born which added to Pakistan's development, the plan did not meet its objectives. There was not enough money; it had given agriculture too little emphasis and Pakistan's population grew too fast. Economics got lost in the maelstrom of politics. President Ayub said later:

"The real and pressing problems of the country were ignored in this hide-and-seek for power."

In 1960, Pakistanis adopted a Second Five Year plan which called for spending $4,600,000,000. It was based on $3,000,000,000 in foreign aid. This time, agricultural improvement was emphasized; more than 35 per cent of the planned expenditure was for farming and water development. In the Third Five Year Plan, starting in 1965, these fields will receive nearly 50 per cent of the development funds.

As leaders of newly-independent countries in Asia have discovered, sometimes to their surprise, the most important "economic unit" in their society is the villager and his family, not the industrialist. Upon the farmer rests the real sustenance of the nation; upon him also lies the burden of improvement and organization.

Agriculture

Nearly 83,000,000 Pakistanis, 85 per cent of the total population, live in approximately 100,000 villages and depend upon agriculture for their livelihood, although not all farm the land directly. They produce, depending upon the weather, about 60 per cent of the national income. The sale of farm products abroad earns 71 per cent of Pakistan's foreign exchange. Except for tea, none of these sales are in food products: jute and cotton are the major cash crops.

Farmers are able to cultivate only 17 per cent of the soil in West Pakistan; 75 per cent is cultivated in East Pakistan. These amounts can be increased as much as 40 per cent with better drainage and irrigation, which Pakistanis are trying to do. Crop yields are among the lowest in the world. With double-cropping and better farming practices, Pakistanis can eventually become self-sufficient in food. Advances have been made. Since 1958, the index of agricultural production has increased from 102 to 114. Even so, in 1964, Pakistanis cannot grow enough food to feed themselves. They must import food from other countries.

One reason why the Pakistani farmer fails to grow enough is that he has little incentive to do so, once he is assured that his family is fed. The traditional land tenure systems, those customs and laws that determine who owns, controls and uses the land and its products, discourage efforts to improve. While these systems vary with the area, they all contain similar im-

pediments to initiative. The farmer rarely owns the land he cultivates.

"Land reform" is a simple phrase to define a solution to a complicated problem. Pakistanis have attempted it for years, without making much headway, although there has been recent progress.

The most significant advances have been made in East Pakistan, where, before 1947, the great landlords were often Hindus. After partition, the East Pakistan government limited holdings to 33 acres per family or 3.3 acres per family member and gave ownership rights to villagers. Landlords were compensated in forty-year bonds. General Ayub announced sweeping reforms in West Pakistan in 1959. In theory, the government purchased land from large landlords, giving them in return twenty-five-year bonds, and resold the land to the farmers on an installment plan. At the same time, the government put ceilings on land holdings: 500 acres of irrigated or 1,000 acres of unirrigated land. In practice, many large landholders have deeded land to relatives but have maintained control, thereby circumventing the ceiling.

Lack of incentive is only one reason why Pakistani farmers are poor. If they have a surplus, the buyers in the marketplace pay little for it even though a few miles away there may be a food shortage. There is little marketing information. But surpluses are rare and the most ambitious cultivator needs more than he has. In West Pakistan, water is scarce; in East Pakistan, it regularly floods his crops. The fields, which the villager surrounds with thick embankments, *bunds,* are usually too small to farm efficiently. The soil is frequently debilitated. In West Pakistan, where irrigation is so widespread in the Punjab, salinity and waterlogging have reached such proportions that some experts predict the once-fertile Indus valley will be a desert within fifty years. Because of salinity, West Pakistan loses an acre of cultivated

land—enough to feed one person—every five minutes (and in the same time, gains ten more mouths to feed). The government has committed large sums to combat this problem, but admits that much more must be done. The U. S. Government has obligated some $5,000,000 to assist in demonstrating that salinity and waterlogging can be controlled.

Seeds are poor and lack variety. Pests sweep through the crops. It does little good if a farmer understands fertilization, because there are few fertilizers available and these are expensive. The best fertilizer is animal manure, but, because of fuel shortage, women pack it into dung cakes to be dried on the household wall and burned in the fireplace.

In many parts of Pakistan, undernourishment and diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and dysentery frequently limit the efficiency of the farming family. Even if a farmer is enterprising, he cannot easily borrow money to buy a better plow or better seeds. The banking system is just beginning to reach into rural areas. The local moneylender, from whom he borrows cash to meet wedding or funeral expenses, charges up to 100 per cent interest.

Above all, the Pakistani farmer lacks knowledge. He is generally illiterate. He plows and sows as his father did, turning the soil with pointed sticks and sowing seed by hand. Farming methods are traditional and sometimes complicated by religious custom. For example, one Baluchi farmer, when he found that his fields would grow two crops a year instead of one when using "foreign" seed, refused the seed because it came from a non-Muslim land.

Pakistan has what is known as a subsistence economy. Farmers who grow food do so primarily to feed themselves and their families, and pay their taxes or their landlord. They do not generally grow surpluses to sell to the cities except when they need to buy a few manufactured items in the local bazaar. The cities cannot depend upon the villages for food—from

1947 to 1960, when food imports increased, food was rationed in West Pakistan's cities. Changing the rural economy to produce surpluses is one of President Ayub's goals.

In West Pakistan, farmers raise wheat, barley, gram, corn, fruit, vegetables and livestock as consumable products. Wheat is the staple and is grown in thousands of tiny patches, the seed hand-sown, the harvest hand-cut and the grain hand-winnowed. Although mechanization is negligible, Pakistan ranks thirteenth among the nations in wheat production. Other consumer crops include sugar cane and oil seeds such as mustard and rape.

In East Pakistan, rice is the major food crop, utilizing 70 per cent of the cultivable acreage, but it is highly vulnerable to destruction by floods. In 1963, the loss to weather was so great that rice production declined nearly 10 per cent, drastically cutting Pakistan's rate of economic growth, from 5 per cent to 1 per cent—far below the natural population increase. While Pakistan is the world's third largest rice producer, in most years East Pakistan must import rice. Other consumable products include oil seeds, sugar cane, and tea, half of which is exported.

Pakistan grows two major cash crops which provide most of its foreign exchange. By far the most important is jute, a tall, fibrous plant much like hemp, grown in the inundated, silty lowlands of East Pakistan. The plants are sown in February and cut in July and August, in water three or four feet deep. The stalks are placed in a pool of water called a *khal* where, for two weeks, they decompose. At the end of this period, a worker beats the stalks until the fibers are loosened and can be stripped off and hung out to dry. House to house buyers, called *farias,* who sail small country boats, pick up the dried jute, take it to market and sell it to middlemen, called *beparis.* These in turn sell the jute to a baler or his agent and the bales are sent by boat to jute mills or docks for

shipping raw jute to mills abroad. Before partition, these mills were in Calcutta. New ones in Pakistan now handle much of the raw jute, turning out burlap and rope for sale abroad, chiefly to the United States and England. With so many individuals between the farmer and the buyer, the man who did the original work gets little, especially when he doesn't even own the land.

Pakistan's second cash crop is cotton, grown mostly in West Pakistan on 12 per cent of the cultivated area, almost all of it irrigated. In pre-partition days, high-grade, long-staple cotton was the pride of Sikh and Hindu farmers, all of whom fled to India in 1947. Subsequently, the quality of Pakistani cotton has fallen and the world markets, already switching to artificial fibers, demand less from Pakistan. Nevertheless, efforts are being made to improve the cotton industry. New gins, high payment for quality grades and better growing practices, including mechanization, are increasing the benefits of cotton farming. New textile mills have made Pakistan self-sufficient in cotton cloth, and cotton products now help raise export earnings.

Few items in their lives are more important to villagers than their animals. Frequently, a farmer's wealth is judged by how many bullocks or horses, camels, or sheep he owns. It is a lucky young bridegroom whose bride brings with her a farm animal in her dowry.

Unfortunately for the economy, farm animals perform many functions and are not particularly good at any of them. Cows, water buffalo and she-camels not only must give milk, but must pull loads. For this they need plentiful food, but food is often scarce. To use a steel plow, which would better turn the soil, a farmer needs a strong animal.

Sheep and goats range unfenced throughout West Pakistan, uprooting precious grass and destroying saplings that

could prevent erosion. Their hides and skins are exportable products.

For animals, crops, and humans alike, water in Pakistan is the key to survival. The rivers that flow from the Himalayas through Afghanistan, Kashmir, and India, and the monsoons that bring rain in the summer, are more important to the people of the land than any other single element. Unhappily, nothing is more unreliable. In West Pakistan a late winter can delay the melting of snows and cause drought. Heavy spring rains or an early snow-melt can flood the lands, carrying off precious topsoil, crops and sometimes the villages themselves. In East Pakistan monsoon rains when accompanied by cyclones inundate entire villages.

The most productive soil in West Pakistan is in the irrigated land of the Punjab and it was here that partition so affected farming.

The source of water for many irrigation canals was in India and the Indian Government frequently impeded the flow of water into Pakistan. Rights to Indus water became a heated subject between the two countries. As early as 1951, foreign experts sought to aid India and Pakistan in reaching riparian agreements. Not until 1960 did they sign a treaty agreeing to the joint development of the Indus River system, in cooperation with the International Bank and a consortium of countries including Australia, Canada, West Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. By the treaty, India agreed not to interfere with Pakistan's western rivers, while Pakistan agreed to build canals which in ten years would replace water it required from the eastern rivers flowing from East Punjab. The total cost of the Indus Development Project is expected to exceed $1,800,000,000 with the donor countries supplying more than half of the cost. Pakistanis predict that the project will ensure the water sup-

ply of more than 50,000,000 people living in an area covering some 30,000,000 acres.

Responsibility for developing Pakistan's water resources lies with the provincial governments' Water and Power Development Authorities (WAPDA), established in 1958. They develop irrigation, fight waterlogging and soil salinity problems, and produce hydro-electric power. In West Pakistan, the WAPDA is responsible for the Indus Development Project and has become one of the most effective government agencies. In East Pakistan, WAPDA's program follows the lines charted by the 1956 United Nations mission under the former United States Secretary of the Interior, Julius Krug. It has endeavored to build embankments to protect villages from sudden flood and sought to increase power from new dams.

Along with water control, village development is another program to improve the rural economy. It began in 1953 with Village AID and continues today through the Basic Democracies.

Village AID was based on the American agricultural extension system in which county agents, called "village workers" in Pakistan, brought farming and home improvement advice to farmers and their wives, demonstrated new techniques, introduced new seed, supplied better implements, and encouraged farmers to construct roads, dams, ditches, and better houses. The image of the dedicated village worker pedaling his bicycle along a dirt path from village to village became a symbol of rural progress. By 1960, nearly 5,000 workers had received training in Village AID Institutes, five in each province. Their supervisors had been trained at the two Academies for Village Development in Peshawar and Comilla. They had established 176 development areas of 100,000 people each, organized 19,625 village development councils, planned 150,000 demonstration plots, dug 1,000 miles of canals, built 3,000 miles of dirt roads, and intro-

duced new farming practices in hundreds of villages. In 1961, to the dismay of the village workers, the government suddenly canceled the program and incorporated it into the Basic Democracies.

One difficulty in the Village AID program lay in the attempt to adopt—and Americans to promote—a system foreign to the people. The principal weakness of the American county agent system in Pakistan was that it sent into a village a person not from that village whose task was to "change" the villagers. Pakistani villagers are suspicious of "foreigners," even if that foreigner is from the next village, much less the city, which is where most village workers came from. Another weakness was that the village worker appeared to the local government administrator as a competitor and disrupter of the peace. Few village workers found the administrator cooperative.

Lack of village enthusiasm for change reflected also the individualistic nature of the Pakistani farmer. Cooperative action between village leaders, except in emergencies, is unusual in Pakistan. While one of every three farms in West Pakistan is operated by more than one household working cooperatively, the number of family leaders involved is few. There is little joint ownership in Muslim societies and Pakistan's is no exception. There are about 28,000 cooperative societies in West Pakistan involving some 1,400,000 members, but these are primarily government-backed banking institutions.

One direction of rural improvement will probably be along the lines set by Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan, the imaginative head of the Academy for Village Development in Comilla. Using some eighty square miles as a development laboratory, Dr. Hameed Khan went into the villages and asked the villagers to select a representative to come to Comilla for training. When the representative returned, his fellow villagers

listened to him and accepted many of the new ideas he acquired at the Academy.

His next step was to introduce cooperative action and before long cooperative societies grew up to provide supervised credit, cooperative purchasing and marketing, and cooperative use of machinery. By 1963, there were 120 village cooperatives in Comilla district and a central association providing a variety of services to the farmers. The experiment was considered so successful that similar programs have grown up in seven districts in West Pakistan and six sub-districts in East Pakistan. President Ayub has ordered this program extended to all thirty districts in East Pakistan. What Dr. Hameed Khan had proved was that the Union Councils in the villages could produce if given the means, that throughout the countryside there was plenty of leadership talent, and, finally, that cooperatives could work in a Muslim society.

To provide administrative and technical guidance to the rural program, the Pakistan government has given increasing emphasis to secondary and advanced agricultural education. Under the Second Five Year Plan, Pakistan has opened two new agricultural universities at Mymensingh in East Pakistan and Lyallpur in West Pakistan, both of which had previously been undergraduate schools. Other agricultural schools are at Peshawar, Tandojam, and Dacca.

Industry

Pakistanis see industrialization as a partial solution to their economic problems. Industry will give employment to urban workers, whose numbers increase drastically each year as population pressures force villagers to seek work in the cities. Industry will reduce the country's dependence upon manufactured imports, make greater use of natural and human resources, diversify investment and, above all, give Pakistanis a sense of self-sufficiency.

The growth of Pakistan's industry has been more spectacular than the progress made in agriculture, although it has affected relatively few people. Manufacturing accounted for less than 7 per cent of the country's national income in 1950; in 1963, it accounted for 14.4 per cent. In 1947, Pakistan had an almost invisible industrial establishment. West Pakistan inherited from India only nine of the subcontinent's 400 textile factories. All the jute factories of Bengal became Indian property and many trained factory workers and owners migrated to India. The new Muslim migrants to Pakistan were unskilled. But by 1964, East Pakistan had over a dozen jute mills; new textile factories in West Pakistan produced over 750,000,000 yards of cloth, against 100,000,000 in 1952. New fertilizer and cement factories, petro-chemical plants, paper and sugar mills, and hundreds of small industries had altered the complexion of urban economic life. The index of manufacturing rose from 38 in 1950 to 205 in 1963.

What industry that did exist in Pakistan would have collapsed altogether if a few wealthy industrialists had not been willing to risk new investment. Even these individuals might have avoided the risks had India been cooperative. In denying its factories to Pakistani raw materials and, in 1950, de-valuing its currency, India effectively forced Pakistanis to rush into industrialization. Said one industrialist a few years later: "India easily could have killed us with kindness."

Consequently, new industries began appearing on the outskirts of Karachi, Lahore, and Dacca. The Adamjee family built new jute mills in Narayanganj and the Ispahanis, besides establishing a bank, started an airline to link the two wings. Europeans and Americans came to provide technical assistance.

Quite early it was apparent that government would have to give private enterprise a helping hand. Credit was lacking, as was planning. So in 1952, the government created the

Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) which began investing government funds in industries. Small consumer goods factories appeared in every city to make matches, light bulbs, cigarettes, and the many small items so expensive to import, yet so in demand by the people. By mid-1962, when it was divided into provincial units, the PIDC had established fifty-five industrial projects in cooperation with private investors.

One of Pakistan's first needs was electric power. Created by coal and oil generators, the total installed capacity was barely 100,000 kilowatts, among the lowest in the world. Pakistani and foreign engineers planned new dams, among them the Canadian-assisted Warsak project on the Kabul River and the United States-assisted Karnafuli dam in East Pakistan. When natural gas was discovered in the Sind desert, a pipeline was laid to bring new power to Karachi. By 1964, Pakistan's power capacity had increased to nearly 1,000,000 kilowatts; still Pakistan was one of the lowest-powered countries.

In its Second Five Year Plan, Pakistan hopes by 1965 to have 1,300,000 kilowatts, one-third of which will be hydroelectric, the remainder deriving from natural gas, coal, and diesel fuel. Plans are afoot to build an atomic reactor in East Pakistan, which is particularly short of power resources. Little oil has been found in the country and Pakistan must import much of her fuel, especially oil and coal. A new refinery in Karachi will have an annual capacity of 1,500,000 tons of crude.

A second problem in industrialization was—and is—mineral resources. Russian, American, and other foreign prospectors have scoured Pakistan's barren hills in search of raw materials. In 1963, United Nations experts decided that an iron ore deposit near Kalabagh, a coal-mining area in the northwestern corner of the former Punjab province, could produce 150,000,000 tons of low-grade ore. Pakistanis feel

this is adequate to support a steel mill, to be built in Karachi. Another steel mill is under construction in Chittagong, under Japanese guidance. Although some chrome ore has been found, exploration for other minerals has not been so productive.

While industrialization is usually thought of as urban, villagers and residents of small towns have also helped create new wealth. More than 1,000,000 Pakistanis are involved in small industries scattered throughout the country, which produce carpets, cigarettes, wood and bamboo products. In a few villages in the former Northwest Frontier Province, Pathans make guns. Nearly all products, especially the guns, are for local use.

Pakistanis are understandably proud of their industrial growth. Not only did their industrial output increase nearly 200 per cent from 1950 to 1963, but they almost reached their 1965 goal two years ahead of schedule. One reason for this is that the government was successful in encouraging private investment in industry, both domestic and foreign. By giving individuals and foreign companies preferential treatment, President Ayub departed from the practice of his predecessors. Shipping, trucking and all small-scale industry are privately-owned and government investment is only minimal in business, mining and large and medium-scale industry.

Government investment is aimed primarily at resource development and the major public services, including railroads, airlines, telegraph and telephone systems, radio and television (in 1964). Some industries, such as the Karnafuli Paper Mill, were started by government and sold to private owners. To promote investment in East Pakistan, the government has given new industries there eight tax-free years, against only two tax-free years in Karachi.

The result of Pakistan's policy has been a private investment boom, which by 1963 had attained 92 per cent of the

1965 target set for the "private sector" in the Second Five Year Plan. Outstanding successes were in textiles and chemicals. The government has declared that it will not nationalize industries and has guaranteed the repatriation of foreign capital and unrestricted remittance of profits. The United States and West Germany have been primary sources of foreign private capital while Japan has shown increasing interest.

Manpower for Development

Whether in agriculture or industry, progress depends upon the development of people, not machines. President Ayub and his advisors have recognized that this development centers on education, not as an academic exercise but as a public investment in economic progress.

The mass of Pakistan's manpower is unskilled, particularly in industrial pursuits. Workers have little familiarity with mechanical or electrical devices and only among certain groups, such as the Pathan tribesmen and urban dwellers, is it easy for them to learn mechanical skills. Nearly all unskilled laborers are illiterate so that training is especially difficult. Yet, the cities are clogged with unskilled migrants from villages and from India who seek employment.

At the other end of the manpower scale are the managers and executives who must mobilize and direct the country's development. While Pakistan has been more fortunate than many other new countries in Asia in having inherited—and subsequently trained—a large body of high-level manpower, there are still too few trained leaders. Both the absence of opportunity and the system of education have prevented the society from producing enough men with managerial talent or technical knowledge. The educational system has been designed largely to produce civil servants, not industrial or agricultural managers.

Between the unskilled worker and the industrial manager lies an even greater vacuum in manpower: the skilled worker and the technical supervisor. To have such manpower, a nation needs a large group of workers seeking training and an educational system equipped to give them the skills. Pakistan has neither. Those few individuals who go to school beyond the elementary grades—less than 1 per cent of the population—are children of urban families who view manual labor with aversion. The educational system reflects their desire to enter government service in a "white collar" capacity and provides little opportunity for technical training.

Aware of these deficiencies, the Commission on National Education, which reported to the President in 1959, stated that "only through vigorous action in training the people needed for this technological and agricultural progress can we escape from the situation in which our vast manpower, instead of being a source of national wealth, is a constant drag on our economy."

Domestic Trade

One of the most private of all economic activities in Pakistan, and one of the least organized, is domestic trading—the buying, storing, selling, and transportation of goods. The government, in its Second Five Year Plan, allotted one-fifth of its investment toward improving commerce and trade, especially transportation.

To most Pakistanis, "domestic trade" means the local village or town bazaars which they visit weekly. There are, of course, millions of villagers who depend but slightly upon the products available in distant markets.

Only in recent decades has the use of money become widespread among villagers. In the past, buying and selling was by barter, the village farmer trading a skin or other farm product for the equivalent in value of a manufactured item.

Considerable bargaining accompanied the transaction. While the use of money has become common in Pakistan, the absence of a fixed price and the technique of bargaining are still common in trading.

In West Pakistan, villagers and townsmen alike do most of their trading in small shops, although many villagers, particularly in Baluchistan and northwestern frontier areas, also depends on nomadic tribesmen who bring manufactured goods from the major trading centers. In East Pakistan, few villages have shops. Instead villagers attend weekly *hats* (bazaars) in nearby larger villages and sometimes wait for the periodic *melas* (fairs) to do their shopping. They also await itinerant vendors who travel by boat from village to village.

Trading in towns and cities is a combination of European and village systems. Each major town has a European section in which stores, both specialty and general, provide goods for across-the-counter sale. The prices are standard and little bargaining occurs. But most urban trading takes place in older town bazaars with stalls and shops specializing in various goods and commodities. Sellers of one kind of item ordinarily group their shops together so that a person wanting to buy shoes, for instance, goes to the shoe bazaar; if pots or pans are desired, the buyer finds the metal bazaar. Goods seldom have fixed prices and bargaining is necessary as buyer and seller reach agreement on values. While barter is common in smaller towns, money is used in cities.

The problems of marketing are serious impediments to economic progress. There are few standards of quality, so that each item bought or sold must find its own relative value. Weights and measures are not standardized. Each region and sometimes each merchant uses distinctive definitions of quantity. Local vendors frequently use bits of metal to determine weights. The usual measures are the *maund* (officially 82 2/7 pounds) which is divided into 40 *seers* and the

seer into 80 *tolas*. In East Pakistan, a maund may weigh anything from 30 to 60 seers. In some areas, a maund can be simply *pukka,* high grade, or *kutcha,* low grade. Pakistan's economists hope eventually to introduce the metric system.

The monetary system also varies from place to place, although in recent years considerable standardization has been achieved, particularly in cities. In 1947, the basic unit of currency was the *rupee,* equal to about 20 U. S. cents. This was divided into *annas* and *pies*. In 1961, President Ayub inaugurated the metric system for money, with the rupee divided into 100 *paisas*.

Improvement of the trading system depends greatly on the state of storage facilities and transportation. Economists estimate that up to 10 per cent of the country's desperately needed grain crops are spoiled or lost in storage after harvesting. With foreign help, the government is introducing modern storage silos in the Punjab and East Pakistan.

Transportation in West Pakistan follows routes established by the British for defense, not internal trade. These routes usually run toward the border of Afghanistan and seldom provide a north-south connection for most towns and villages except along the border. Thus, while a village in one valley could have a food surplus, villagers only a few miles away across a hill could be facing starvation. While some major new roads are tying larger towns together, the absence of feeder roads to villages keep millions of people isolated. Here the Basic Democracies are achieving admirable results by encouraging villagers to build their own access roads to the major trunks.

Local transportation in West Pakistan consists mostly of oxcarts and other animal-drawn vehicles which travel on dirt paths to reach nearby markets. In East Pakistan, boats do the chores of oxcarts. As new roads have connected larger towns, the use of buses and trucks has increased. Trucking holds out

great hope for improving trade and represents the ultimate in private enterprise. Competition is keen. The industry has provided jobs for many, particularly Afridi tribesmen of the Pathan area who find in truck driving an outlet for their carefree spirits.

Railroads are one of Pakistan's most potentially valuable assets, but they are sadly neglected for want of money. Partition left Pakistan with about 8,000 miles of track, almost all built for military defense rather than economic support, and with badly deteriorated rolling stock. Subsequently, Pakistan has improved the Karachi-Lahore-Peshawar system, which services the cotton export industry, and has built new railroad shops in Karachi and the Punjab. East Pakistan has only 1,700 miles of railroad and this is particularly hard to improve. Both systems use diesel power.

Until recently, the central government managed the railroads, but in 1962, their administration was transferred to the provincial governments, which have concentrated their efforts on rehabilitating the existing system rather than expanding it.

There is some trading between the two provinces, but not nearly so much as Pakistanis would like. West Pakistan buys tea, paper products, tobacco, and a little jute from East Pakistan, which in turn buys cotton products and small consumer items from West Pakistan. The trade advantage lies with West Pakistan.

Inter-province trade relies on ocean shipping. In 1947, Pakistan owned three ancient and rusted cargo ships. In 1963, there were forty-three, all privately-owned, and for the first time there was adequate cargo space to handle traffic between Karachi and Chittagong and Chalna.

Passenger and mail transportation between the two wings and within the provinces has been revolutionized with airline development. Because of ill feeling between Pakistan and In-

dia, air travel is the most effective method of linking the two provinces.

In its early days, Pakistan had two privately-owned airlines flying Dakota and Convair airplanes. The government established Pakistan International Airlines in 1955 and today it is perhaps one of the most efficiently run businesses in the country. Jet airplanes whisk politicians and businessmen back and forth between the wings of Pakistan like commuters. Smaller airplanes reach out to nearly all major towns. East Pakistan has started one of the world's first transportation systems based on helicopters. A government-subsidized shuttle service between twenty-two towns costing the same as first class riverboat fares will eventually serve more than 200,000 passengers a year.

Government-controlled Pakistan International Airlines also services major cities of the world, providing regular jet flights to London, Frankfurt, Geneva, Rome, Beirut, Teheran, and New York. The government negotiated an agreement in 1963 with Communist China to begin flights to Canton, Shanghai, and Peking, much to the disappointment of Pakistan's anticommunist allies. The first flights began in April, 1964.

Foreign Trade

While agriculture and domestic trade form the major part of the work Pakistanis do, foreign trade is vital to the general economy. It is through trade with other countries that Pakistanis earn most of the foreign exchange with which to buy manufactured goods, fuel and capital equipment, as well as hardware for their armed forces. What foreign exchange Pakistan does not earn by trading, it obtains through grants and loans from industrial countries.

As in most new Asian countries, Pakistan exports raw materials chiefly. These are limited to two main products: jute and cotton. The sale of jute and jute products accounts for

about 59 per cent of the value of all exports and provides the world with nearly half of its raw jute and jute products. Raw cotton and cotton products earn about 10 per cent of the foreign exchange. The market for these exports is threatened by synthetics, so Pakistanis hope that they can increase their exports of tea, fish, hides and skins, wool, cottage industry products, paper and other minor products which make up the balance of the export trade.

For many years, Pakistan's best customers were, in order of importance: the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan and West Germany. India, in 1959–1960, purchased only 5 per cent of Pakistan's exportable products. In that year, however, the two countries worked out the Trade Agreement and Special Payments Arrangement and in 1960–1961 India was suddenly Pakistan's best customer, buying 58 per cent of her exports, in rupee value. Great Britain was next with 16.6 per cent, followed by the United States, 9.2 per cent and Japan, 6.8 per cent.

With the United Kingdom and other West European countries moving toward closer economic relations, Pakistan has worried about the security of its export markets. This apprehension, combined with a shift in foreign policy, brought about development of new markets. In 1963, Pakistan signed barter agreements with the Soviet Union for railway ties and cement in exchange for jute; with Communist China, cement in exchange for jute; with Poland, cement in exchange for jute; with Czechoslovakia, automobiles and other manufactured items in exchange for chrome ore; and with Hungary, electrical equipment in exchange for jute. With all this trading, the total value of the barter agreements is a mere $5,000,000.

With such a limited economy, Pakistanis need to import a substantial amount from other countries. The range of desired consumer goods increases every day as more people learn,

by radio, newspapers and word-of-mouth, what other people in the world have. But consumer goods must compete with fuel and machinery for Pakistan's limited foreign exchange. The government generally controls foreign exchange and from year to year varies the amount allowed for various kinds of purchases. In 1958–1959, 24 per cent of imports by value was for consumer goods; in 1960–1961, the amount was 42 per cent. Purchases of raw materials for industry and fuel and spare parts for machinery and vehicles accounted for the rest.

Pakistan has purchased more goods from the United States than any other country. In 1960–1961, the U. S. supplied 24 per cent of her imports. Other countries who sell to Pakistan include the United Kingdom, 18 per cent; West Germany, 8.5 per cent; Japan, 8 per cent and India 4 per cent

To the dismay of the East Pakistanis, whose jute crops are the major export item, most of the imports purchased with foreign exchange have gone to help West Pakistanis. However, since 1962 the government has funneled an increasing amount of export earnings to East Pakistan and in the Third Five Year Plan Bengalis will receive more of the available development funds than West Pakistanis.

The chronic deficit between import costs and export earnings has been one of Pakistan's most serious problems—as it is with nearly all developing countries. Up to 1956, when jute was selling well and harvests were bountiful, imports and exports were generally in balance. Since then, there have been ever-increasing deficits as food production fell, jute competition increased and imports rose drastically. While exports between 1956 and 1961 rose only 25 per cent, imports doubled. In 1962, exports reached the equivalent of $397,000,000; import costs were $738,000,000. The continued deficit makes it even harder for Pakistan to borrow money or in other ways meet its development costs.

In its foreign trade policies, Pakistan is guided by several external factors. Because it borrows heavily from agencies controlled by the United States government, which also furnishes grants-in-aid, Pakistan is forced to make large—and relatively expensive—purchases in the U. S. Pakistan's association with the British Commonwealth and its membership in the sterling area permits relatively free exchange of money, an encouragement to trading with other sterling bloc countries. Pakistan is also a member of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), whose members give each other preferential tariff and trade treatment.

Government Participation

Muslim and British traditions in the subcontinent, the lack of natural resources and money, and the concentration of talent in the bureaucracy have all led to an increasing government role in Pakistan's economic development. The amount of government activity has varied with the years. After partition, the government tried to take responsibility for nearly every economic problem. Both the First and Second Five Year plans reflected an awareness that the government could not control and operate everything. Many responsibilities in industry were returned to private enterprise and control of public industries was decentralized. The provincial Pakistan Industrial Development Corporations, the Pakistan Industrial Development Bank, Pakistan International Airlines, and Karachi Electric Supply Corporation were made semi-public. But in agriculture and development of water and power resources, government activity has, if anything, increased.

Another area in which government has had to play a major role has been banking. Prior to partition, the banking structure in Pakistan's part of the subcontinent was in the hands of Hindus, Sikhs, and foreigners. The Koranic injunction against riba and the dearth of opportunities for Indian Mus-

lims to enter the banking business left the field to others. In mid-1947, there were 631 registered bank offices in the Pakistan area. A year later, after partition and the departure of non-Muslims, there were 195. By 1963, the number had grown to 861.

The government formed the State Bank of Pakistan in 1948 and it has become the most important money-lending institution in the country. Like the U. S. Federal Reserve Bank, it issues money and acts as a "banker's bank." It was instrumental in founding the privately-owned National Bank of Pakistan (1949), the House and Building Finance Corporation (1952), the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (1957), the Agricultural Development Bank (1961) and the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (1961). It also regulates the sixteen foreign and domestic private banks which actually do most of the banking business. Government postal savings banks try to serve Pakistanis on the lower economic levels and government-operated agricultural credit cooperatives attempt to aid farmers.

Sitting atop all these government activities and directing them with a firm hand is the powerful National Economic Council, whose chairman is President Ayub. Composed of leading government officials such as Mohammed Shoiab and economic planner Said Hassan, it is the final arbiter of economic affairs and frequently, the only source of decisions for development matters. The Council leans heavily on the Central Planning Commission which, since 1955, has been advised by economists from Harvard University. Powerful and influential, the Commission helps formulate development policies and oversees the implementation of development plans.

Upon the National Economic Council and the Planning Commission rests the responsibility for carrying out the Second Five Year Plan. They also have now drawn up the outlines of the Third Five Year Plan which will cover the years

1965 to 1970. Latest estimates place the cost for the Third Plan at more than $10,000,000,000, twice as much as the Second Plan. Significantly, the Third Plan envisages an acceleration of 150 per cent in the development program of East Pakistan with the long-term objective of removing the economic disparities between East and West Pakistan by 1985. Its goals include raising the national income by 30 per cent (against 24 per cent in the Second Plan), increasing power and agricultural production and reducing dependency on foreign aid from 50 per cent to 40 per cent.

Foreign Aid

Pakistan began receiving help from other countries soon after independence. First, its wealthier Commonwealth colleagues (Australia, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand) organized the Colombo Plan to assist less fortunate members. The first major project was the development of the Thal region in the Punjab for resettling refugees. Then the United Nations and the United States sent technicians and funds to attack basic economic, social, and welfare problems. With its entry into the Baghdad Pact, later called the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and its foreign policy commitment against international communism in 1954, Pakistan's benefits from U. S. foreign aid increased perceptibly. For instance, in 1956 Pakistan received $154,000,000 in foreign economic aid. In 1958 it received $145,000,000, and in 1962, after the revolution, it received $323,000,000.

United States aid has varied in kind and amount depending upon the foreign policy changes of both countries. U. S. economic aid in grants and loans was $404,000,000 in 1962. Only one country, India, received more from the U. S. in that year. Since 1947, Pakistan has received more than $1,500,000,000 in economic assistance from the U. S.

United States aid has helped nearly all economic projects, but most of the funds have gone for food and major development programs in transportation, power, and irrigation. Investment surveys, dollar and local currency loans, investment guarantees, and support for development banks have aided private enterprise. A large amount of aid has been in surplus food. One of the most recent projects supported by low-interest loans has been the construction of the Wah Cantt industrial center near Rawalpindi. Originally an ordnance factory, the two square miles of buildings will eventually turn out products as diverse as safety pins and bulldozers. In 1963, U. S. aid was aimed at the saltwater intrusion problem, increasing rice production, improving rural health, streamlining the bureaucracy, supporting an all-out education program, and promoting private industry. Pakistan is one of four "pilot" countries selected by the U. S. government for special emphasis on private enterprise activity (along with Thailand, Colombia, and Nigeria). Special efforts are being made to encourage American companies to invest in Pakistan's industries.

Pakistanis welcome foreign aid, aware that without it they cannot possibly improve their low standard of living. But, like patients receiving a vaccination for their health, Pakistanis do not like the treatment. They are sensitive and deeply resent the necessity of having to be injected with foreign aid. The very pride which led subcontinent Muslims to seek a country of their own forces them to accept with reluctance a dependence upon other people for their welfare.

This pride also encourages Pakistanis to work harder than they perhaps would work otherwise to reduce their dependency and in this effort they are somewhat successful. For instance, in 1963 exports of cotton textiles were the highest in Pakistan's history, up some 10 per cent over the previous year. Pakistanis expect that exports will increase steadily so that

their dependence on foreign aid will drop from 49 per cent to 41 per cent before the Second Five Year Plan is completed.

Yet increasing exports do not, in the short run, answer the needs of most Pakistanis, the villagers. In 1962–1963, manufacturing increased, as did exports, but floods and drought brought such calamity to the farmers that Pakistan's overall national income declined 1 per cent. Until the 83,000,000 villagers of Pakistan are able to produce more and obtain real compensation, Pakistan's development programs will be only superficial. It is in the development of its human resources that Pakistan must find the key to its prosperity.

8. *Traditions Under Attack*

As Pakistanis seek prosperity they face a constant conflict with their age-old customs. Progress requires change and for a people whose traditions are ancient and revered change does not come easily. Most Pakistanis live by rigid code, bred of a need to survive in a hostile world. Religion has confirmed these codes, making modification of them even more difficult.

The most powerful institution guiding a Pakistani's life is his family. Be he villager or city dweller, educated government official or simple farmer, Muslim, Hindu, Parsee, or Christian, Punjabi or Bengali, a Pakistani is a family man. His membership in a particular family or tribe forms the guidelines of his life.

The family is the basic economic unit in which a man works, earns and retires. It provides his security, not only as a fighting unit for tribesmen, but for protection against physical disability, unemployment and old age. In industrial societies, these functions have been usurped by the state—and insurance companies. Not so in Pakistan.

Family systems vary in South Asia, but anthropologists agree that they have one thing in common: a family consists of more than the husband, wife, and their children. It extends outward to include fathers and mothers, a married brother and his children, perhaps a widowed sister, all living in the same household. Among tribesmen, the "family" may include all parents, brothers and sisters, cousins, uncles and aunts. In the Punjab and Sind area, the lineage of a family is called a *biraderi.* Among Pathans it is called a *kheyl,* which incor-

porates a particularly large number of relatives. Bengalis call their lineage *athaya-shajan*. The degree to which a Pakistani recognizes a relative as part of his biraderi or kheyl depends on how "modernized" he has become.

Among most families, especially of the Muslim faith, the father is the family head. The members of the biraderi trace their relationship patrilineally to a common male ancestor. Among non-tribal families, the eldest son becomes head of the family when the father dies. Among Pathans, this is not always so. While ancestry extends back through the father, family leadership falls to the son who, in the eyes of the kheyl, is the most competent.

Toward each member of his extended family, a Pakistani child has certain prescribed obligations. The father commands great respect and the relationship between father and child is formal, and often restrained. A Pakistani's warmest attachments are to his mother and, next, to his sister and his maternal grandmother. For aunts and uncles, the family code sets forth strict rules of behavior. The child who best follows this code becomes a favorite, defended by all.

A family performs as a team. Each male fulfills certain tasks in the trade or occupation of the family. Women attend to the household and child-rearing needs. Married daughters have the obligation to settle quarrels between family members while sons are expected to defend their sisters' honor. The removal of a family member, as when a boy goes off to school, threatens the functioning of the family team.

While the family unit's strength gives protection and security to its members, it also inhibits development of new institutions which new nations demand. It may impede the development of the individual by limiting his education or mobility. It breeds nepotism in government.

Family or tribal loyalty can and does conflict with a man's loyalty to the larger "family" of his nation. Some farming

families resist education and mechanization which would disrupt the traditional unit. "Teach my boy to read and write," says a farmer, "show him the world beyond our village, and he will leave home. Without my son, I cannot plow, sow, or reap. And who will care for me in my old age?"

To insure protection and security, families must be strong and large, with many sons. Because disease takes so many children, a husband and wife will try to have a lot of children and they look with suspicion on attempts to persuade them to limit the size of their family.

Generally, then, a Pakistani's first loyalty is to his family. He will guard it against defamation and maintain its honor. If a member commits a crime that reflects on the family's prestige, the offender is severely punished and threatened with the ultimate penalty—expulsion. Yet, a family will defend its members, even if they are wrong, if by doing so the family's reputation remains unaffected.

It is because of the family's importance that marriage is such a highmark in Pakistani life. Planning marriages and selecting mates are of concern to the entire family. Early in a child's life, parents begin searching for a partner. They look first within the lineage, seeking a second or third cousin from a more important family unit. Usually this is in another village. The job of husband- and wife-finding is the mother's, although the father must bargain over the dowry a girl takes with her.

Muslim marriages are contractual affairs, not religious. The family of each partner works out precisely the responsibilities of each child. The daughter's family must make sure that if there is a divorce the daughter will receive as much "alimony" as possible. When the contract is settled, the families sign it, the boy and girl then agree to it and the marriage is consummated accompanied by joyous festivities which sometimes stretch over an entire month. While child marriages still ex-

ist in many villages, it is becoming more common for parents to wait until the boy is at least 16 and the girl 15.

President Ayub's government has tried to eliminate many of the traditions of Pakistani marriages. For instance, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 decreed every marriage must be registered with the Union Council and that divorce had to be a two-way proposition. Under orthodox Muslim law, a husband may divorce his wife merely by saying to her three times in front of a witness, "I divorce you"—the woman is thus divorced. Now, the woman must either consent or her husband must obtain permission from the Union Council. Religious leaders are quite upset by this intrusion of the government into personal Muslim law.

While the Pakistani family forms the core of the society and is the basic economic unit, few families are completely self-sufficient or independent. Over the centuries, society has developed occupational groups and social classes within each village or group of villages, each of which depends upon the other for security. Among Hindus, this stratification is solidified into the caste system, which has religious sanctity. For Muslims, distinctions exist without religious basis.

Thus, in a village there will be a barber, carpenter, weaver, baker, cobbler, mullah, *hakim* (folk doctor) and others whose families have acquired specialization through the years. Each is like an occupational caste. Children marry within their caste and wherever they go tend to follow the occupation and customs of the caste. This system applies equally in the cities among manual laborers, shopkeepers and government servants, modified, of course, by the degree of "modernization" that has taken place.

Social distinctions stem not only from a family's occupation, but from ancestors. One such distinction is called *ashraf*, or high-born, as against *ajlaf*, or low-born. Much of Pakistan's aristocracy is ashraf, descendants of Arab and Afghan con-

querors and Moghuls who once ruled South Asia. They are proud of their ancestry and maintain a class awareness, usually marrying other members of the class. Millions of Pakistanis—indeed, most of them—are descendants of converted Hindus. These the ashraf classify as ajlaf, a distinction without great significance to most Pakistanis.

Another division in the social structure is the *zamindars,* the landowners, or, in East Pakistan, *talukdar.* Many zamindars are also ashraf and thus are in the highest echelons of society. But a zamindar may also be a small landowner, far from wealthy. By owning land or being a member of a family which owns land he acquires membership in this group. He seldom marries outside it.

Millions of Pakistanis classify themselves as *kammis.* They are the craftsmen who generally do the non-farming jobs of the community, although they may also do field work. Kammis are divided into various occupational groups. Between kammis themselves and between kammis and zamindars contractual relationships exist which insure that everyone is fed and cared for. While each has a higher or lower relationship to the other, no one is indispensable. The lower seek favors and give gifts to the higher who, in turn, protect the lower. Changing any part of the system—even to removing the landlord—threatens the entire community.

Village life in Pakistan revolves around the family and caste relationships. The leading family is usually that of the wealthiest zamindar who himself is the *choudhury,* or chieftain. In East Pakistan, he is called the *morol.* It is he who must act as representative of the village to the government, be public spokesman, settle disputes (unless the dispute is such that he must call in the village elders, the panchayat) and maintain a guest house for visitors. He usually gets elected to the Union Council, although in some cases, the mullah or the peripatetic barber may gain enough stature to get elected.

At village level, the choudhury acquires his position by inheritance, but with the acquiescence of the other villagers. They may, if they are unhappy enough, change their allegiance to another zamindar, in which case, rivalries develop and biraderis compete for first place.

Among Pathans, the chieftain is called malik or khan. While his authority is considerable, he must first gain acceptance by the minor tribal leaders. When he speaks, it is only after the leading members have met together in jirga to discuss matters.

A West Pakistani desert or plains village is composed of dried clay houses with flat roofs covered with mud some twelve inches thick, laid upon timbers. Some have thatched roofs. Usually, each group of family houses is surrounded by a mud wall. Narrow lanes wind among the houses and act as sewers as well as paths. In many areas, especially in tribal territory, the entire village is surrounded by a wall. Many villages have a central "courtyard" which may have a store or two. It is common for the mosque to be off to one corner of the village. The courtyard may have the only well in the village. Some villagers keep their animals in their own houses; others keep them in a common stable in the village, but in nearly all cases animals at night remain very close to their owners. In higher terrain, West Pakistanis depend more upon wood, stone, and thatch in construction of their houses.

East Pakistan villages are quite different from those in the West. A Punjabi or Sindi village may have as many as 1,500 people, but a Bengali village will have fewer than 1,000. While a West Pakistan village will include many families living close together geographically, an East Pakistan village will have only a few families, each living apart in a subdivision called a *para*. There are not enough large areas of dry land on which to build an extensive village. Each family builds a row of bamboo huts around a central courtyard,

which usually has a pond. The sloping roofs of the houses are thatched with dry grass and their eaves droop in response to the heavy rains. More a group of separate homesteads than a village in the ordinary sense, the collection of paras in a banana or coconut grove has no store or other commercial enterprise, although it may have a small mosque.

More than 95 per cent of the people in East Pakistan live in such family villages, many of which are so close together that densities sometimes exceed 2,000 people per square mile. In the Lohanjang *thana* in Dacca district, more than 3,000 persons inhabit a square mile.

Villages in both provinces are usually connected in such a way as to form groups. Intermarriage between youths of the same caste in nearby villages and trade and craft relationships bind many villages together. Villagers share festivals and celebrations and there is much visiting back and forth. One village will become prominent and perhaps have a school and even a store available to other villagers. For most rural Pakistanis, this cluster of villages is their world and it is upon this cluster that President Ayub has built his Basic Democracies program. While villagers learn of events in the cities from radios, itinerant vendors, and other visitors, they really know only individuals and events within their cluster.

One characteristic of village life is its routine. Any variation from the routine is welcomed and villagers eagerly look forward to celebrations, religious festivals, visits from outsiders (who, properly, always give advance warning of their visit) and market days.

Zekiye Eglar, a Muslim scholar who did graduate work at Columbia University in New York, lived among Punjabi villagers for five years. She describes a sample of village life—a typical winter day.*

* Zekiye Eglar, *A Punjabi Village in Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960) p. 59 ff.

"By the time the sun is quite high, the woman at home has finished her morning chores. She rose before sunrise and in the dim light of a small lamp started to grind the grain. The sound of the grinding mill reaches the children in their beds, but they sleep on. Then she begins to churn the milk; in spring and summer she would churn outside. . . . The children wake up, but still remain for some time in bed, while the mother lets the chickens out from under the large basket with which they were covered at night. Then she kneads the dough and lights the fire. The children come outside and warm themselves near the hearth. They do not change their clothes for they sleep in the same clothes they wear during the day. They eat bread with butter and pickles, drink buttermilk and go to the mosque.

"Not every woman cooks on winter mornings. Some give the children bread or rice from the previous evening with buttermilk. In some houses people eat both breakfast and lunch, but other women prefer to prepare an early lunch.

"Children hardly wash their hands and faces in the mornings, for they are cold and the mother doesn't insist too much. She will wash them in the afternoon when it gets warm, and will change their clothes. The woman herself changes into fresh clothes in the afternoon, after she has finished her work, has washed, and has combed her hair; she finds little time in the morning to attend to her toilette.

"Men do not wash themselves at home. They go either to the well or to the bath attached to the mosque. A man wraps himself in an old sheet and sits in the sun while his wife washes and dries his clothes.

"After the children leave, the woman washes the dishes from the previous evening and from the morning, and feeds the chickens. She rolls up the bedding and puts it away, and carries the cots out into the courtyard for they are used during

the day. A neighbor may stop in for a few minutes, but morning is a busy time.

"The smoke rising over the walls of the baker's house is a sign that the oven is being heated. The baker's wife heats the oven twice before noon on winter mornings—for the people who eat an early lunch and for those who eat after noon. The baker's wife, as she works, squats by the side of an earthenware oven sunk in the ground. A small roof protects her from too much sunshine. Other women squat around her with their earthenware platters of dough which they shape into flat round breads and pass to the baker's wife to stick to the sides of the heated oven. For every eight loaves baked, she lays aside a piece of dough for one loaf as payment for her work. But even though she is paid every time bread is baked, at harvest time the *zamindars* who are her customers send her some grain. While they wait for their bread to be baked, women's tongues are as busy as their hands. This is the social club for women, where they exchange all the news and gossip of the village; how many outfits a certain woman brought from her visit to her parents' home; how, to spite her daughter-in-law, a farmer's mother was trying to persuade her son to take a second wife; and how the weavers threatened to leave the village unless the daughter of a weaver who had eloped with the son of a poor *zamindar* was returned to her parents. . . .

"As the sun rises higher and if the well is working, some women go there with their laundry, which they have soaked in boiling water and washing soda, and, placing a washboard under the running water, they beat the clothes with a wooden club, rub them with soap, and rinse them out. They spread the clothes to dry on the grass in the fields next to the well. . . . While the clothes are drying, a woman squats and washes herself in a small enclosure through which a thick jet of water from the well runs on its way to the fields. . . .

"While the little children are playing by the well, the older boys are in the mosque, where they go for an hour every day to learn to read the Quran from the village *imam,* and the girls study in the *imam's* house under the tutoring of his wife. This is the extent of the children's formal education. . . . Instead, they help their fathers in their work and thus, if the fathers are *kammis,* learn their fathers' trade. All boys learn how to cultivate the land and take care of the cattle. . . .

"The afternoon is the time for leisure and for visiting. A few women neighbors may drop in, and they all sit crowded together on a cot. Someone may read the popular poem, for women love it, too. The barber's wife or his mother may drop in, but she does not stay very long for she is on her way to the *chowdhri's* [choudhury] house where she will wash and comb and braid the *chowdhrani's* hair and will also massage her body, for this is her duty. . . .

"There are always people from the outside who pass through the village. There are vendors who sell children's toys, cheap crockery, and fruit; the men who pewter the copper pots; in summer, the ice cream man; a juggler; a man with a trained monkey and a bear; a group of professionals whose specialty it is to sing a lullaby to a baby; a village bard who travels with an orphaned son; a traveling *fakir* . . . the beggar begs in the name of God. They usually know which are the doors to knock at, and people give them grain or food—never leftovers, for that is a sin. . . .

"In the men's guest house, a small group of men play cards —a cobbler, the driver of a carriage who has come back from the city early in the afternoon, a *zamindar,* and the old servant of the *chowdhri.* A few men are also watching them. They play bridge and trumpet cards, and are intent on playing their best, for they never play for money, but are proud to play well.

"Late in the afternoon some men come in from the fields laden with huge piles of fodder. Others go home to milk the

buffaloes. The children are already at home, playing in the courtyard.

"As sunset nears, a few men go to the mosque to take their ablutions. Women who pray take their ablutions at home. Sunset is announced by the chanting of the call to prayer from the veranda of the mosque. Silence falls on the men sitting outside, as each says a prayer in his heart. Women pray on small mats spread in the courtyards or on the verandas of their homes. When the prayer is over, the men go home for their evening meal. . . .

"The evening meal is served right after sunset. The family squat near the hearth, except for the father who sits on a cot and is served there. After the meal, men get together in small groups. If they have work or some intrigue to discuss, they will visit each other's houses; otherwise they leave their houses and go outside to the places they usually frequent—the men's guest house, the place where some wealthy landowner keeps his cattle, or the workshop of the cobbler who always keeps a fresh *huka* [hooka]. Young men and boys join the older men or sit and tell stories or guess at riddles. . . .

"Everything becomes quiet after the night prayer. The only sound heard is the tinkling of the bells of the buffaloes working at the well, the regular flow of the water, and the song of a young man who is working at the well the whole night."

Time for the villager does not move by the clock. The sun is his major timepiece and the seasons determine how daily chores may vary. During fall and late spring, he is planting and sowing. In the winter and early and late summer, he has little to do. Except in times of emergency like a flood, life moves slowly. Phases of the moon set the dates for religious festivals.

City life is largely an extension of village life, modified to meet new conditions. During partition, refugee farmers from India fled to the cities of Pakistan. Since then, many Pakistani

villagers have migrated to the cities, as shown by the fact that, in the past ten years, the rural population has increased 19.8 per cent while the urban population has increased by more than 56 per cent. Millions of urban dwellers are still villagers at heart and are bound by the same traditions. Even the urban aristocracy is attached to the land and government and busiless leaders often have ties to one village or another.

Thus, in the cities, the same occupational caste distinctions pertain. Between occupational and social groups, there is little intermarriage except as modern-educated youth are able to ignore traditions. Like their village relatives, the family is a close-knit unit. Each member depends upon the other for security and livelihood. The arranging of proper marriages is as important to city folks as to villagers. In a country where prosperity is reserved for the very few, family members frequently give each other preference in jobs.

As in the village, a city man's prestige derives as much from the social level of his biraderi or kheyl as from the quality of his work. Money naturally plays a much larger role among urban Pakistanis and wealth brings honor of sorts. But wealth, combined with a good family ancestry and caste, means ever so much more.

In the cities and towns life becomes frustrating for Pakistanis. Their traditions were set in the village or tribe and have little relation to the pace and demands of modern city life. One example of frustration is the conflict between living according to time—as measured by the clock and as measured by traditional means. Promptness for appointments is a foreign manifestation and producing work according to a deadline or plan acquires an adjustment often beyond many Pakistanis. To the military-trained leaders of Pakistan, whose lives have been strictly regimented, the casual tempo around them demands great patience.

City life in Pakistan is superficially like life in any city. The calendar is Gregorian for most purposes. Work for the men begins at a specified time in the morning, stops for lunch, begins again an hour or so later, stops for tea, resumes and finally ends about 5 P.M., at which time every one goes home. Shops and the bazaars stay open much later. For a woman, life is more flexible, but she must spend at least half of each day in the bazaars. There being few "general" stores, she must go to one place for vegetables, another for meat, another for shoes or cloth. Fortunately, in the cities there are schools for her children, a blessing her village cousin does not always have.

Like the villagers, people in the city use the evenings as a time to socialize, meet with friends, listen to music, tell stories, and exchange gossip. If they can, families walk or ride a bus to the outskirts of town to escape the city heat. On weekends, a picnic and more visiting enlivens the routine. For men, and a few women, movies are a favorite recreation. In fact, the cinema in Pakistan is one of the more successful businesses. One theatre owner reported that he did not consider a movie popular unless the average movie-goer had seen the same film at least five times.

Recreation, especially group sports, plays a large role in the life of Pakistani youth. Most sports require little equipment but considerable output of energy. One popular game is called *kabadi* or *hadudu* in which two sides of any number of players oppose each other on a large field. Team members alternate as raiders, trying to cross the center line to touch a member of the opposing team without getting caught, all the while repeating in one breath the syllables "ka-ba-di-ka-ba-di." Another game is *hinga dari* or *laban dari*. Here teams attempt to steal salt from the center and place it in squares about the field. Inter-village matches bring forth enthusiasm similar to that found at American football games. In the Punjab and

among the Pathans sports on horseback are popular, ranging from polo to tent-peg sticking. So, too, is hunting.

On a national scale, although mostly in the cities, Pakistanis have produced athletes in nearly all sports. Their cricket teams play regularly against those of their Commonwealth partners. In the British Empire and Commonwealth Games in 1962, Pakistan's wrestlers won seven gold medals (in eight weights). For many years, the brothers Kashim, Azam, and Rowshan Khan have been world champions in squash rackets. Soccer is a popular school sport as is field hockey, in which a Pakistan team captured a gold medal in the 1960 Olympic Games. In basketball, track, tennis, and swimming, Pakistan is trying to develop Olympic competitors, although these sports, while popular, are relatively new to the country.

One distinguishing feature of Pakistani life, village or city, is the role of women. It is prescribed by tradition, religion and the men. Just as there are detailed obligations between individuals within a family or biraderi, so, too, is there a carefully defined occupational and social role for women to play, whether they like it or not. Basically, this role is similar to being a contractual servant to the man, satisfying his sexual desires, bearing and raising his children, preparing his food, finding a good mate for his children, keeping him informed of family affairs, comforting him in his old age, and supporting him in all his pursuits. In return, he provides her with children to raise, food to cook and a family to organize. He protects her, gives her the alimony previously agreed upon if he divorces her, and sometimes defers to her commands in the running of the household. If she is strong-willed, he may even permit her to advise him in business affairs. Each depends upon the other, but each has a separate place in society.

In this traditional role, Pakistani women are usually secluded from affairs outside their family. They generally may not meet male strangers who visit their husband's home. When

they walk beyond the confines of their house, they must be unobtrusive. In the towns, where there are many strangers, "unobtrusive" means veiled from head to toe. The practice of purdah, or seclusion, remains prominent in Pakistan, more so than in almost any other Muslim country except, perhaps, Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia.

Tradition has kept women isolated from those few streams of progress running through Pakistan. Education has largely passed them by. Most schools are for men and co-education is permitted only at the most primary level. While 80 per cent of the men are illiterate, over 90 per cent of the women are.

In a few corners of Pakistani society, women are escaping from the "separate but unequal" role. Some have cast off the veil, literally and figuratively, to become some of Pakistan's most adept and prominent leaders. They have achieved eminence in nearly all professions. Many of them are from families who migrated from India and who left behind not only their lands, but also their bondage.

The All-Pakistan Women's Association (APWA) is typical of the women's attempt to break with the past. Headed by Begum Liaquat Ali Khan, wife of Pakistan's first prime minister, who was assassinated in 1951, APWA is as formidable a force for Pakistan's progress as any other single organization in the country. From its ranks of young, dedicated women have come village workers, welfare aides, nurses, and social action leaders who have swept away years of lethargy among women and stubbornness among men and brought change into Pakistani homes.

In addition to Begum Liaquat Ali Khan, who has also been Pakistan's Ambassador to the Netherlands, other leading women have been Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Pakistan's founder, and Begum Mujibunnissa Akram, at the age of thirty-seven a member of the National Assembly and delegate

to the United Nations. Begum Sarwari Irfannullah participated in the World Congress of Women held in Moscow in June, 1963, while Begum Ruqqaya Anwar is an outstanding East Pakistan member of the National Assembly. Begum Mahmooda Selim Khan is a West Pakistan minister. Begum Jehanera Shah Nawaz from Lahore is a leader in the opposition and a prominent feminist. Together, these leaders have been able to break the centuries-old injunction against equal inheritance rights for women, much to the anger of religious leaders who continue to hold by the Muslim law which allots to daughters only half the amount of inheritance as sons.

Whether Pakistanis live in a village or town, they place the same high values on various aspects of life. Although some are common to all Asians, others are characteristic of Pakistanis.

Foremost among their values is a firm belief in the essential equality of all Muslims. Like most people, they breach the code of equality in practice, but Pakistanis are firm in their acknowledgement of the right of any man to sit at another man's table or pray by his side in his mosque (although women must pray separately).

Pakistanis also place value on loyalty—to the precepts of Islam, to their families and to their villages. The codes of behavior are well defined and the person who observes these codes attains stature. The young man who shows respect for age, the young girl who acts modestly, the zamindar who sacrifices an animal on Id al-Bakr, the son who returns to his village to visit his family, the person who does not eat pork and who fasts during Ramazan—each gains in the eyes of his community.

Hospitality, too, is a basic value, to the Punjabi or Sindi villager as much as to the Pathan whose codes are the most strict. To strangers and friends alike, Pakistanis accept an obligation to open their doors to those who seek shelter or

friendship, and as poor as he might be, a man must share what he has with a guest in his house.

Among townsmen, and an increasing number of villagers, formal education has great value. It is a means of rising in the social scale despite one's birth. For a farmer who is enlightened enough to permit his son to leave home temporarily, it is an opportunity for the son to do better than his father and to improve the life of the village family. For the patriotic—and there are many so motivated—education is an assurance that their country will progress. Some place such a high value on formal education that the university degree becomes the end of all endeavor rather than a step toward greater achievement.

Materially, villagers and many urban Pakistanis place great value on land. Here is tangible security. Muslims in South Asia have been farmers and rulers, not tradesmen or industrialists. Ownership of land evokes feelings of dignity and safety. This attitude has kept many urban Pakistanis so emotionally close to the soil they are reluctant to invest earnings or their future in factories or commerce. By the same token, Pakistanis also place value on jewelry which, over the years, has proved the safest means of hoarding wealth. Governments may come and go, economies may rise and fall, but gold earrings conserve their value in the marketplace and please the womenfolk as well.

In the life of nearly every Pakistani "The Government" asserts some influence, directly or indirectly. Although there are many who do not even know there is such a nation as Pakistan, few are oblivious to some kind of superstructure riding herd on their lives. What they think about it affects the government and the activity of people as citizens.

Pakistanis have two conflicting attitudes toward government. Both grew out of past experience. On the one hand,

the government is expected to solve most of the country's problems; on the other, it is the cause of most problems.

During most of India's history before 1947 the attitude of government leaders, whether Hindu, Moghul or British, was paternalistic, while the attitude of the people was one of passive submission. The state satisfied all needs; it built schools, roads and hospitals; maintained law and order and dispensed justice. In return, it expected from the people obedience, cooperation and the performance of assigned tasks. Initiative was seldom expected or encouraged and the relationship between government and the people was impersonal. This attitude still is deep-seated among government officials and the ordinary citizen today. But it has been modified by increasing mutual disrespect.

As the various nationalist movements gained strength after 1857, particularly after Mahatma Gandhi's movement of non-cooperation at the end of World War I, government became singularly unpopular among South Asians. Political awakening brought increasing criticism. Every action of government, good or bad, met with a storm of protest. "Government" came to be viewed as evil and its laws oppressive; non-cooperation was a badge of patriotism.

Pakistan came into being with combined attitudes of apathy toward personal or community initiative and resentment toward authority in public life. Both attitudes plague the advancement of Pakistani society. Many government servants see people as subjects and the people see government as a ruler, the cause of all problems and the source of all solutions.

As surely as the monsoons sweep into Pakistan every year, so change is creeping into its society and affecting patterns of living, attitudes and values, welcome or not. It is this progress and control of the changing social system that is a major challenge to Pakistan's leaders. If they must threaten the protective link in the family's chain of security, then they must

provide—or convince the people to provide for themselves—a substitute.

A son leaving his village to seek his way in the city appears to threaten his family's security, yet such a move gives greater opportunity for a young man to build a better life. A daughter seeking education violates the traditions of village life yet broadens her horizon. An unarranged marriage between a couple of different occupational castes defies the practices of centuries, yet gives both boy and girl opportunity to find greater happiness and a more meaningful life. A young girl joining APWA against the wishes of her father contravenes the code of family loyalty and female modesty, yet brings another soldier into Pakistan's army of welfare workers.

Few villagers in Pakistan and even fewer city dwellers have escaped acquaintance with abrupt change in the past decade, particularly since the advent of President Ayub. For many years to come, zamindars and kammis, ashrafs and ajlafs, Muslims and Hindus, villagers and urbanites, will follow the traditional ways of living in the subcontinent. But more and more they will all shed certain habits and values as they get caught up, willingly or not, in the twentieth century.

9. *The Absent Necessities*

Although sought by many, formal education and good health are luxuries available to relatively few Pakistanis. For the majority of the people—the villagers—development of the mind and care of the body depend upon family convention. In its Second Five Year Plan, Pakistan has embarked upon an ambitious course to adapt these conventions to modern technology. Already, the benefits of science and education have been extended to many thousands who could not previously perform effectively in their changing society.

Education

Pakistan's leaders have come to realize that investment in education is an integral part of the country's investment in economic development; that without trained manpower there can be little growth in industry or agriculture. Unfortunately, the initial costs of such an investment are enormous because Pakistan has so far to go. Literacy is a good indication. Only some 15 per cent of the people can read or write—less than 20 per cent of the population aged five years or over. What literacy gains Pakistan makes in expanding primary education are practically nullified by the rapidly expanding population.

Centuries of poverty prevented the establishing of educational institutions in South Asian villages. But two other factors contributed as well. One was the traditional Islamic approach to learning and the other was the narrow scope of education supported by Muslim and British rulers.

Formal education among Muslims generally, whether in

South Asia or the Middle East, has largely meant learning about religion, although there are exceptions. Various Muslim courts throughout history—in Baghdad, Ghazni, Khorosan, and Delhi—encouraged scholarship in a broad range of subjects. For the masses, however, the educational process was in the hands of mullahs, whose primary purpose was the teaching of Islam—and Arabic. And as the world progressed about them, the mullahs made little use of modern knowledge. In Bengal, Muslim missionaries established madrassahs which taught only religious subjects until a group of "reformed madrassahs" introduced arithmetic, history and geography in 1915. In the area that is now West Pakistan, these schools were called maktabs and, at a more advanced level, *dar-ul-ulums.*

Religious schools were once the chief educational institutions for Muslims and they still play an important role in education in Pakistan, as do religious schools for Hindus in East Pakistan. Subjects offered remain predominantly theological. The government has begun an intensive program to organize classes for mullahs and imams in hopes of raising the level of their teaching. Among Hindus, the government supports some 100 special schools known as *tols,* supervision of which it leaves to Hindu leaders.

The Moghul rulers of India encouraged some Muslims and a few Hindus from important families to seek broader education in order to serve in the top ranks of the government. The British who followed them continued the same policy.

Beginning in 1835, the British promoted a limited system of public education, which Christian missionaries supplemented with private schools. The objects were to propagate Christianity and to train young Indians for government service. The architect of the system was T. B. Macaulay, who wrote at the time that the British system of education was designed to produce "a class of persons, Indian in blood and

color, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect." Classes were offered in philosophy, English literature, grammar, European economics, English history, and some science. With this broad base, graduates could then serve in administrative posts demanding general knowledge. Little or no effort was made to provide technical training or mass education.

For many years, British-styled education appealed primarily to Hindus, especially after the uprising of 1857 when they received preference in government service. While Hindus advanced academically, Muslims continued to rely on their madrassahs and maktabs. It was to overcome this Muslim disadvantage that Sayyid Ahmed Khan established the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh in 1875. In 1920, it became Aligarh University and was the primary institution for training subcontinent Muslims for government. Its graduates formed the core of Pakistan's early leadership. Few of the newly-independent countries of the world today have a more qualified group of educated leaders than Pakistan did at the time of its independence.

Yet the very system which produced well-educated leaders provided only minimal training for those who were needed to build the country, the engineers, doctors, scientists, businessmen and technicians.

In Pakistan's inherited educational system, a student progresses in four stages to reach the university level. The first five years are called "primary," the next three "middle," the next two "high school," and the final two "intermediate." The curriculum in all stages, beginning with the first grade, contains subjects of a predominantly theoretical nature and a student need only memorize facts from books and from copious notes carefully written verbatim as the teacher speaks. While the object of the student may not be to enter university or government service, the plan of studies is designed with

these goals in mind for everyone. Those who do not succeed are not prepared for anything else.

In the early days of Pakistan, the government's approach to education was primarily to expand what it had inherited. More schools and teachers seemed to be the answer. By 1955, Pakistan had doubled the number of primary school teachers to 75,000. It was not long before Pakistanis realized that increased facilities and teachers did not provide the quality of education which the society needed. The First Five Year Plan made a small beginning at giving teachers better training, but it alloted only one-fifth of its development funds to education. The government's biggest step was to appoint a Commission on National Education, headed by S. H. Sharif, with freedom to look into all the corners of Pakistan's educational system.

In 1959, the Commission made its report. It minced no words in pointing out the weaknesses of the old system and, indeed, its report was praised in many parts of the world. Of more importance, President Ayub supported its recommendations, appointed an autonomous Planning and Development Division in the Ministry of Education and instructed Mr. Sharif to hurry. In the Second Five Year Plan, investment in education was doubled. Against the resistance of many teachers, who had not been consulted or been involved in the educational planning and who opposed many of the new plans, the government made slow headway. In some areas, such as home economics education and agricultural training in East Pakistan, advancement has been remarkable. On a country-wide basis, however, the system strongly reflects that which Pakistan inherited.

No more than 40 per cent of Pakistan's children enter primary school. Of these, nearly 75 per cent drop out before they have reached the fifth grade, the stage at which a child is considered literate. Only about 5,000,000 children, 4,000,000

of whom are boys, enter the 50,000 primary schools each year. Nearly all live in the towns and cities.

Children do not go to school for several reasons. First, there are not enough schools, especially in West Pakistan, or enough teachers. But even when schools are available, some village parents do not see the sense of formal education. Children are an important part of the working unit and farmers often feel that their children are more useful in the fields than in school.

Ever so slowly, attitudes toward education are changing. Zekiye Eglar states: *

"Formerly, many well-to-do *zamindars* sent their sons to school, but if the boy did not show much eagerness to study the parents did not insist because the land was always there. Today, both sons and daughters are being educated. The demand for educated girls has become widespread, and in the villages people have already learned to inquire whether a marriageable girl has completed primary or high school. . . . The *kammis* are equally eager to educate their children. Most of them send their children to the village school opened by the government, but not all of them as yet send their daughters to the same school with their sons. Instead, they still prefer to have their daughters study the Quran, which is taught by the wife of the *imam*. However, among the young men who have had some education, there is a strong desire to marry an educated girl who has studied in a regular school."

The Commission hoped to see the number of primary schools expanded by 22,000 by 1965 and educational reforms made which would decrease the drop-out rate and increase enrollments. After two years, the Implementation Commission was far from its goal, although advancement in East Pakistan was encouraging.

* Eglar, *op. cit.*, page 191.

Students from the secondary stages of education form the bulk of the educated community. They have attended one of 6,000 public and private schools. Most teachers have only a secondary education themselves, but since their only requirement in the present system is to read lectures, the pedagogical demands on them are not great. The goal of the students is to pass a year-end written examination in which success can be achieved through memorization. Throughout the year, all intellectual effort is aimed toward this single examination. The student receives no credit for work done during the year.

The Commission on National Education wrote:

"Our own secondary system is so far removed from our actual and immediate needs, as to make it hopelessly inadequate." The Commission recommended that the curriculum be diversified, that it "include such additional subjects and training as will form a preparation for specific vocations and careers."

Teacher resistance to the Commission recommendations has been particularly strong in secondary education, especially in changing the examination system, broadening the curriculum and up-grading the teachers. An effort has been made to establish an "educational extension" program in major cities to give in-service training to teachers and supervisors. In addition, new "demonstration" secondary schools have been built, with American assistance, to show how a different system of education can be effective. The experiments are too new to have made an impact on the system.

In higher education, Pakistan has had to overcome great handicaps, not all deriving from the educational system. For instance, in 1950, Pakistan had only three universities, one each in Sind, the Punjab and East Bengal. Dacca University was originally affiliated with the University of Calcutta, India's major teaching institution. It and the University of the Punjab in Lahore were considered outstanding. They trained top

level civil servants. However, most of the university professors were Hindus who migrated to India in 1947. Both schools deteriorated drastically. Only in recent years have they begun to improve their standards with young, foreign-trained Pakistani teachers. Today, Pakistan has six universities: University of Sind, University of Punjab, Peshawar University, Dacca University, University of Karachi, and Rajshahi University. Their total enrollment in 1960 was about 7,400. Affiliated with them, or sending students to them, were some 209 nonprofessional two-year colleges, many privately-owned, with an enrollment of 110,000.

As in secondary schools, university students obtain a degree, their passport to government service, by passing a year-end examination. Teachers lecture only on those subjects contained in the examination and students generally concern themselves only with preparing for the final test. The Commission on National Education claims that teachers "have substituted cramming for education" and says that the "emphasis has been on the successful retention of some facts about a subject for a brief period rather than on the more arduous but rewarding aim of mastering a subject, understanding its basic principles, and learning how to apply this understanding to real situations."

Those Pakistanis who pass the examination—and retain what they have previously memorized—are well-educated in a narrow sense. With additional study abroad, many have become singularly well prepared to assume positions of leadership in government and in education. But many students entering universities are not equipped for it and they fail, only to repeat the process the next year, and perhaps the next. For instance, in 1957, more than half the students of Punjab University did not pass examinations for the various degrees. Nearly all returned the following year. Even the failed student has more education than most Pakistanis and

is proud of what little he has. It is not unusual for applicants for white collar positions to include in their applications, "B.A.-Failed."

The Pakistan government in its Second Five Year Plan accepted most recommendations of the National Commission, but it sees an advantage in a continued, although restricted, university course preparing students for government service. It seeks to raise academic standards, improve selection of students and the quality of teachers.

While there is a recognized place for generalized university education in Pakistan, the Commission has also noted the urgent need for more professional and technical manpower. While 75 per cent of the employed persons in Pakistan are in agriculture, for instance, only some 200 students take degrees in agriculture each year compared to 800 graduates in law.

A start has been made in meeting this problem. In 1963, there were sixteen polytechnical schools open, against three in 1958. Since 1960, the government has developed agricultural universities at Lyallpur in West Pakistan and Mymensingh in East Pakistan. Two engineering schools in the universities of Dacca and Lahore have been made into four year degree schools and two new technical universities are being built. New home economics colleges in Lahore, Dacca, and Peshawar joined the one previously existing college in Karachi.

Perhaps the greatest impediment to developing technical education is the attitude of students—and their parents and teachers—towards manual labor. The Commission on National Education wrote:

"One of our greatest weaknesses as a people is our unwillingness to use our hands and a misconception of the true nature of manual work. So long as this remains a feature of

our educated class, progress in developing our country will be slow."

For students, graduates and teachers alike, education has meant freedom from manual labor. Regardless of when the student leaves school, he expects to find office work. Even those who study for vocations such as agriculture and engineering often feel excused from working with their hands. Few agricultural students intend to farm the land themselves. They look forward to clerical and administrative positions in government.

The aim of President Ayub's government is, as the Commission on National Education recommended, "to reverse the national aversion to the use of the hands" and "develop in our people a sense of dignity of manual work and a pride in technical achievement. We must develop our manpower skills at all levels if national progress, self-sufficiency and welfare are to be achieved."

A second handicap in training manpower is the absence of discipline among student bodies. This attitude goes back to pre-partition days when students led much of the criticism of authority, in that case, the British government. Students were, after all, an elite, organized group within an illiterate, unorganized society. Contempt for authority was widespread and when Pakistan became independent it continued rather than abated. Political opportunists have taken full advantage of the students' mercurial interest in politics and used them for non-academic purposes. Students who are often unsuited for higher education, with much free time on their hands and lacking guidance from the faculty, have acted with a predictable degree of irresponsibility. They have rioted when they felt that their examinations were too difficult; they have intimidated voters, marched on and stoned government offices and have frequently forced the government to close their schools.

At the heart of the problems lies the fact that education is for the few; most Pakistanis receive no formal education at all. Mostly these are villagers, not many of whom are averse to manual labor. But teaching them is expensive, requiring more than mere construction of schoolhouses or training of teachers. When village parents can neither read nor write, and follow patterns of living that resist change, their children soon lose whatever gains they made in a schoolroom. Pakistan's educators have begun an adult education program, but they have only rippled the surface of a deep sea of illiteracy and ignorance. In no field are the effects of this ignorance and poor communications between those with modern knowledge and those without it so apparent as in the field of health.

Health

Perhaps the saddest part of life for Pakistani parents is the sickness of their children and their inability to do anything about it. Throughout the villages, particularly in crowded East Pakistan, malnutrition is commonplace, disease is widespread, doctors are few, and death is a frequent visitor. The average life span of a Pakistani villager is under thirty years and over half of all deaths are among children under ten. Life expectancy in Pakistan is less than in India, Indonesia, and many other Asian countries.

Health statistics are difficult to gather. Most people die without benefit of an attending physician. The man responsible for reporting deaths and who usually makes the diagnoses is a poorly-paid *chawkidar,* or watchman, who often attributes death to "fever." Villagers are under no obligation to give him information. But from what little is known, few people in the world suffer more from ill health than Pakistanis.

Much ill-health stems from a poor diet, which leaves the body susceptible to disease. Few villagers eat more than 2,000

calories a day (against a needed 2,400 to 3,000 calories). Their meals are ill-balanced, with very little protein. The villager who eats meat once a month is fortunate. A recent study among 1,500 villagers near Dacca revealed that 76 per cent were malnourished.

Another related cause of ill health is ignorance of sanitation. Water polluted by both animals and humans washes the clothes and dishes and also quenches the thirst. The idea that flies and other insects carry disease is foreign to most villagers, including those responsible for selling and preparing food.

More than 24,000,000 Pakistanis suffer from malaria every year, nearly a quarter of the population. Of these, 500,000 die and another 6,000,000 become susceptible to other diseases due to the debilitating effects of malaria. No other disease causes such mortality. And unfortunately, mosquitoes in Pakistan are becoming resistant to DDT.

Tuberculosis, too, is prevalent, especially in crowded city slums and villages. Rapid industrialization and overpopulation, coupled with poverty and undernourishment, help tuberculosis spread. Villagers frequently contract the disease from cattle, which often share sleeping quarters with the families. Public health officials estimate that more than 1,000,000 Pakistanis have tuberculosis and more than 150,000 die from it each year.

Cholera is one of the major epidemic diseases of East Pakistan. It sweeps the province twice a year, causing up to 30,000 deaths annually.

Smallpox is also endemic, as is typhoid. Dysenteries affect nearly all village children. A study of children in a village near Dacca in 1958 revealed that every single child had intestinal worms. Throughout West Pakistan, millions face blindness from trachoma.

It is common for villagers to attribute their illness to the will of God and to accept their fate. There is little they can

do about it anyway, except to try what folk remedies they know, such as washing sores in the warm blood of a freshly-sacrificed animal. Usually a sick villager will first seek help from the local mullah, who will probaly give him an amulet or some holy water. If a doctor is near, he then may seek medical help. It is not unusual for a disease to be far advanced by the time a doctor is called in.

There are two kinds of doctors in Pakistan, both recognized by the government: those trained in modern medicine, who number about 10,000, and those trained in traditional medicine, who far outnumber modern doctors. In Muslim society, the traditional system is called *unani,* which was introduced during the Muslim conquests and is derived from Greek science. A practitioner is called a *hakim,* although many apply this name to any doctor. In East Pakistan, particularly among Hindus, the predominant system is *ayurvedic* and the practitioner is called *vaid* or *kaviraj.* This system follows medical texts compiled twelve to fifteen centuries ago. Its pharmacy influenced the development of medicine in Europe. Both the hakim and vaid practice healing techniques long since abandoned in most developed countries. However, the Unani Research Center in Karachi seeks to discover the benefits that may exist in the many herbs and remedies employed by these doctors. The manufacture of ayurvedic medicines is an important local industry in East Pakistan. Government officials do not consider these medical men effective and hope to replace them with scientifically-trained doctors. Meanwhile, the government is trying to persuade them to incorporate more modern techniques into their practice.

With fewer than ten modern doctors per 100,000 persons, Pakistan's medical corps is less developed than in most Asian countries, including India and Burma. This is not surprising since Pakistan had to begin from scratch to build a public health service. Before partition, the medical and technical

staff in the various provinces now constituting Pakistan were mostly non-Muslims, nearly all of whom migrated to India. For instance, in the Northwest Frontier Province in 1951 there were only 53 medical officers to man 121 government medical positions. West Punjab lost 75 per cent of its nurses to India.

Partition left Pakistan with only one fully-operating medical school, the King Edward Medical College in Lahore. By 1963, there were six medical schools in West Pakistan, one exclusively for women and three in East Pakistan. They graduate about 600 doctors each year. Nearly all of these, like their colleagues before them, seek private practice in the cities, shunning the rural villages where facilities and compensation are meager.

Nursing has developed especially slowly. There are about 2,600 in the country. There is considerable social pressure against women entering any profession, including nursing. Many nurses are Christian and Parsee, but the number of Muslim girls in nursing is increasing. A college of nursing was established in Karachi in 1956 and some twenty training centers now prepare young women as auxiliary nurses.

Partition also left Pakistan with few hospitals. By 1963, the number of beds per 100,000 people was about 30, less than India (35) or Burma (37). In the Second Five Year Plan, the government hopes to add another 8,000 beds. Development of health facilities is almost entirely in the hands of the government, especially the provincial governments, although foreign missionaries still make an important contribution.

A Medical Reforms Commission has noted that the problems of ill health and malnutrition can only be solved when the general economic and social conditions improve substantially and when education is more widespread. But it has recommended to President Ayub, who has forcefully backed it, an intensive program of improvement with most of the

emphasis on preventive, rather than curative, medicine. The Second Five Year Plan assigns close to 60 per cent of its health development funds to raising general health standards, recognizing that the cost of trying to cure all present ills is prohibitive.

Special emphasis has been laid on malaria eradication and many areas of Pakistan have been sprayed with DDT. World Health Organization experts have guided the program and training courses have started at the Malaria Institute of Pakistan in Dacca. A new country-wide B.C.G. vaccination campaign continued to attack tuberculosis in 1963 with thirty-two mobile teams touring both provinces, bringing to more than 16,000,000 the number of people vaccinated.

Two new programs begun by President Ayub's administration are the first hope in years for real progress in preventive medicine. The first is the establishing of 300 rural health centers. By 1963, 10 demonstration and training centers were opened and construction started on 48 more. Each health center serves 30 to 40 villages and is staffed by one male and one female doctor with an auxiliary staff consisting of a woman "health visitor" and several technicians. Every health center has 3 sub-centers with a health technician and a midwife who attend to 10 villages. Three days a week, the male doctor serves at the Primary Health Center and on the other three days he visits the sub-centers. Similarly, the woman doctor visits sub-centers while the male doctor is in the Primary Center, because in Pakistan women usually demand women doctors. These centers provide for medical treatment, maternal and child welfare, sanitation, family planning, control of communicable diseases, and health education. Patients needing confinement are referred to tehsil or thana and subdivisional hospitals. The government plans to assign medical interns to these centers before granting them their medical certificates.

A second new program is in family planning. In few other areas in the world is population growth more "explosive." The percentage increase is 2.4 per cent annually; in West Pakistan, it is 2.7 per cent. Rapid population growth (spurred by health programs that cut the death-rate) limits the opportunity for children to develop properly, curtails investment resources in favor of current consumption, raises the net cost of supporting the population and creates serious obstacles to social and economic development. As parents see their children die from unknown causes—one of every four dies before the age of ten—and as the economic and social system depends upon working children to support their parents in old age, couples, particularly husbands, tend to look favorably on frequent childbirth. But above all, ignorance of planning, the lack of knowledge that they can do anything about recurring births, prevents couples from limiting the size of their families to a number they can support.

Through the Basic Democracies, the rural health centers and some 1,920 (in 1963) family planning centers, the Pakistan government is undertaking an ambitious program to slow the rate of population growth. Advised by demographers and health experts from the Population Council in the United States, Pakistan has trained 605 doctors, 446 health visitors and nurses, and 4,800 village workers and *ansars* (helpers) in family planning techniques. It has also carried out research on the acceptability and effectiveness of different methods of birth limitation.

Foreign advisory help has figured prominently in Pakistan's efforts to meet health problems. The Colombo Plan nations, the United States and the United Nations agencies—World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF)—have been active in medical education, preventive medicine and research.

Social Welfare

As in all developing countries which have such a large proportion of poor people, there are millions unable to find for themselves even the basic requirements of life. Rapid urbanization caused by refugees from India and migrants from the villages have swelled Pakistan's towns with individuals sick in both body and heart, without housing, food, or work. Cyclones and floods have uprooted thousands more. While government agencies have begun an attack on specific social problems such as education and health, most government energy has gone toward building an economy which hopefully in the long run will create a society strong enough to care for its poor. Meanwhile, these millions of urban poor must rely on a few public and private social welfare agencies.

Few societies have had to face such a serious refugee problem as Pakistan. After 1947, nearly nine million Muslims from India flooded into East and West Pakistan without the means to survive. They clogged city streets with makeshift huts devoid of sanitation facilities. Many died of virulent disease which swept through their miserable refugee colonies.

Pakistan's Commonwealth partners first came to its aid in resettling agricultural refugees in the Punjab. In the sandy wastes of the Thal desert, irrigation projects opened new lands and newcomers began building a new life, each receiving land based on the amount of land he farmed in India. Villages sprouted from the once barren soil and new market towns with such names as Qaidabad (after Mohammed Ali Jinnah) and Liaquatabad (after Liaquat Ali Khan) began to flourish. Other settlement projects began wherever new irrigation works were built, especially after the 1958 revolution, when Ayub Khan ordered immediate attention to the refugee problem.

Many Pakistanis, particularly the women, helped by foreign

friends, made heroic efforts after 1947 to meet the refugee problem in Karachi. While their efforts were of an emergency and shortrange nature, they won praise for preventing a miserable situation from becoming worse. After 1958 they found substantial help from the Pakistan government. Under the energetic command of General Azam Khan, General Ayub's Rehabilitation Minister, an entire new community was built in Korangi, on the outskirts of Karachi. Today some 30,000 houses and their inhabitants now form a new city with mosques, schools, markets, playgrounds and hospitals. Elected Town Committees organize the people within the Basic Democracies program and urban development projects run by the government help the refugees adjust to their new life. By 1965, the government expects all the Karachi refugees to be settled.

With General Azam Khan transferred to East Pakistan, new resettlement schemes and town planning began in that province. By 1962, three of seven schemes were completed and 11,500 families resettled. Slowly, but at an increasing pace, the refugees are finding homes. Concurrently, the government is supporting both public and private house construction generally, although private builders have tended to concentrate on homes for the wealthy.

Traditionally, care of the helpless in Pakistani society is the responsibility of the family. It is the family which cares for its members who become lame, blind, or mentally ill. In old age, parents find security through their children. As the family system weakens, inevitable in today's changing society, its economic role decreases. As the families move from village to city, so too does the family's welfare function deteriorate. In such circumstances, society must provide an alternative welfare service, and in Pakistan the society is ill-equipped. Except among a few factory workers' organizations, Pakistan has no formal social security system.

Under the First Five Year Plan, the government began a program based on the local community, utilizing as far as possible the services of private agencies. It established schools of social work in Dacca and Lahore and formed, in 1956, the National Council of Social Welfare. In the Second Five Year Plan, more use was made of the Basic Democracies with trained advisers attached to local councils. Furthermore, a social welfare unit was made a permanent part of the powerful Planning Commission, assuring that in most future development programs social welfare will not be ignored. By 1965, the government hopes to have 1,100 social workers and 900 other professional workers for instruction of the physically handicapped and in adult education programs. Two new schools of social work were established in Karachi and Rajshahi. All social welfare activity is now under provincial directorates of social welfare, which are advised by social welfare councils.

Most welfare activity, however, stems from the work of private, voluntary agencies, both religious and secular. Traditionally, care of the poor has been a religious, as well as family, responsibility and Islam has within its instructions the firm obligation of charity. Religious taxes such as zakat supported some welfare work and the meat and skins of animals sacrificed in religious ceremonies helped a few of the poor.

At the time of partition, the only major voluntary agency equipped for social service was the Red Cross, which immediately established a Pakistani branch. Since then, the Pakistan Red Cross has been the chief private organization for meeting welfare emergencies. It is the only private agency yet able to coordinate world-wide efforts to help Pakistanis in time of need.

However, the largest and most effective general social service organization is the APWA, organized shortly after partition to distribute food and clothing, and to nurse the sick.

With branches in each province and every city, it has mobilized women to serve their country by running schools, helping in adult education projects and organizing maternal and child welfare centers. APWA has demanded of political groups to include women and has encouraged the government to appoint women to units of the Basic Democracies. Above all, APWA has kept pressure on the government to give increasing attention and money to social welfare.

Through local organizations, some religious, including Christian missions, foreign help has also brought support for social service programs. Red Cross groups in many European and American countries have responded to appeals for aid. Western church groups such as the Church World Service and the National Catholic Welfare Council in the United States maintain liaison with Pakistani organizations. The U. S. government's foreign aid program assists in training social service workers as well as providing surplus food for free distribution.

WHO and UNICEF participate in social service activities, working through both governmental and private groups such as the Pakistan National Tuberculosis Association, Tuberculosis Patients Welfare Association, Pakistan Leprosy Relief Association and the Association for Mental Health. The Population Council helps family planning associations, the key groups which are attempting to slow the rate of the country's population expansion.

10. *In Search of an Identity*

In the fading twilight of a Pakistani day, clusters of village men gather around hookas, squatting on the ground or sitting on *charpois* (rope beds) to talk. They tell stories, recite poems, sing. The women sit nearby, sometimes joining in song. Some are hand-spinning coarse wool. Children play, perhaps the popular game of striking a small stick with another to see how far they can hit it. Together, they form a tableau common in thousands of villages across the countryside, a tableau that is part of Pakistan's personality and its pastoral people.

The stories are often accounts of the day's events or, if one has returned from a visit, his adventures. Or the stories may be about a man who lived long ago—a pir, a ghazi, or a great zamindar. Told again and again, never written, these tales become history as the villager understands it. A man with a poetic or musical ear may turn the story into a poem or song and it becomes a part of Pakistan's great wealth of folk culture.

Whether Sindi, Pathan, Punjabi, or Bengali, songs and poems tell of the land and the mysteries of religion. As farmers who are deeply attached to the soil, Pakistanis live in constant awareness of the elements. Few folk songs ignore the environment of their authors who often use pastoral subjects as romantic allegory.

A Bengali villager sings:

> The month of Aghran brings the new crop
> Some reap the harvest,
> While others are engaged in the harvest festival.
> One who has reaped well is happy,
> One who has none awaits others' mercy.

The month is almost over,
But the maiden's desire remains unfulfilled.
Shortly comes the month of Paush
With all its youthful vigor.

In each region of the country, the variations in climate and land are reflected in the literature of the people. Thus the Bengali writes and sings of rivers and boats. He usually has a song for every occasion, even for plying his boat upstream (in which case he sings a type of song called a *sari*) or downstream (when he sings a *bhatiali*).

Take back thine oar, O boatman,
I can no longer ply it.
All my life I have struggled
To bear my boat upstream,
But backward it has gone;
And now in my old age
I find my efforts gone for nought.

A Sindi shepherd weaves his tale on the loom of a hot and dry desert which is rarely watered by an irrigation canal.

The jackals are howling across the dark stream,
My love is a peacock, in beauty supreme.
The forest of myrtles spreads up to the brink
The love of my girl is like heavenly drink.

Religion is always near the consciousness of the villager. During religious festivals, a chant called a *qawwali* expresses the universally deep devotions of Pakistanis.

How rich and mighty is God!
He has set up the panorama of the world,
Which He will break up any time He likes without
  paying heed to anyone.
In this market-place of the world
Many are engaged in selling and buying.
(They seldom feel that)
God and the Prophet are its owners.
Adore the deepest truth.

But perhaps the most common folk songs and poems are concerned with romance. Whether sung or written by men, they are usually about a woman's lost or departed love. In West Pakistan, the forlorn young woman often dreams of her lover as a warrior, as in this Baluchi folk song:

When he walks, it seems he is going to conquer the enemy fort;
When he turns to look at his foes, they tremble with fear.
He is pledged to see me;
I am certain he will turn up,
Walking sportively with his silvery gun,
Because Baluchi blood flows in his veins.

A Punjabi maiden inevitably visualizes her man on horseback and sings a song called a *dholak,* after a drum which accompanies it:

I have green trees
In my courtyard.
Turn round thy horse, O swain,
Come let us sit in the shade.

I have a pair of cows
In my courtyard.
Turn round thy horse, O swain,
Come, have a cup of milk.

I have a mango tree
In my courtyard.
Turn round thy horse, O swain,
Have a few mangoes.

While the villager seems relatively contented with the various styles of expression he has developed, the urban poet, musician, dancer, painter or architect in Pakistan is restless and often frustrated. He wants to be recognized by the rest of the world, particularly Europe and the United States. He is sometimes guilty of gross imitation, rejecting his cultural traditions as unworthy of the modern world or the new Pakistan. But he is beginning to search his own heritage for artistic inspira-

tion. He is experiencing the forms of feeling universal to man and he seeks a greater opportunity for self-expression. Slowly, he is discovering the personality of Pakistan.

Literature

The oldest literary stream in Pakistan flows in Bengal, where the continuity of recorded history and language extend back more than 1,000 years. Under the Buddhist Pala dynasty, a colloquial language developed that was the beginning of Bengali. Songs in this ancient Indo-Aryan tongue were recorded by Buddhist monks. Suppressed by the Hindu Senas (1100–1200 A.D.), who established Sanskrit as the language of literature, Bengali began to flourish again when Muslim Turks conquered Bengal in the 13th century. The sultans of Bengal (1351–1575) patronized art and literature. While they imported Persian poets, local bards such as Shah Mohammed Saghir (1389–1410) composed in Bengali and sent down to modern times epic songs of romance and mysticism. *Puthi* poetry, ballads of mythical adventure similar to the *Arabian Nights,* became a popular literary form. Under the Moghul governors, Persian culture was deeply implanted in Bengal. New words appeared in the Bengali language, Shi'ism, with its traditions of tragedy and suffering, and sufism became part of an expanding Bengali Muslim literature which existed side by side with Hindu mythological poetry and song.

During British rule, Hindus dominated the literary scene in Bengal. In Calcutta, modern Bengali literature developed through non-Muslim scholars: Michael Dutt, Bankimchandra Chatterjee and, finally, Rabindranath Tagore (1860–1941), perhaps the greatest of all Bengali literary figures. With lyrical charm, Tagore expressed a mystical philosophy of life. An artist, novelist, dramatist and poet, he was awarded the Nobel prize for literature in 1913.

Muslim poets were lost and outmoded, engrossed in their

puthis and religious tracts. The first sparks of a Muslim renaissance were struck by Nawab Abdul Latif who organized the Mohammedan Literary and Scientific Society in 1863. But Muslim Bengali literature did not burst forth until shortly before World War I when a young poet named Nazrul Islam rebelled against Tagore's mysticism, and declared his own war against social injustice and colonialism.

> How much longer will the weak suffer thus?
> Those whose bones have gone to run the iron train,
> Babu Sahibs throw them out as coolies in disdain.
> Have you paid wages? Oh, stop you band of crooks!
> You paid in *pies,* but pray confess how many millions you took.

A soldier by training, who had a scholar's passion for language and music, Nazrul Islam (b. 1899) composed lyric poetry that was recited in nearly every Bengal village. He introduced into Bengali poetry the Persian *ghazal,* a sweet lyric easily put to music. He also set to music hundreds of poems. He predicted with joyous optimism the end of British rule and sang of a new order for his people. Sadly, Nazrul Islam could not know that his predictions came true. In 1942, he suffered a mental breakdown, from which he has not recovered.

While Bengalis created their own literature, influenced in part by Persian and Arabic words, styles and ideas, and partly by the Hinduism around them, Muslims of northern India fed another literary stream. More so than in Bengal, these Muslim poets and composers wrote and sang in Turki and Persian rather than in the native languages of India. Each Turkish and Moghul court included artists from foreign lands who imposed upon the indigenous cultures the languages and ideas of their home countries. The mingling of foreign languages with local Indian tongues produced Urdu and by the fourteenth century some poets were experimenting in the new language.

In the princely state of Hyderabad, the first "school" of Muslim poets and scholars flourished, attracting intellectuals from the Middle East. Here lived and wrote such revered poets as Vali of Deccan (1668–1744), and Sultan Quli Shah who more than any other gave Urdu a respectability in scholarship. Later, Delhi became the center of Muslim Urdu literature while Lucknow and Lahore each had schools of its own. Mir Taqi Mir (1720–1808) composed romantic ghazals which also reflected the crusading reformation among Muslims. Asadullah Khan Ghalib (1797–1869) and the last Moghul emperor himself, Bahadur Shah Zafar (1775–1862), set high standards of Urdu poetry as they lamented the fate of Muslims.

Muslim poets were probably the most important influence in reviving the spirit of Muslims toward the end of the nineteenth century, a spirit that grew into a nationalist movement. Pakistanis call them "poets of freedom." Their lyrics, satires and patriotism awakened Muslims throughout the subcontinent to their special heritage, language, religion and culture. Among the leaders were Mohammed Hussein Azad (1823–1910), Altaf Hussein Hali (1837–1914), Hussein Rizvi Akbar (1846–1921), Maulana Shibli (1857–1914) and Zafar Ali Khan (1870–1950), the latter a brilliant orator and editor who founded the outspoken newspaper, *Zamindar,* in Lahore. But the greatest in more recent times was the man who first suggested a nation of Pakistan: Mohammed Iqbal (1873–1938), the poet-philosopher.

> India, I gaze at you, and weep and wail,
> For never was there such a tragic tale.
> The pickers have not left a flower in sight,
> The while the gardeners all amongst them fight.
> The heavens have many thunder-bolts in store;
> O nightingales, be watchful evermore.

Iqbal wrote a clear and virile prose on politics, philosophy, economics, sociology and religion. He is remembered notably, however, for his beautiful ghazals in Urdu and Persian. Iqbal was a visionary, prone to mysticism, but he was also a man who demanded action.

Iqbal was a philosophical poet, but departing from themes of his predecessors whose thoughts were chiefly of despair, he advanced a philosophy of hope. Real life finds expression, he said, "when the swimmer dives into the boundless ocean of life, fighting the huge waves and surmounting them." The basis of much of Iqbal's poetry was *khudi,* the ideal of the "self." He wrote:

"Loyalty to God virtually amounts to man's loyalty to his own ideal nature." But "self," he added, is nothing without love and without perception and awareness, there can be no love.

> The hand of knowledge grasps an empty sheath,
> If in the breast a heart illumined beats, then
> warmth of words will breathe the fire of life,
> But if no light there be, words are forever dead.*

Increasingly, literary scholars of Europe and America are discovering Iqbal's works, finding therein new thoughts and writing techniques which only a handful had previously appreciated. Through the work of the Iqbal Academy, this philosopher-politician is becoming better known as a prose writer and poet.

Many others, of course, have made major contributions to Pakistan's literary heritage. In Sind, where song springs from nearly every breast, there are few villagers who cannot quote lines from Shah Abdul Latif (1699–1752) of Bhit or who have not made a pilgrimage to the tomb of this revered saint. A patriot and poet, this ancient mystic adapted classical forms

* Edward McCarthy, "Iqbal as a Poet and Philosopher," *Pakistan Anthology* (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, June, 1961), p. 82.

of music and verse to the spirit of Sind, where the earthen jar (*ghaghan*) is often used as a drum and the desert gives man an endless range for his imagination. Farther north near Multan, another sufi saint, Khwaja Farid, wrote mystical poetry in the last century, which Multanis sing today. In the Punjab, Waris Shah, another nineteenth century poet, wrote in the vernacular, developing the *hir,* a romantic story told in rhyme.

One of the most venerated of all regional poets, however, is a Pathan, Kushhal Khan Khattak (1613–1691), whom Pathans still quote endlessly. Khattak was a warrior and his ghazals extolled the virtues of honor, battle and Pathan greatness, at the same time condemning those who swayed from the Pathan codes. He wrote:

> I, only I, care for my nation's honor.
> The Yusufzais are at ease tilling their fields;
> Afridis, Mohmands, Shinwaris, what are they about?
> See! The Moghul host lies in Ningrahar,
> And the true Pathans, every one from Kandahar to Attock,
> Should stand openly or in secret to the cause of honor.

From the seventeenth century until today, the Khattak tribe has produced outstanding Pushtu poetry.

Poets remain the most popular writers in Pakistan. Among Bengalis, the name of Jasimuddin stands about the highest. He is noted for his historical epics, love songs, and poems about nature. Sometimes called the "folk poet of Bengal," he is also a dramatist and folk singer. Here is one of his more romantic poems:

> O my boatman of the wide river!
> In the evening, rowing your boat,
> To whom are you going?
>
> O my boatman of the wide river!
> Rowing downstream into the mysterious shadows,
> My heart is roaming, weeping.
> My beloved beckons from the shadowy clouds.

O my boatman of the wide river!
Beyond the bend on the further bank
Is my wife's field.
The gentle wind from her banana grove
Lifts my hair.
Give her this message.
A poor wretch dies of weeping
From the grief she causes him.

Also writing in classical Bengali style is Ghulam Mustafa who, in addition to using a rural setting for his works, writes of Islamic history and religion and is strongly nationalistic. Begum Sufia Kamal and Farrukh Ahmed are two more Bengalis, both lyric poets who write of romance, although the latter is also noted for his nursery rhymes.

The so-called poet laureate of Pakistan is Hafiz Jullundri, equally praised for his epics and lyrics which he writes in Urdu. Yet he has also developed several new forms of poetry and has successfully put to verse the history of Islam. He is also the author of Pakistan's national anthem:

Blessed be the sacred land
  Happy be the bounteous realm
Symbol of high resolve
  Land of Pakistan
Blessed be thou citadel of faith.

The Order of this sacred land
  Is the might of the brotherhood of the people
May the nation, the country and the State
  Shine in glory everlasting
Blessed be the goal of our ambition.

This flag of the Crescent and Star
  Leads the way to progress and perfection
Interpreter of our past, glory of our present,
  Inspiration of our future,
Symbol of Almighty's protection.

Faiz Ahmed Faiz is as famous as Hafiz. After independence, Faiz skillfully used the ghazal to protest vehemently the social inequities, economic disparities and political discords in Pakistan, and was once imprisoned by the government. More recently, he has turned to blank verse and has originated new forms in modern Urdu poetry to write of love and lust as well as social reform. His personal following is large and devoted.

Sometimes called the "poet of youth" and "poet of revolution," Josh Malihabadi is, like Faiz Ahmed Faiz, a critical Urdu poet whose reputation was earned before partition when he urged the people to rise against the British.

Other well-known Urdu poets include Sufi Ghulam Mustafa Tabassum, who excels in romantic ghazals and nursery rhymes, and Jafar Tahir, the originator of a new style of canto in Urdu which makes use of majestic words and phrases. One of the founders and chief exponents of blank verse in Urdu, N. M. Rashed, writes forcefully on social and political subjects. He is responsible for many innovations in metre and rhyme. Among the favorite young poets today are Salimur Rahman, Abbas Athar, and Majid Amjad.

Prose in subcontinent Muslim literature is a relatively recent form except for religious and political essays. Prior to British rule, some Muslims had written prose epics, tales of fantasy and history. But the novel and short story became popular only in the twentieth century, beginning most notably with Prem Chand, who used social conscience themes with considerable literary quality.

In Bengal, Shaukat Osman is well known for his social and political satires. Allauddin Azad writes popular Bengali fiction and Syed Waliullah's short stories about family life in East Pakistan are widely published. Bengali essayists include Dr. Shahidullah and Dr. Sajjad Hussain.

For several years after independence no significant novel appeared in Urdu. Finally, in the fifties, three outstanding

works were published. *Ag Ka Dariya,* by Q. A. Haider, is an attempt to tell the history of mankind, whose characters spiral back and forth through time. Miss Haider's humanistic approach was first seen as pessimistic and subversive by many critics and for some time she was the target of controversy. A second good novel, *Alipur Ka Eli,* by Mumtaz Mufti, is somewhat reminiscent of Sartre's *Nausea.* But Mufti has developed a simpler and more straightforward manner of narration. The third is *Udas Naslen,* by Abdullah Husain, considered by some the best novel written in Urdu. Through his central character the author describes life in the period from 1910 until after independence.

The major literary output in Urdu in the past twenty years is the short story. Dozens of writers have turned to this form. Chief among them are Ahmad Abbas, Manto, Mumtaz Mufti, Ahmad Qazmi and Ghulam Abbas. Younger writers, such as Intizar Husain, have re-discovered their heritage of romances and prose epics. With unblushing realism, these authors are contributing a new dimension in Pakistani literature. Hopefully, efforts will be made to translate the better works into other languages.

Few writers are able to live on their work; they must depend for their livelihood on other professions. Some are journalists, others are teachers and a few work for the provincial and central governments. Various government-subsidized societies promote literary activity and lend assistance to writers. Among them are the Pakistan Writers' Guild, the Iqbal Academy, the Society for the Advancement of Literature in West Pakistan and academies for Urdu, Pashto, Punjabi, Sindi and Bengali. The Urdu Academy, the most authoritative body on the lexicography and usage of that language, is preparing a dictionary which, with its 200,000 entries, will be the longest and most complete dictionary of the Urdu language ever attempted. A few philanthropists extend patronage on an indi-

vidual basis and to societies. In 1960, for instance, the Adamjee family established an annual prize of 20,000 rupees for the best literary work of the year.

Most literary efforts appear in the 1,400 or so periodicals and newspapers, rather than in book form. However, the combined circulation of all the journals published in Lahore, Karachi, and Dacca does not exceed 400,000. Only 10 of the 80 or so dailies exceed 10,000. But readership—or even more important, the "listenership" of a publication—is far greater than its sales figures might indicate. It is not at all unusual for those who are literate to read newspapers to those who cannot read. In this way, probably about 3,000,000 people are reached by the printed word.

More than 900 publications are printed in Urdu, the language of some 70 daily newspapers. Prominent among them are: *Jang* (War), a pre-partition paper from Delhi; *Nawa-e-Waqt,* a paper with considerable cultural interests, especially in the works of Mohammed Iqbal; and *Imroz,* once a far left-wing paper since converted to the cause of the Ayub government. *Kohistan* is another outstanding daily printed in Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Multan. Briefly closed by the government in 1963, it has a well-developed news service, good reporters and an enterprising owner who has introduced new techniques in printing.

Bengali, spoken by most Pakistanis, is the language of a dozen dailies and some 150 other periodicals, although most of these have a greater circulation than publications in West Pakistan. The outstanding Bengali newspaper is *Azad,* which supports the government. It is an important medium for Bengali literature. *Ittifaq* and *Sangbad* are strongly regionalistic and frequently critical of any government in Karachi or Rawalpindi.

English, the language of officialdom and the universities, is also the language of about 10 daily newspapers and over 200

other periodicals. Some have a long history and hold an important place in the intellectual life of Pakistan. *Dawn,* founded in New Delhi by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, is published in Karachi by the wealthy Haroon family. Edited by the choleric Altaf Hussein, it takes extreme views on most issues, but nevertheless provides a good outlet for writers in English. From Rawalpindi and Lahore, the *Pakistan Times* provides probably the most unslanted news and gives more space to serious literary efforts as well as to discerning coverage of cultural events. Other English newspapers are *The Pakistan Observer* in Dacca, and *The Morning News,* published both from Karachi and Dacca. *Evening Times,* Karachi, is an important tabloid.

Periodicals are in a more nascent stage than newspapers. With poor financial backing and small circulations, they number in the hundreds. Some are religious, others are political, but most are literary and are good media for poets and short-story writers. One of the best is probably *Lail o Nahar* (Day & Night), edited by Ghulum Hustafa Sufi Tabussum. Other serious literary magazines are *Nuqoosh, Naya-Daur, Sat-Rang, Mah-e-Nau,* highly sophisticated critical journals which set the taste in Urdu literature in both India and Pakistan. English language outlets for literary works include *Vision,* published by Yunus Said, a Karachi writer, *Scintilla,* a quarterly on arts, crafts and literature, and the government's *Pakistan Quarterly,* which for the most part is devoted to the publicizing of Pakistan's cultural heritage in the arts, architecture, literature and philosophy. *Mah-e-Nau* (The New Moon), a monthly Urdu journal published by the government from Karachi is, unlike most official publications, a genuine literary force and has attracted the most influential writers in Pakistan for over sixteen years.

Radio, too, provides writers with new opportunities, especially in drama. There are few theatres in Pakistan and only

limited interest in live drama, but this interest is increasing as a result of radio plays.

Performing Arts

Musical programs, the most popular output on radio, support many musicians who would otherwise have to turn to other occupations. It is principally through radio that Pakistani musicians are able to experiment with new forms of music and seek in music an expression of the Pakistani personality.

Music, like poetry, is an old and vital part of the culture of South Asia. Indeed, the two are not far apart for a poem is, more often than not, to be sung rather than recited. And across the land, whether in the fields and meadows of the Punjab or along the banks of Bengal's rivers, a listener is seldom out of earshot of a song being sung or a tune being played by a shepherd, a farmer, or a boatman.

Unlike European music, Pakistani music is based on a single line of notes, a complicated melody without chords or harmony. The instruments accompanying a singer or a lead instrumentalist play in unison. Rhythmical and infinitely variable, it is easily adapted to the emotions and ideas of the performer who is not bound by rules of harmony. Little of the music is written, so that players and singers display considerable improvisation, spontaneity, and freshness.

The most ancient South Asian music was devotional, sung and played by Hindus in their temples. The early Muslims rejected this music because the religion of Islam discouraged the formal playing of music. Such "orthodoxy" fell into unhappy days with the coming of the Moghuls, whose respect for the Persians, the least "orthodox" of Muslims, was high. Under the Moghul emperors, musicians from Arabia and Persia brought new musical techniques. In the Moghul courts, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, classical mu-

sic reached heights similar to that of the contemporary European composers, Beethoven, Bach, and Brahms.

The earliest great master among Muslims in South Asia was Amir Khusro, a scholar and poet who established the present classical styles of Pakistani music. He invented musical instruments, notably the *sitar,* a stringed guitar with a long finger-board that is one of the most sophisticated instruments of today's music. It is usually played as a solo instrument. Khusro and his successors reconciled Hindu and Muslim styles so that now the music of Pakistan and India are essentially the same, although there are regional variations.

Among the various classical styles is the *dhurpad,* a vigorous, manly type of music that became popular in the time of Akbar and is used for heroic tales and praises to God. The *qawwali,* which originated in Persia, is a monotonous, hypnotic mode used by mystics in their devotional music. *Tappa* is quick tempo music which developed out of folk songs centuries ago. *Thumri,* light and frivolous, is sung by women, who move seductively with the music.

Pakistani music, classical or folk, is music to be sung or danced to, and most songs are romantic. Although there are religious songs (which inevitably elicit strong criticism from mullahs when they are sung on Radio Pakistan) and a few patriotic songs, nearly all subjects revolve around a girl's longing for a boy, who is usually some place else than beside his loved one. The basic instruments used to play the music include the stringed *sarangi,* the harmonium (a table-top accordion), and the *tabla* (drums), with additional stringed and reed instruments and flutes. Generally, there are few instruments playing at one time as each is essentially a solo instrument. There are no orchestras as such to play Pakistani music.

While the government of Pakistan has not encouraged the progress of classical music (out of fear of antagonizing the

mullahs), popular music has nevertheless developed remarkably. The countryside abounds wth strolling groups of minstrels who travel from village to village and city to city, playing at weddings and festivals. Few villages are without a singer or instrumentalist who, when the mullah is not around, entertains the people and accompanies their evenings songs. With the advent of radio, singers such as Roshan Ara Begum, and instrumentalists such as Ustad Alauddin Khan, have achieved wide popularity. As in all cultures, modern interpretations and rhythms greatly influence the music of the people. It is not unusual today to hear attempts at combining the harmonic system of European music with the single note style of South Asia.

Dancing, like music, had its origins in the religion of the Hindus and received from Muslims new interpretations and styles so that today there is little difference between Hindu and Muslim dancing. What is different are the regional variations; in East Pakistan, dances are usually subtle, delicate and symbolic, although the *jari-gan* is a dance (and song) about warriors which is popular during the festival of Muharrum. Among Pathans and Baluchis, dancing is more virile and martial. In the Punjab and the Sind, romance is the usual theme. Dancers, like the music accompanying them, perform in unison. When a dancer performs alone, he (or she) has freedom to make innumerable interpretations as the dance develops.

Two classical dances of West Pakistan are the *bharata natyam,* a Hindu-based temple dance secularized by the Moghuls and now shared by all, and the martial *Khattak,* of Pathan origin. In the latter, dancers perform with swords or sticks. Folk dances in West Pakistan include the festive *bhangra* of the Punjabis and the *jhoomer,* a swaying, swinging, seductive dance popular among Sindis and Baluchis.

Dancing professionally is not so respectable in the eyes of Pakistanis as the performers would wish and few women make a career of classical dancing. Consequently, a tradition has emerged whereby male dancers take female parts, a practice common among Sindis and Pathans. One notable exception is Mrs. Ghanshyam who, with her husband as a partner, is a well-known classical dancer. Other popular dancers are Afroza Bulbul and Rafi. The Institute of Culture in Karachi and the Bulbul Academy in Dacca, commemorating the great performer, Bulbul Choudhury, and the Ghanshyam Rhythmic Art Center train future dancers and bring folk dancing before a wide public.

Dancing and music are important in entertainment. An example of this is the experience of an Indian film producer who spent large sums of money making a movie without music. When the film failed to draw audiences, the producer recalled it, inserted irrelevant dances between various dramatic sequences and released it again. The film was an instant success.

Drama has never mattered much in Pakistan's culture, although millions of Pakistanis are avid movie-goers. India is one of the world's leading film-producing countries and movie-going is the single most popular commercial entertainment for urban dwellers, who pay about 20 cents for admission. Pakistan has begun a modest film industry whose rate of growth depends on whether or not the government permits the import of Indian films. There are a dozen studios producing about 50 films a year. The most popular stars are Shamim Ara, Sabiha, Nayyer Sultana and the comedian Nazar. Western films, especially musicals, spectaculars and cowboy pictures, whose action may be followed whether the sound tracks are dubbed or not, attract large audiences.

In Bengal, the *jatra,* a dramatic performance based on provincial myths and legends, is popular among villagers and is

acted out by amateurs. Bengali playwrights such as Hussein Ali, and Urdu playwrights such as Imtiaz Ali Taj and Asghar Butt, have found that their satires and farces are popular in both provinces. Amateur theatrical groups such as the Shilpi Chakra in Dacca, the Karachi Art Theatre Society and the Avant Garde Arts Theatre, have not found many angels nor do they draw enough paying customers; consequently, they have not been too successful. The Parsee community theatre group in Karachi, however, has fared better.

Painting and Architecture

Painting as an art form has developed slowly in Muslim South Asia. For centuries after Mohammed the Prophet reproduction of the human form was considered blasphemous and a violation of the Islamic injunction against idol worship. Consequently, design and ornamental calligraphy grew into a great art in many Muslim countries. Iranians, however, did not accept the orthodox injunction and Persian miniature painting, including representation of the human form, came with the Moghuls to India, there to intermix with Hindu styles and colors. The conventions of Asian painting, such as strong symbolism, the absence of shadows and deliberate disregard of perspective, were combined with the Persian use of flowers in profusion, hunting scenes, and romantic motifs.

Today, the most noted artist in the Moghul tradition is M. A. Rahman Chughtai, whose works are only slightly influenced by European styles. His simple line drawings and Persian-style miniatures are displayed and sold throughout the world.

While some new Pakistani painters have followed Chughtai's style, others have sought expression through the entire range of Western art patterns from representational to abstract. Zainul Abedin, a Bengali who founded the Dacca Art Group, is the foremost representative of Westernized painting.

In recent years, his themes more and more center on village life. He has begun to experiment with abstract forms.

Other artists, such as folk-painter Allah Buksh, muralist Fyzee Rahamin, abstractionists Zubeida Agha and Shakir Ali have received acclaim in Pakistan and abroad. Behind them is a growing number of young and spirited artists groping for styles and idioms that will better express what they consider the "new" Pakistan. Many are influenced by Japanese painting. Among them are Sadequain, Gulgee, Hamidur Rahman, Khalid Iqbal, Aminul Islam, Ajmal Hussain, and Atiya Hasan, all of whose works are beginning to appear in the United States.

Painting has received more public support than literature, music or drama, although few artists are able to earn a living from the products of their brushes. In Lahore, the Mayo School of Art and the Punjab University Art Department have a pre-partition history, while in Dacca the Art Institute has attempted to replace the important position once held in art education by Calcutta. Arts councils in major cities receive government subsidy and provide young artists with opportunities for exhibition. A National Exhibition of Paintings each year gives recognition and awards as an encouragement to artists.

As in so many other art forms, traditional architecture is a synthesis of imported Muslim influences and native Hindu styles. And, as with other artists, architects are still searching for a distinctive Pakistani personality, one that does not reject the past yet expresses their modernizing society.

Hindu and Buddhist architecture which Muslims found when they invaded the subcontinent was lavish with sculpture in which various forms were piled together seemingly without plan. The low domes of Buddhist stupas, Bengali convex roofs whose eaves kept rain off the sides of the building, and dark

and mysterious interiors, reflected an adjustment to environment and fitted the contemplative and mystical religion.

Muslim conquerors brought with them styles of geometrically simple buildings with open and light interiors. Mosque builders sent slender minarets reaching skyward and giant, single domes arching above each place of worship. Gradually, these forms changed; domes became lower and broader, minarets became fatter and buildings developed a complexity more akin to the native Indian manner. The great Moghul builders—Akbar, Shah Jahan, Jahengir—employed Hindu as well as Persian designers and left in their ornate monuments such as the Taj Mahal in Agra and the Moghul palace in Lahore a new architectural synthesis.

In perhaps no other visual art field have Pakistanis ignored their cultural heritage as in architecture. In their efforts to become "modern," home builders, government planners, factory owners and their architects have demanded "Western" design. The result is too often imitative of the West's worst, and additionally look alien on Pakistani soil.

Some builders, however, are recognizing their rich heritage and here and there are attempting to reconcile their desire to be "modern" with their Asian traditions. In the residential area of Gulberg in Lahore, some of the new homes reflect these attempts. The houses display riotous color and decoratian, some are original in design and indicate that a true Pakistani architecture may be developing. In East Pakistan, architects are experimenting with bamboo as a structural element.

Handicrafts

Aesthetic sensibilities of a people, reflected in their music and art, are also found in their folk handicrafts. Like their stories and songs, the motifs and patterns derive from centuries of aritstic traditions beginning perhaps as long ago as

the Indus valley civilization in pre-Aryan days. While the ancient styles have continued to the present, much of what is included in the contemporary minor arts and handicrafts displays the impact of Muslim society, introduced by invaders and settlers. The floral and geometric surface decorations on objects of everyday use can be traced to Muslim influence, as can Muslim predominance in certain handicraft trades such as shoemaking.

In the area that is now Pakistan, certain indigenous handicrafts have achieved particular excellent. Glazed pottery in Sind and the Pathan areas feature colors of turquoise, green and brown and are covered with floral patterns from ancient designs. The potters of Multan and Bahawalpur are adept in making an extremely light and elegant "paper" pottery. The Ceramic Institute in Lahore helps adjust old practices and styles to modern marketing demands.

Fashioning jewelry and utensils from gold and silver is a long-established art in the Punjab, Pathan areas, and East Pakistan. The continual demand for jewelry as a means of "banking" wealth encourages the industry, which still follows the ornate and filigree styles of the Moghuls.

In weaving, each district has its own distinctive patterns. The Muslims of East Pakistan have lost much of their quality with the introduction of machine-made goods, but they remain unusual. Heavily decorated woven flax cloth is a specialty of Sindi weavers. Embroidery is universal, but in the Punjab, Sind, and Baluchistan nearly every piece of material displays extensive needlework with a profusion of sequins.

Muslims, less prohibited by their religion than Hindus from working with leather, have become skilled shoemakers. They have created artistic and practical styles of footwear. Pathans excel in making *chapals,* marketed in Europe and the United States as "chaplees," while in the Punjab richly ornamented shoes with upturned toes are the pride of every bridegroom.

Afridi Pathans are also noted for the craftsmanship of their homemade rifles which they turn out in village workshops, copying Western models. The industry is as old as the rifle itself and attempts by the Pakistan government to assert some control over the industry have not been very successful.

In Bengal, village crafts center around bamboo and cane work, palm leaf matting, rope and quilt weaving, and the potter's products. Except for pottery, most craftwork is done by women. Dacca and Rangpur are famous for their ivory and horn carvings. Bangles made from conch shells are popular.

Partition and the subsequent migration of Muslims brought new artisans to Pakistan. Wood and ivory carvers and carpet weavers from Kashmir, potters from Bidar, brass and coppersmiths from Delhi, and silk embroiderers from Benares have added to the talent available for an expanded handicraft industry. The government gives some support in its economic planning for development of small industries based upon these skills.

In all the various fields of artistic and intellectual expression, the government has taken some interest, but not a great deal. In literature, it has created its own publishing facilities, most of which are devoted to propaganda for government purposes, although they do provide new outlets for nonpolitical writers. Radio Pakistan and the government information bureaus employ many artists. The government is building a National Arts Center in Karachi and subsidizes local arts councils. A cultural center in the Sindi town of Shah Abdul Latifabad is a model for other centers scheduled for construction. New museums and libraries are proposed in the Second Five Year Plan. But essentially, development of the arts and the search for a Pakistani personality depend upon what each artist can find for himself. Increasingly, those artists and writers who are creating something new are finding inspiration in their own centuries-old culture.

11. *Kashmir*

The symbol of all that separates Pakistanis from Indians and Muslims from Hindus in the subcontinent is Kashmir. A subject that stirs the deepest emotions, Kashmir is a barrier between two peoples who can ill afford to be at odds. For Pakistanis, Kashmir is a land whose Muslim inhabitants, 75 per cent of the population of 4,400,000, have not yet been permitted to decide whether they wish to join Pakistan or India as a result of partition. For Indians, Kashmir is a beloved part of their country; they hold it and intend to keep it.

Few problems on the international scene are so tangled in prejudice. Both governments involved disseminate considerable propaganda explaining their respective positions. In the United Nations, spokesmen ramble tediously through the intricate by-ways of history, law and logic, myth, passion, and illogic. The future of the people and land of Kashmir remains no clearer in 1964 than in 1947.

As the Punjabi plains roll northeastward along the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers, they rise toward the Himalayas which separate south from central Asia. A few miles beyond Lahore and Rawalpindi in Pakistan and Amritsar in India, the mountains begin, first as foothils, then as towering ranges, deeply carved with gorges. To the west toward Afghanistan these hills and ranges become Pakistan's northwestern frontier, the home of the Pathans. To the east, the higher ranges become Chinese-occupied Tibet. Between them lies Kashmir, part of whose northern boundary is Communist China.

Kashmir—technically the "State of Jammu and Kashmir"—

comprises several distinct geographical and cultural areas, each with a separate history. The most important, economically and politically, is Kashmir proper, a small province of about 2,000 square miles noted for its beautiful "Vale" and the tourist-loved city of Srinagar. South of Kashmir is the province of Jammu, which borders India, and its small, but distinct territories of Poonch and Mirpur which border Pakistan. Other areas include the isolated northern district of Gilgit with the unique principalities of Hunza and Nagar, and the mountainous lands of Baltistan and Ladakh along the borders of Tibet and China. Together, they form a state some 85,000 square miles in size. It is an area of alpine beauty and lush, fertile valleys. Its rushing streams feed the plains below in India and Pakistan. Only a few passes provide land routes to the outside world. Yet despite its scenic grandeur, and except in isolated centers, Kashmir is an unhappy and poverty-stricken land.

Centuries ago Aryan tribesmen settled in the valleys of Kashmir and developed their culture in semi-isolation from others who swept down onto the subcontinent. To the plainsmen, the greatest Hindu gods lived in the mountains of Kashmir and the aloof Kashmiris believed themselves to be closest to these gods. Here lived the purest of the Brahmins, the highest caste Hindus. Consequently, here also lived the poorest of the lowest castes, kept in virtual social slavery by the Brahmin priests.

Buddhism, offering hope to even the lowest, met with success in Kashmir. But by the third century A.D., Hinduism had re-established itself. By the thirteenth century, a Buddhist prince in Ladakh captured Kashmir and, under the influence of a Muslim missionary named Bulbul Shah, he embraced Islam. Eventually most Kashmiris became Muslim and Kashmir became a center of Muslim learning. Seldom united, however, the people were constantly being conquered by out-

siders. In the nineteenth century, they finally succumbed to the great Sikh general, Ranjit Singh.

In the Sikh emperor's court in Lahore, a Hindu chieftain from Jammu rose to eminence. His name was Gulab Singh of the Dogra caste of Rajputs. In return for his services, he received rulership of Jammu. In the British-Sikh wars, however, he backed the British who, in 1846, sold him the rest of Kashmir for the equivalent of $1,500,000. Thus began the rule of the Dogra Rajputs of Jammu and Kashmir. Not one of their twenty-eight prime ministers before 1947 was a Muslim.

The Dogras reigned over the largest, but one of the poorest, of the princely states of India and placed upon the people a tyranny unmatched in the subcontinent. The Brahmins enforced the harshest Hindu caste and dietary restrictions. Slaughtering a cow meant ten years imprisonment. Slavery was openly practiced until the 1920's. Taxes were harsh.

Over the decades of Dogra rule, Kashmir's ties with the rest of India were tenuous. In the winter, the people were snowbound. Down the rivers and few roads in summer came a few exports of wool, animal products, and carpets. Tourists sought the coolness and beauty of Kashmir's "Vale," and the British government stationed an unwelcome representative in the capital of Srinagar to watch the strategic northern border and to "guide" the Maharaja.

There was little homogeneity or unity among the population. While three-fourths of the people were Muslim, the area contained more than a dozen distinct language groups. Kashmir province was perhaps the most united. Here, nearly 90 per cent of the 2,000,000 inhabitants were Muslims and nearly all spoke Kashmiri, or *Kashiru,* an Indo-European tongue laced with Persian and Turkish words and phrases. Jammu province had nearly 2,000,000 people, most of whom spoke Dogri, akin to Punjabi. On a province-wide basis, about 61

per cent were Muslims, the rest Hindus, although in Poonch and Mirpur, Muslims (who spoke Punjabi) accounted for more than 90 per cent. In the northern district of Gilgit and the little principalities, the 300,000 or so inhabitants were almost 100 per cent Muslim, but they spoke several different languages. Ladakh and Baltistan were about 80 per cent Muslim and in the sub-district of Leh, near the Tibetan-Chinese border, the majority, about 40,000, were Buddhist.

Only in Kashmir province itself was there a sense of being "Kashmiri." Most people identified themselves with their religion, district, village, or language. Thus, a man considered himself, for instance, to be a Punjabi-speaking Muslim from Poonch or a Dogri-speaking Hindu from Jammu rather than a "Kashmiri."

In 1932, a Muslim schoolteacher in Srinagar founded the Muslim Conference which he hoped would help lead Muslims to a better life in Kashmir. His name was Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah and he became known as the "Lion of Kashmir." As the independence movement in undivided India grew in the 1930's, he believed that Kashmir would probably be able to retain its semi-autonomous position within a future secular India, especially if India was led by his close friend, Jawaharlal Nehru. He rejected the communal position of the Muslim League and in 1938 formed the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, which he associated with Nehru's Indian National Congress. Henceforth, he fought for independence, but not for Pakistan. His place at the head of the Muslim Conference was taken by Choudhury Ghulam Abbas, a communally-minded Muslim from Jammu who supported Mohammed Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League.

With independence approaching, the British, Congress, and the League agreed that, among the British-governed provinces, contiguous Hindu-majority areas should form the territories of India and contiguous Muslim-majority areas should form

the territories of Pakistan, with the Punjab and Bengal being partitioned. All three parties agreed on the principle of self-determination in British India. The rulers of the princely states were given the opportunity to decide their own futures, although the Congress insisted that their only choices were to accede to either India or Pakistan.

Thus it was that Hindu- and Sikh-ruled states with Hindu and Sikh populations joined India. Most Muslim states acceded to Pakistan. Some created confusion. For instance, the Muslim Nizam of Hyderabad, whose subjects were mainly Hindu, wanted independence for his state even though it was surrounded by India. Indian troops entered the state in what India called "police action," and Hyderabad became Indian.

The Muslim Nawab of Junagadh decided to accede to Pakistan even though his state did not touch Pakistan and his 800,000 subjects were Hindus. Jinnah accepted his accession, giving, in effect, tacit recognition to the principle that the ruler need not consult his people. The Indian army reversed the Nawab's decision and Junagadh became Indian over Pakistan's vociferous objections. India held a plebiscite and, in so doing, reaffirmed its support of the principle of self-determination. Pakistan has yet to relinquish its claim to Junagadh and it has become enmeshed in the Kashmir dispute.

The Maharaja of Kashmir wished to delay making a decision and asked both India and Pakistan to sign a "Standstill Agreement." Pakistan accepted, but India refused, claiming that to do so would be to recognize the Maharaja's right to declare Kashmir independent. Pakistanis assumed that the Maharaja would defer to the wishes of his Muslim subjects and accede to Pakistan. Indians hoped he would not. Gandhi sped to Srinagar to assert his immense influence. Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference, while opposed to the Maharaja (Sheikh Abdullah was in jail at the time), wanted Kashmir to join India. The Maharaja equivocated.

Indecision in India in 1947 was tantamount to provoking violence. Insecurity bred tension and fear which led to riots and massacre. In the Punjab, frightened Hindu and Sikh families fled to Jammu and from there they raided Muslim refugees pouring into West Punjab. Punjabi Muslims, in turn, raided Jammu and violence swept the land of the Dogra Rajputs.

In the summer of 1947, the Muslims of Poonch, inspired by a lawyer named Sardar Mohammed Ibrahim, revolted against the Maharaja's army. The rebellion spread. The Muslims were not only farmers and tradesmen; some were well-trained soldiers who had fought in World War II. Their revolt was so successful that leaders of the Muslim Conference met in Rawalpindi on October 1, 1947, and formed the Azad (Free) Kashmir government. This was later reconstituted on October 24 to include non-Muslims.

Communal violence in the Punjab and the Muslim revolt in Poonch stirred the emotions of the Pathans in the hills a few miles west. Fellow Muslims, they felt, were under attack. Besides, British authority had collapsed. So in October, 1947, thousands (estimates range from 2,000 to 30,000) of Pathans—Mahsuds, Waziris, and Mohmands—swept up the valleys from Abbottabad into the Vale of Kashmir. They overpowered the meager forces of the Maharaja and threatened to capture Srinagar. They probably would have entered the captured city had they not stopped to loot the town of Baramula.

The revolt of the Poonch Muslims caused little concern among Kashmir's Muslim leaders. But the incursion of the Pathans created consternation. Here was an invasion of "foreigners." Sheikh Abdullah, released from jail in September, was outraged when the Pathans turned toward Srinagar, threatening his beloved Kashmir. So, too, was the indecisive Maharaja who pleaded for Indian troops to save him.

On October 26, the Dogra ruler officially and precipitously acceded his country to India and fled to Jammu. India's governor-general, Lord Louis Mountbatten, provisionally accepted the Maharaja's accession, pending, he said, "a reference to the people" of Kashmir. Prime Minister Nehru confirmed the decision to hold a plebiscite once the "invaders" had left Kashmir soil. In Srinagar, the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference set up an interim government, as part of the accession agreement. The Indian government began to air-lift troops to the Kashmir capital.

The fighting for Kashmir now approached full-scale war as Indian troops fought the forces of Azad Kashmir and Pathan tribesmen. Jinnah wanted to send Pakistani army troops, but his British commander-in-chief, Sir Douglas Gracey, counseled against the move. Jinnah had not accepted the Maharaja's accession to India and called it a violation of the Standstill Agreement. He called for a cease-fire, withdrawal of both Indian troops and Pathan tribesmen, and then a plebiscite administered either by both governments or by an international body. To this, Nehru disagreed, maintaining that the accession was proper, Pakistan was interfering and supporting the Azad Kashmir forces and that Indian troops would not withdraw until Kashmir was cleared of all invaders.

India took its complaint to the United Nations on January 1, 1948, and asked the Security Council to charge Pakistan with "an act of aggression against India." Pakistan's foreign minister, Zafrulla Khan, countered with charges of genocide and placed the question of Junagadh before the U. N. The Security Council's answer was that both sides should stop fighting, Pathan tribesmen should withdraw, India should reduce the number of Indian troops and Sheikh Abdullah's government should admit Azad Kashmir officials preparatory to holding a plebiscite. Both India and Pakistan rejected this

suggestion, but agreed that a U. N. Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) could try to "exercise its good offices."

Although each country had agreed to a plebiscite, they disagreed on the conditions under which it would be held. Arguments over details became increasingly complex and bitter. And in Kashmir the fighting continued, with the Indian army steadily pushing the Azad Kashmir forces back. Muslim refugees fled into Azad Kashmir and Pakistan. In May, 1948, the Pakistan government committed its own army forces, took over operational control of the Azad Kashmir army and sought to protect Muslim gains in Poonch. That warfare did not become more widespread can be attributed to the calmer heads of the respective armies, each commanded by an English general and each composed of Hindu and Muslim officers whose respect and affection for each other outweighed their communal passions.

The U. N. Commission arrived in July, 1948, and on August 13 it adopted its first resolution on the subject, approved by both Pakistan and India. The resolution provided for a cease-fire, reliance upon U. N. military observers, withdrawal of all Pakistani troops, citizens and tribesmen, eventual withdrawal of most Indian troops, and joint determination of the prerequisites for a plebiscite. Details of the plebiscite implementation were spelled out in a subsequent resolution on January 5, 1949. The U. N. Secretary-General appointed U. S. Admiral Chester Nimitz as Plebiscite Administrator.

On January 1, 1949, after fourteen months of battle, formal fighting stopped in Kashmir as the UNCIP arranged a cease-fire. By July, the cease-fire line had become stabilized, so stable, in fact, that fifteen years later, it was almost unchanged. It became the boundary between Kashmir and Azad Kashmir.

By 1949, the Azad Kashmir government had lost the town of Poonch to the Indian army. The only lands it controlled—some 5,000 square miles—were a western strip of Jammu with

the town of Mirpur and part of Poonch, and a portion of western Kashmir province, including the city of Muzaffarabad. Sheikh Abdullah's government controlled most of Kashmir and Jammu provinces, including Srinagar and the Vale, plus some of Ladakh along the Tibetan border, in all about 55,000 square miles with a population of about 3,000,000. The Pakistan government assumed control of the mountainous, sparsely settled, northern frontier lands—Gilgit and that part of Ladakh bordering Communist China—which it termed its "Northern Area." In size, it covers approximately 23,000 square miles.

The significance of Kashmir to Pakistan is the same today as it was in 1949. It is partly economic, partly strategic, and largely emotional.

Economically, Pakistanis see Kashmir as vital to West Pakistan's development. While not economically wealthy itself, Kashmir does contain the headwaters of the major rivers which mean life or death to West Pakistan's agriculture. The Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers all enter Pakistan from Kashmir, and Pakistanis fear that a hostile government in Srinagar could assert disastrous control over these streams.

Strategically, Pakistanis see a hostile Kashmir as a northern sword hanging over their heads. Although the Indians have now built roads to connect Kashmir and India, the former routes out of Kashmir are still available to troops wishing to march into Pakistan.

Finally, many Pakistanis see Kashmir in the context of Hindu-Muslim communalism. Pakistan came into existence in order to provide a home for South Asia's Muslim minority, yet nearly 3,000,000 Muslims living across a cease-fire line in Kashmir are not permitted an opportunity to choose Pakistan. To these Pakistanis, Kashmir's Muslims are enslaved brothers, held down forcibly by an occupying Hindu army. Kashmir is

symbolic of India's enmity towards Muslims in general and Pakistan in particular.

The significance of this emotion lies not only in Pakistan's efforts to obtain a plebiscite in Kashmir. It has provided a unifying factor within the strained body politic of Pakistan itself. By throwing out emotional pails of Kashmir water, Pakistani leaders have been able to douse many small fires of disunity among Pakistanis, especially among the Pathans, the embittered refugees and important religious leaders who now and then call for jihad against India. Keeping external issues in an emotional realm is a technique used by many countries to mobilize sentiment in support of unstable governments. This one was particularly effective in West Pakistan during the depressing days of earlier political maneuvering.

Not all Pakistanis view Kashmir with the same intensity. Most East Pakistanis have less concern for Kashmir than West Pakistanis. Farther from the scene, they are also deeply concerned with their own problems. Indeed, many of them have resented the attention Pakistan governments have given to Kashmir to the detriment of economic development and political rights in East Pakistan.

For Indians, Kashmir's significance is also based on strategic and emotional factors. Economics are not very important; in fact, Kashmir is more of an economic liability than an asset. Strategically, Kashmir contains passes through which invaders might march. Already India and China have fought over parts of Kashmir. In the hands of a hostile nation, Kashmir would threaten India's security.

Kashmir holds a special place in the hearts of many Indian Hindus. It is the homeland of the gods, the heart of the revered Himalayas. For Kashmir to belong to Pakistan is, to many Hindus, unthinkable. Its presence as a Muslim area in India, is evidence of the validity of India's secular policies. Pakistanis claim that Prime Minister Nehru, who was a Kash-

miri Brahmin, was so personally and emotionally tied to Kashmir that he would countenance no change in its status.

Like Pakistanis, not all Indians feel equally intense about Kashmir. Indeed, some Indian groups are prepared to see Kashmir go to Pakistan and the issue settled. Others have openly espoused partition of the state along the present lines or granting Kashmir independence. But many fear that should partition be made officially permanent the result would be renewed communal violence.

In the futile negotiations that followed the cease-fire of January 1, 1949, the significance of Kashmir to each party appeared in various guises. The next step after obtaining the cease-fire was demilitarization of Kashmir, with Pakistan to start withdrawing its troops first. This Pakistan began to do, but trouble arose over the disarming of the Azad Kashmir army. India refused even to reduce its forces unless all Muslim forces were disarmed first. Since then, neither side has agreed to the other's proposal for demilitarization. By 1963, four different U. N. teams had attempted to bring about a reconciliation. The Kashmir dispute had appeared dozens of times on the Security Council's agenda, each time producing hours of rhetoric without results. Almost every Pakistani prime minister attempted to negotiate directly with Prime Minister Nehru and in 1963 Pakistani and Indian ministers sat together for many days seeking an understanding, without success.

In Kashmir itself, India strengthened its position, albeit with difficulty. In October, 1950, the Jammu and Kashmir Conference Party, now controlling Kashmir politics, called for elections of a constituent assembly to determine Kashmir's future. Much of the Western world was dismayed and in March, 1951 the United Kingdom and the United States led the Security Council to adopt a resolution condemning such an election as an inadequate substitute for a fair plebiscite.

Pakistan naturally accepted this resolution, while India naturally rejected it. But the elections were held anyway in the autumn of 1952 under the auspices of Sheikh Abdullah's party—and the Indian army. Only two seats out of seventy-five were contested and all were won by the Jammu and Kashmir Conference Party.

Sheikh Abdullah's goals were the development of Kashmir as a state with special relations with India. While India might logically concern itself with Kashmir's foreign affairs, defense and communications, Kashmiris should otherwise be "completely free and autonomous." Although Prime Minister Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah reached an agreement in 1952 for this "special status," Sheikh Abdullah found it difficult to maintain. The Indian army still controlled the country and in India politicians rejected the idea of special treatment for Kashmir. As with other states, they said, Kashmir should be integrated into the Indian Republic on the same basis. Meanwhile, Hindus and Sikhs in Jammu, resentful of Sheikh Abdullah's predominantly Muslim government, also insisted on Kashmir's complete integration. They commenced demonstrating and rioting. In 1953, Sheikh Abdullah made a speech in Srinagar reminding the Indian government that Kashmir's accession was provisional and that the Constituent Assembly had no authority to pronounce on the question of accession. A plebiscite should be held, he said. Six days later, he was dismissed from office and imprisoned.

With the "Lion of Kashmir" in jail, the Assembly, led by the new prime minister, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, voted to work toward the complete accession of Kashmir to India.

Pakistanis seethed anger. They found considerable support from the rest of the world, although not from the Soviet Union which, two years earlier, had thrown its support to India. In 1954, Pakistan and the United States signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement which had been in

preparation ever since the Soviet Union sided with India. A few months later, Pakistan joined the anti-communist pacts sponsored by the United States. Pakistan and its Kashmiri obsession had entered the Cold War.

Now it was India's turn to seethe. In both countries, the military's share of the national budgets climbed to more than 60 per cent at the expense of needed development programs. Indian and Pakistani armies faced each other on the borders of Kashmir and the Punjab.

An able, but harsh administrator, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed began building that part of Kashmir under Indian control. With two-thirds of his budget coming from New Delhi—nearly $700,000,000 by 1963—he expanded Kashmir's tourist facilities, bolstered the carpet industry and built schools.

In January, 1957, he promulgated a new constitution which formally acceded the entire state to India, dissolved the Constituent Assembly and called for elections. These were held in March and, to no one's surprise, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed's National Conference Party won an overwhelming victory. A Plebiscite Front Party, pledged to the popular Sheikh Abdullah, found little chance to gain votes. In November, amidst a great ovation, Kashmir's representatives took their seats in the Indian legislature in New Delhi. So far as the Indian government was concerned, the status of Kashmir was no longer a subject for serious discussion.

The "Lion of Kashmir" thought otherwise. In late 1957, the Kashmir government released the imprisoned leader. Promptly, he began accusing India of violent repression of Kashmir's rights, demanded a plebiscite and called for United Nations troops to occupy Kashmir. After fifteen weeks of freedom, he was back behind bars.

In succeeding years, the question of plebiscite appeared to become more irrelevant as Indian-held Kashmir became increasingly a part of India. While it retained its own citizen-

ship laws and political institutions, and its leader was called "prime minister" instead of "chief minister" as in India's other fourteen states, Kashmir was publicly a problem only to Pakistanis—and many Kashmiris. In 1963, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed resigned, to be succeeded by his Finance Minister, Khwaja Shams-ud-Din. With Bakshi active behind the scenes, integration went forward as the prime minister tried to get his title changed to "chief minister."

In 1964, events occurred in India and Kashmir which seemed to offer hope for progress. In March, Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq, a politician with close ties with Indian neutralists, became prime minister of Kashmir. And in April, to the surprise of many, Sheikh Abdullah was released from prison with all charges against him dropped. He promptly repeated his familiar call for self-determination in Kashmir and traveled to New Delhi to meet with his old friend, Prime Minister Nehru. He followed this with a visit to Pakistan for talks with President Ayub.

In the preceding years, Pakistan, like India, had been consolidating its control over Azad Kashmir, whose government was now "temporarily" established at Muzaffarabad. Since 1949, this government had been careful to avoid the appearance of being permanent, maintaining throughout that its real capital was Srinagar and its citizens the people of Kashmir Jammu. It recently changed its name to "The Azad Government of Jammu and Kashmir."

The land of Azad Kashmir is the least fertile part of the area. Few streams flow through it and hardly any roads exist to carry in the tools of development to the people. The approximately 1,000,000 Kashmiris of Azad Kashmir, 200,000 of whom are refugees, are among the poorest of the subcontinent. The refugees are also among South Asia's bitterest, for their homes are under Indian rule. Their capital, they feel, is Srinagar, not Muzaffarabad or Islamabad.

Since they came together in 1947, the leaders of Azad Kashmir have fought amongst themselves and with the Pakistan government for control. The competing groups within the Muslim Conference Party are the Muslims from the Poonch-Mirpur-Muzaffarabad area, the refugees from Kashmir province led by Mir Waiz Usuf Shah, and the Jammu Muslims under Choudhury Ghulam Abbas. More communally-minded than the others, Abbas pleads for jihad and forceful "liberation" of Kashmir. Once imprisoned by the Pakistan government, he remains a strong figure in the background of the Kashmir Liberation League. In 1952, the rivalries between the groups led to open warfare and the Pakistan government stepped in to assert firm control. This control has remained strong.

The President of Azad Kashmir in 1964 is Khurshid Hasan Khurshid, a journalist, who seeks international recognition for his government. He has built his strength through the support of President Ayub.

Regardless of their political feelings, all Azad Kashmir leaders are agreed in their support for a plebiscite in Kashmir, which they believe would result in accession to Pakistan. They also agree that the cease-fire line is temporary.

While the administration of the Azad Kashmir government is solely Kashmiri, the Pakistan government, through its Ministry for Home and Kashmir Affairs (headed, in 1964, by Khan Habibullah Khan) guides its affairs. It also helps in the development of the area, although not always as much as Azad Kashmiris would like. It has supplied technicians, both military and civil, and alloted a portion of each annual budget to Azad Kashmir. Through the Basic Democracies, it has sent agricultural experts into the valley villages. New roads have tied isolated communities together and new schools and hospitals have been built. A great new dam—the Mangla Dam—is being constructed on the Jhelum River to provide power

and irrigation. From its own imported supplies, the Pakistan government distributes food. And over the Azad Kashmir Radio network, broadcasts through more than 10,000 radio receivers in both Azad and Indian Kashmir encourage a spirit of "free Kashmir."

Between Indian Kashmir and Azad Kashmir runs the cease-fire line, manned by Swedes, Canadians and other United Nations forces who keep the armies of the two parties apart—most of the time. The U. N. personnel wish to leave. The Indians, Pakistanis, and Kashmiris also wish them to leave, but each group has its own conditions for bringing about the departure. Obtaining a meeting of minds on these conditions has plagued them all, but especially the Kashmiris, since 1947.

In the years of battle and debate over Kashmir, the basic arguments of either side in the dispute have changed little:

—Pakistan maintains that the accession of Kashmir has yet to be determined because the action of the Maharaja was illegal and no plebiscite has been held. India replies that the accession of the Maharaja was legal (did not Pakistan accept the accession of the Nawab of Junagadh?) and that the will of the Kashmir people was expressed in the elections of 1957 under the new constitution.

—Pakistan maintains that the partition of the subcontinent on the basis of communal determination in areas contiguous to either state has not been completed and that Kashmir should be dealt with in the spirit of the 1947 partition agreements. India replies that Kashmir was a special problem and to re-open the issue now would lead to communal violence.

—Pakistan maintains that India is committed to holding a plebiscite in Kashmir. India replies that conditions have changed since this commitment and that there is no further question over Kashmir's accession.

—Pakistan maintains that the government of Azad Kashmir is the true government because it grew out of the first

rebellion against the Maharaja. India replies that the Azad Kashmir rebellion was not successful and the government is a puppet of Pakistan with no separate identity.

—India maintains that Pakistan committed aggression in Kashmir and continues to support aggression through its support of the Azad Kashmir government. Pakistan replies that its forces entered Kashmir only after Indian troops threatened the security of Pakistan.

—India maintains that Pakistan did not abide by the U. N. Commission resolution to withdraw its troops so demilitarization could be achieved. Pakistan replies that it could not withdraw its troops so long as Indian troops in Kashmir threatened Pakistan.

—India maintains that by Pakistan's joining CENTO and SEATO pacts, the Kashmir problem changed character, became part of the Cold War, and all previous agreements over Kashmir were thereby nullified. Pakistan replies that Kashmir has nothing to do with the Cold War, but is a subcontinent problem.

—India maintains that its position on Kashmir is irrevocable and conclusive: Kashmir is an integral part of India and shall so remain—there can be no negotiation over past issues. Pakistan replies that Kashmir remains an unresolved problem and that Pakistan will accept arbitration.

Essentially, the status of Kashmir is not determined by legalistic arguments or United Nations resolutions, but by the simple fact of possession. India occupies its part of Kashmir and is not about to relinquish it. Conversely, Pakistan possesses the frontier regions of Kashmir and effectively controls Azad Kashmir. It is not about to relinquish what it controls. To prove its position, Pakistan in 1963 reached agreement with Communist China over demarcation of 300 miles of Kashmir's border. India fought with Communist China to maintain possession of parts of Indian-controlled Kashmir.

The meetings between Sheikh Abdullah and the prime ministers of India and Pakistan appeared to be the beginning of constructive action toward solving the Kashmir problem. Many talked of partitioning Kashmir; others suggested that the land be given autonomy, but under the joint guidance of India and Pakistan. The death of Prime Minister Nehru on May 27, 1964 brought a temporary halt to the discussions. Despite the enmity between Pakistan and India, Pakistanis generally agreed that, with time, Nehru would have eventually reached agreement with them.

The status of Kashmir continues to plague the lives of Pakistanis and Indians and will probably do so for years to come, regardless of the formal solutions reached by government leaders. Kashmir stands, in Pakistani eyes, for all the hostility the world has shown to Pakistan. To deny the right of Kashmiris to accede to Pakistan if they wish is to deny the right of Pakistan itself. Desperately, Pakistanis reach out for support in their private "cold war" in the Himalyas.

12. *A Need for Friends*

From the day Mohammad Ali Jinnah led Pakistanis to independence, they have wanted and needed friends, particularly friends who could help them. Such friends were hard to find in 1947, and even today those who claim friendship often appear to Pakistanis to be less than helpful.

Pakistanis keenly felt that the world was against their new country. While a few Muslim nations applauded perfunctorily in 1947, the nations that counted—the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union—rushed to congratulate the Indians. The first test of friendship was Kashmir, and here Pakistan's failure to achieve any form of success was evidence of the minor role Pakistanis felt the major nations ascribed to them.

Unlike India, Pakistan faced a single, overpowering problem: survival. From without, India seemed to be purposely exacerbating the economic plight of new Pakistan while at the same time threatening Pakistan with its stronger army. Afghanistan appeared to be grabbing at Pakistan's northwestern frontier. The Soviet Union rushed to support the communists, who found fertile fields for subversion. From within the country, tensions between the various provinces, particularly those of West Pakistan and East Pakistan, tore at the unity the Quaid-i-Azam so painfully had created. Survival was a real concern to Pakistanis in 1947.

As the early years passed and enmity with their neighbors increased, Pakistanis placed more importance on the questions of security and independence than anything else. Today, their

extreme sensitivity over these concerns is an outstanding characteristic in Pakistan's foreign affairs.

Pakistanis recognize that they can only advance in peace. Thus they seek friendship with those countries and organizations which work for peace and which at the same time will assist their development. Most Pakistanis bitterly reject colonialism and support the self-determination of all dependent peoples. And many also have a strong sense of identity with Muslims of other countries and wish to associate with them so long as this association does not work against their efforts to achieve military and economic strength.

These feelings help explain Pakistan's enthusiastic support of the United Nations, of which Pakistan has been a member since 1947. Through the United Nations, Pakistan has sought aid—futilely, it seems—for its Kashmir stand. It has, however, gained economic and welfare support from various U. N. agencies. In 1963, Pakistani troops participated in the U. N.-supervised transfer of West Irian from Dutch to Indonesian control.

Survival, development, and Kashmir also help explain Pakistan's acceptance of military and economic assistance from the United States, its alignment with Turkey, Iran and the West in CENTO, and with Thailand, the Philippines and the West in SEATO. They explain Pakistan's apprehension of comnunism but also the country's developing ties with the Soviet Union and Communist China, whose delegates Pakistan has supported for seating in the United Nations and with whom Pakistan has signed border, trade, and cultural agreements.

India

With few exceptions, those Pakistanis concerned with "foreign" affairs would like to seek friendship among the people they have known best, and for so long—their Indian neighbors. Personal friendships, in fact, have continued across the

borders between Muslims and Hindus and these have helped keep minor problems from becoming major crises. In times of relative peace, travel between Pakistan and India increases ten-fold as Muslims "go home" to visit families and friends. The "hated" Sikhs cross into Pakistan by the hundreds to visit shrines. With so much in common in their backgrounds, especially during British rule, antagonisms are sometimes difficult to maintain. Both know that together their economies would be stronger, as would their armies.

Yet on a national level, these realizations, friendships, and the logic of cooperation are overshadowed by the actions of the respective governments. To Pakistan, India is the bitterest of enemies and the greatest foreign affairs problem. The ruling minority—government, religious, political ,and intellectual leaders—are still afraid of India's Hindu leaders. They feel that these individuals, all of whom opposed Pakistan's creation, have not accepted the permanency of Pakistan. Pakistanis accuse these leaders of being motivated by Hinduism, not the proclaimed secularism, and charge that Indians seek to control Asia through a doctrine of neutralism and armed force.

To justify these charges, Pakistanis point primarily to Kashmir. They also include India's action in "occupying" Junagadh, which Pakistanis still claim—and show as Pakistani territory on their official maps. Another case of "Indian aggression" arose over the Hindu-majority state of Hyderabad whose Muslim Nizam tried to assert his independence after 1947. As in Kashmir and Junagadh, the Indian army marched in to assure Hyderabad's accession to India. In all three cases, Pakistan blames India for thwarting the will of Muslims, asserting the "right of possession" based on military force. When India attacked the Portuguese enclave of Goa in 1961, Pakistanis felt that their charges of Indian imperialism were confirmed. Said President Ayub in 1963:

"Indian leaders somehow feel that every country from Afghanistan down to Indonesia, where there is a semblance of Indian culture, forms a part of Indian heritage, and so it must also form a part of the Indian political empire."

To Pakistanis, the communal nature of Indian society was not eliminated with the partition of the subcontinent. Hindus are still Hindus and more than 40,000,000 Muslims remain as a minority in a caste-ridden society. Daily reports of Hindu suppression and violence against Muslims are constant reminders to Pakistanis that India is anti-Muslim. Indeed, Pakistanis accuse India of "blackmailing" Pakistan by holding the Muslims of India as "hostages" in a "cold war." Indian leaders lend credence to this charge by saying that communal violence will break out if Kashmiris ever vote to join Pakistan.

Indians, of course, deny that any such evidence exists for Pakistan's fears. Quite the contrary, they say that Pakistan is a threat to India, was an aggressor in Kashmir and could well become an aggressor again. They feel that Pakistan's membership in anti-communist military pacts are really attempts to strengthen the Pakistani armed forces for an eventual attack upon India. While Pakistanis point to Indian persecution of Muslims, Indians also feel that Muslims in East Bengal persecute Hindus. Refugees straggle across the borders between the two countries to support both viewpoints.

Despite these fears, Pakistanis and Indians have been able to settle some of their disagreements. As a result of efforts by Eugene Black and the International Bank for Reconstruction, the two countries agreed to the joint development of the rivers of the Punjab. India paid most of Pakistan's claims for cash assets in pre-partition India and both sides settled on payments for evacuee property left behind by refugees. The Indian government gave up small parts of Bengal to Pakistan, although the Indian Supreme Court ruled that the government had no right to do so. And Indian trade crossing East

Pakistan to Assam and Tripura exceeds 200,000,000 rupees a month as the two countries gradually reach a few economic agreements.

While these successes remove much of the fringe frustration on both sides, they do not perceptibly reduce the suspicions and fears which prevent solutions to major problems. They do not prevent both sides from aiming their armies at each other across the Kashmir cease-fire line rather than at other possible aggressors, or deflecting expenditures from military purposes to economic development.

The Chinese communist attack on India, begun in 1959 but intensified in 1962, greatly affected Pakistani-Indian relations. Public reaction in Pakistan to India's involvement could have been predicted: India had invented the entire affair in order to obtain military aid to use against Pakistan. Pakistanis feel that Indian claims to "neutralism" were proven false and that, in order to obtain arms without admitting the error of their past policies, Indian politicians provoked the Chinese. When the United States and the United Kingdom began sending arms to India, Pakistan officially protested that the West was merely arming India against Pakistan, thereby creating an arms race. In reaction, Pakistan intensified its search for friends.

Afghanistan

While India has been Pakistan's major concern, neighboring Afghanistan has also appeared to Pakistanis as a threat to their unity and security. The issue over which they have quarreled is "Pashtunistan." From the day Pakistan became a nation, Afghan leaders, themselves Pathans, have claimed that the Pathans in Pakistan should be given the right to form a country of their own—if they wish.

Control over all the Pathans has long been the aim of the Pathan rulers of Afghanistan. It is understandable. In a tribal

society such as Afghanistan's, in which the ruler is the tribal leader who can subdue all the others, any Pathan tribe not under his control is a threat. In 1893, the British rulers of India, seeking to keep the Pathans divided and the Afghan king weak, instructed Sir Mortimer Durand to draw a line down the map of the northwest frontier. Until 1946, the Afghan government accepted this line. The Pathans on the Afghan side of the Durand line were theoretically the responsibility of Afghanistan. The Pathans on the Indian side were the concern of the British. The Pathans themselves, particularly the strong Mohmand, Afridi, Wazir, and Mahsud tribes who lived along both sides of the Durand line, felt themselves responsible to no one. Well-armed and strategically located in the hills of the borderland, they were able to maintain considerable independence from the sovereigns in Kabul and New Delhi.

At the time of partition, the strongest Pathan leader was Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the "Frontier Gandhi." He opposed the creation of Pakistan and in the referendum held to decide whether Pathans wished to join Pakistan or India he asked his followers to abstain. He wanted a third choice: independence. Only slightly more than 50 per cent of the Pathans voted in the referendum and of these 99 per cent selected Pakistan. To the Afghans and Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the referendum was not a true indication of Pathan wishes. When Pakistan applied for admission to the United Nations in September, 1947, only Afghanistan voted in opposition.

Afghanistan is a landlocked country whose foreign trade depends upon its neighbors—Pakistan, the Soviet Union and Iran, primarily the first two. Long a target for political exploitation by Russia, even before the communist revolution, it has also been a buffer between the rulers of India and other imperialists wishing to march through its rugged terrain. Afghan rulers have often toed a neutralist line, either by

necessity or design, hoping to remain independent yet survive economically. And they have dreamed of obtaining an outlet to the sea. In the years after 1947, King Zahir Shah faced the choice of securing the allegiance of the Pathan tribesmen through the Pashtunistan issue (and obtaining an outlet to the sea) or maintaining good relations with Pakistan, which controlled the only alternative trade routes to those through the Soviet Union. The Pathan ancestry of the royal court, dominated by the prime minister, Mohammed Daoud, led the King to worry less about the Soviet Union and more about the Pathans. Any unrest among the Pathans was not only to be supported, but encouraged.

Hostility toward Pakistan among Pathan hill tribes did not diminish in the early years of Pakistan. Although Abdul Ghaffar Khan was jailed for a time, others took his place. Among them was the Fakir of Ipi, a mullah with considerable following. Until his death in 1960, the Fakir of Ipi was the Afghan government's chief hope in the frontier area. He used pamphlets printed in India and funds supplied by Kabul to exhort dissident Pathans to raid Pakistani-controlled lowlands. Propagandists from India traveled across Europe and the United States pleading the cause of an independent Pashtunistan. The Fakir even proclaimed himself President of Pashtunistan, a country that would extend to the Indus River and the Arabian Sea. His appeals reached all of the subcontinent over Indian and Afghan broadcasting facilities; Soviet broadcasts supported his claims.

One of the peaks of tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan came in 1955 when Pakistan announced the unification of West Pakistan. The Afghan government mobilized its armed forces and Pakistan evacuated its citizens from Afghanistan, simultaneously blocking Afghanistan's borders. The Soviet Union denounced Pakistan and rushed to Afghanistan's aid with new purchasing credits and transit fa-

cilities. Neither Kabul nor Karachi liked the Soviet intrusion and in 1956 relations eased. But not for long.

In 1960, trouble flared again when the Afghans supported a tribal attack on the small frontier state of Dir. Pakistan aided the opposing tribal chief, the Khan of Khar, who finally emerged victorious. In the melee, Pakistan deposed the old and autocratic Nawab of Dir, bringing the territory under the administration of the Pakistan government.

Tension from this episode spread throughout the Pathan valleys and violence increased to the point that the Pakistan air force began bombing dissident Mohmands. The year 1961 became the bloodiest in the history of the Pathans since 1937 and, in September of that year, Afghanistan and Pakistan broke off all relations.

For twenty months, Pakistan and Afghanistan remained bitter diplomatic enemies, to the advantage of the Soviet Union, which promptly secured additional trade concessions from the Kabul government. Tons of American aid supplies sat on the piers in Karachi while Afghanistan signed trade agreements with Communist China and strengthened its air force with Czechoslovakian airplanes.

Attempts to bring the two countries together failed repeatedly until the Shah of Iran offered to mediate. In May, 1963, the Shah induced Pakistan and Afghanistan to resume diplomatic relations and both began opening their trade offices. Although Afghanistan did not agree to bury its hatchet for a Pashtunistan, King Zahir Shah did take one significant step toward this end. He dismissed Prime Minister Daoud, the most powerful individual in Afghanistan behind the Pashtunistan issue.

A period of peaceful relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan can help each country. They share the Kabul River and could benefit by its development. Annually, thousands of Pathan tribesmen, the powindahs, move across the Afghan-

Pakistan border seeking work and grazing lands. The settling of these tribesmen would be to the advantage of both countries. But above all, the increasing flow of trade would bring greater prosperity and security to Afghans and link them more closely with the non-communist world rather than with the Soviet Union.

Iran and the Muslim World

Afghanistan has two special claims to the affections of Pakistanis and these they also share with the Iranians. All three are primarily Muslim in religion (Iranians are Shi'ites, Afghans are Sunnites) and Aryan in origin. As recently as 1962, President Ayub Khan called on all three countries to form an Aryan Confederation and in both Afghanistan and Iran cultural leaders replied in friendly terms, if not in political action.

More than any other Muslim country Iran holds a special place in the hearts of Pakistanis. It was the first Muslim country to recognize Pakistan. For centuries, the language of Muslim poetry and song in India was Persian, as was the language of government. Artists drew in the fashion of Persian painters and the sufism of Persia's mystics found enthusiasts among India's Muslims.

Iran and Pakistan are back fence neighbors, sharing a common border. This border is remote and undeveloped, but recent efforts through CENTO have led to improved communications and there are plans to link the two countries by rail. A single track leads from Quetta to Zahedan in Iran, but there the line stops.

Unfortunately, the two countries have little else to share. Both have an underdeveloped agricultural base to their economies and neither is able to provide the other with its needs. Although Iran has great quantities of oil, it is neither able nor willing to share this wealth with any other country.

In their search for friends, Pakistanis look longingly toward other Muslims, if not for material support at least for solace and votes in the United Nations. Even the country's constitution states that "the bonds of unity amongst Muslim countries should be preserved and strengthened."

The old dream of Pan-Islamic unity has pretty well disappeared now in Pakistan. Once a goal of some Indian Muslims, particularly after World War I when the fate of the Ottoman caliph was being decided by Kemal Ataturk, it has been mislaid in the secular nationalisms of the Middle East.

Yet the Arabic greeting among Muslims—*"Salaam aleikum"*—can be heard from West Africa to the Philippines. There are indeed deep emotional ties and sympathetic understanding among Muslims wherever they are. And Pakistan is one of the largest of Muslim nations.

After partition, the hopes of many Pakistanis for a rejuvenation of Muslim brotherhood brightened perceptibly. Muslim friendship societies sprouted in Karachi, Lahore, and Dacca. Said the Minister of Education:

"With the Muslim countries we claim a community of outlook based on spiritual and moral affinities. We have the same faith and the same cultural traditions as they have, and, like us, they too are emerging from the sloth of centuries and are becoming increasingly conscious of the important historical role which Islam has to play as a unifying force. It is only natural that our first cultural links should be with them."

Societies such as the Pakistan-Iraq and Pakistan-Iran cultural associations were helpful in establishing contacts between public groups in various countries. The Pakistan-Arab Cultural Association undertook to publish an Arabic-Urdu dictionary and a Council of World Muslim Affairs provided a forum for Islamic subjects. The Jama'at-i-Ulema-i-Islam in Pakistan sought to make Arabic the official language of all Muslim nations, to create an independent Islamic bloc in

the United Nations, to introduce a central inter-Islamic currency and to promote free trade among Muslim nations. The former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, brought his anti-British World Muslim Organization to Karachi in 1951 and called for the creation of a commonwealth of Islamic countries.

In its adolescent years, Pakistan sought to befriend every Muslim nation, to support every Muslim cause in the United Nations and to assume leadership among Muslims. It supported the Arabs on the Palestine question and has not yet recognized Israel. It opposed France in Algeria, Italy in Libya, the Dutch in Indonesia (after World War II, Indian Muslim troops deserted the British to help Indonesians in their fight for independence), and the British occupation of Suez.

Not all Muslim countries accepted Pakistan's aggressive brotherly love with open arms. Many Turks were apprehensive over the appearance of budding theocracy in Pakistan, even asking Pakistan to recall one of its envoys on the grounds of encouraging religious reactionaries in Turkey. Many Arabs suspected the Islamic orthodoxy of these "foreign" Muslims who could not even speak Arabic. The rector of the Muslim university in Cairo, Al-Azhar, protested that too many Islamic conferences were being held in Pakistan. Iranians spoke contemptuously of the Pakistani language, Urdu. Pakistan's prime minister, Hussein Suhrawardy, once complained bitterly that the Egyptians were insulting to Pakistan.

Eventually, Pakistan's self-interest dampened some of its fraternal ardor. Economically, Pakistan's Muslim brothers could do little for the new country and Pakistan sought help elsewhere. No Muslim nation came to Pakistan's aid over Kashmir except to vote against India in the United Nations. Even Islamic Afghanistan became a predatory neighbor allied in the Pashtunistan cause with India. In joining what was

then called the Baghdad Pact, Pakistan antagonized most of its Arab friends, but at least allayed the fears of the Turks, with whom Pakistan signed a military pact in 1954. Pakistan has not joined the Arab economic boycott against Israel.

Sentiments of Muslim brotherhood are nevertheless strong in Pakistan and, so long as religion remains as deeply-rooted as it is among the people, the fate of any Muslim nation in the world will affect Pakistanis. Properly directed, these genuine desires for Muslim unity can help Pakistan play a more significant role in aiding Muslim nations to find strength and stability. Should President Ayub's experiment in the Basic Democracies prove successful, other Muslim nations as politically and economically underdeveloped as Pakistan will be among the first to follow Pakistan's lead.

Non-communist Asia

Many Pakistanis have also searched for friends among their fellow Asians. They share with them a feeling of resentment against Europeans who have long ruled, directly and indirectly, the lives of Asians. The resentment is based on political and racial grounds and, throughout Pakistan, emotions are strong against evidences of racial discrimination in Western countries, especially in the United States.

Relations with neighboring Burma have been of particular concern to East Pakistanis; these relations have not always been completely amicable. While Burma is primarily a Buddhist country, a community of Muslims lives in the Arakan region bordering Pakistan. Shortly after independence, these Muslims rebelled, many fleeing—with their arms—to Pakistan, where they fed anti-Burmese sentiments. Minor problems over delineation of the borders aggravated the situation, although later most of these problems were settled. Occasional stresses, including Burma's threat to deport Pakistani (and Indian) traders and businessmen living in Burma, have not

prevented Pakistan and Burma from enjoying friendly diplomatic relations or joining together in various Asian conferences to seek ways of strengthening Asian influence in world affairs.

In Ceylon, Pakistanis see another country menaced by India and thus a potential friend. Indeed, many Buddhist Ceylonese fear the Hindu minority in Ceylon. They have also not forgotten that India's Nehru once referred (apparently in jest) to Ceylon as a potential Indian province. In 1963, President Ayub visited Ceylon and was warmly received.

India has fostered Pakistan's interest in Asian affairs through its rivaling search for friends. While India has attempted to gain a leadership position based on the late Prime Minister Nehru's "neutralism," Pakistan has spoken for those Asians committed to containing the expansion of communism. At numerous Asian conferences prior to 1964 Pakistanis have been the most effective spokesmen in moderating Asian resentment against the West and opposing the virulence of Asian communists.

Pakistan committed itself to opposing communism in 1954 when it joined Australia, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States in forming SEATO, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty Organization. Under this treaty, Pakistan agreed to uphold the U. N. Charter and to develop its capacity to "resist armed attack and to prevent any counter-subversive activities directed from without against [the] territorial integrity and political stability" of the treaty members. Pakistan agreed to join with the members in meeting common dangers to any territory which the members might designate, by unanimous agreement. Cambodia, Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of Vietnam were so designated. Pakistan also agreed to cooperate in economic, social, and cultural fields.

While consistent in its commitment to SEATO, Pakistan has continued to seek friends among the non-committed Asians. These drives reflect a growing discontent among Bengalis with anti-communist commitments in Asia and Pakistan's increasing skepticism over the efficacy of these postures, particularly in solving the Kashmir problem. This skepticism was expressed in 1963 when Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto called for another meeting of Asian leaders similar to that held years before in Bandung, at which time the principle of neutralism and the Asian feelings of resentment were predominant.

The Commonwealth

While Asian and other Muslim nations rushed to congratulate Pakistanis on their independence in 1947, Pakistanis themselves found their most effective friends among their old rulers, the British. This effectiveness, however, was limited in Pakistani eyes. Pakistanis felt the British had let them down during the Punjab massacres and, later, in Kashmir. India's Prime Minister Nehru appeared to be Britain's hero. Nevertheless, it was, in fact, the British and their Commonwealth partners who first helped Pakistan along in those crucial early years.

Great Britain's impact on Indian Muslims before 1947 was great. Among the Muslim intelligentsia, government servants, political and educational leaders who formed the majority of the articulate Muslims, Great Britain and its traditions were deeply respected. Almost to a man, these Muslims spoke English, were educated in British institutions, wore British clothing, admired the British court system and rose to prominence within it. Parliamentary government along British lines was a more natural constitutional system to them than any other and association in the Commonwealth after independence was a logical consequence of this respect.

After partition, Mohammed Ali Jinnah appointed British officers to head each military service and British civil servants as provincial governors. Nearly every ministry had a British expert and Britons were called in to help write the constitutions. It was as easy to find British customs and ideas in Pakistan's cities after 1947 as it was to find native Indian or Muslim ones. The British-trained armed forces wore British-styled uniforms. English was the language of Pakistan's universities and the most influential daily newspapers—*Dawn, Pakistan Times,* and the now defunct *Civil and Military Gazette.* The first economic development projects, such as the reclamation of the Thal desert in the Punjab, grew out of the Commonwealth-inspired Colombo Plan.

Pakistan's membership in the Commonwealth is a voluntary association which prescribes no rigid rules of behavior but does encourage each country to work closely with other members. Each member may follow an independent foreign policy. At first, the Queen of England was also Queen of Pakistan, but this relationship disappeared when Pakistan became a republic in 1956. Now, the Queen is merely "Head of the Commonwealth" and there is no formal or legal link between the British sovereign and Pakistanis.

As a Commonwealth member, Pakistan participates in the various conferences and committees of the Commonwealth. Pakistan is a member of the Imperial Economic Committee, the Imperial Shipping Committee, the Executive Council of the Imperial Agricultural Bureau and the Committee on Imperial Defence. Pakistan's monetary base is British sterling, controlled through the Commonwealth, and Pakistan shares in the trade "preferences" which Commonwealth members give to each other. Great Britain's proposed membership in the European Common Market would threaten Pakistan's economic advantages within the Commonwealth and this is one reason for the reluctance of many Britons to support

fully the Common Market idea. Above all, Pakistan has joined with Great Britain in two major alliances—CENTO and SEATO.

But in spite of British and Commonwealth ties, Pakistan's relationships with Great Britain are sometimes strained, usually over the Commonwealth's inability to solve the Kashmir dispute to Pakistan's advantage. Great Britain's representative to SEATO, Lord Louis Mountbatten, was denied a welcome in Pakistan in 1962 because of his previous activities as India's governor-general during the initial stages of the Kashmir troubles. When Great Britain invaded Egypt in 1956, there were widespread demands that Pakistan quit the Commonwealth. If the invasion had not been halted, these demands might well have become irresistible. The most recent strains have arisen over British assistance to India during India's controversy with Communist China. In this, Great Britain shares the criticism leveled by Pakistanis at the United States.

The United States

In the early days of independence, when it appeared that Britain was favoring India on the subject of Kashmir, Pakistanis looked longingly to the United States for friendship. They welcomed American Admiral Chester Nimitz as the first plebiscite administrator for Kashmir. Many asked that American technicians be employed to replace the British. The Mir of Hunza sought to make his little principality the forty-ninth state of the United States.

The United States was slow to respond to these entreaties. Even after Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan visited the U. S. in 1951, Washington attempted to follow a neutral course in the conflict between India and Pakistan. American public opinion lionized India's Nehru. Books by Louis Fischer, Vincent Sheean and other American visitors to the subcontinent gave a villain's role to Mohammed Ali Jinnah. U. S. foreign

aid flowed into India appropriately heralded by Ambassador Chester Bowles, whose every move and statement demonstrated to Pakistanis that Americans liked India best.

United States policy toward the Soviet Union, enunciated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles after 1953, brought sudden change in the relations between Pakistan and the U. S. Advocating the creation of bi-lateral military pacts between the U. S. and non-communist countries and multi-lateral regional groupings to deter Soviet expansionism, this policy found many friends, each of whom was rewarded by economic assistance. As Pakistan's search for friends was limping along ineffectually and the struggle for Kashmir was particularly unsuccessful (in 1952, the Soviet Union openly sided with India), Pakistan eagerly grasped Mr. Dulles' outstretched hands. In 1954, the U. S. and Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact and in 1955, Pakistan joined CENTO. Ambassador Bowles returned to the United States. Pakistan had found a friend which, it presumed, would support it against "neutralist" and "imperialist" India. The U. S. had found a friend which, it presumed, was stalwart in its opposition to international communism. Both ignored the facts of life.

The growing affection between Pakistanis and Americans was phenomenal. U. S. government policy denigrated Prime Minister Nehru's attempt to be neutral between the Soviet communists and American anti-communists. To Pakistanis any foe of Nehru's was a friend of Pakistan's. Many Pakistani leaders—Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed (who was primarily responsible for obtaining U. S. support), Prime Minister Mohammed Ali (Bogra), Minister of Defense Iskander Mirza, and General Ayub—genuinely feared Soviet expansionism and stood unhesitatingly on the side of the Western allies. They also saw what could be gained through alliance with the U. S. in terms of economic and military

development. They had cast envious eyes on the progress of Turkey after that country's alliance with the United States.

These leaders were not soon disappointed. U. S. military aid arrived through Karachi faster than men could be trained to use it. Supersonic jets—better than India's—and the latest tanks gave the American-advised armed forces a strength undreamed of by the original British commanders. By 1963, the cost of this military hardware and personnel training exceeded $1,000,000,000. Economic aid in the form of cash gifts and loans, surplus food and industrial equipment, and thousands of technicians, landed in Karachi and Dacca to help Pakistanis bolster their languishing economy. Nearly all sectors of Pakistan's economic and social development program found some support from the U. S. Through the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporations, loans helped start hundreds of small and medium-size factories. Agricultural projects, especially those involving irrigation, soil improvement and rural education received backing. The U. S. helped build the giant Karnafuli dam in East Pakistan and poured funds into the Indus River development scheme. Loans helped begin rehabilitation of West Pakistan's railroads and construction of airfields in East Pakistan. And by May, 1963, the U. S. had sent more than 146 Peace Corps volunteers into Pakistan (only 47 to India). Meanwhile, private American philanthropic agencies and universities gave help to programs in birth control, village development, and urban planning. By 1963, the value of economic aid to Pakistan was $1,500,000,000, or approximately $15 per person. India in the same period received $3,900,000,000 in economic aid from the U. S., or about $9 per person. Few countries in the world had gained more—economically and militarily—than Pakistan from American friendship.

Visits of dignitaries also increased along with aid. In 1959, President Eisenhower arrived in Karachi to be met by the

biggest reception Pakistan had ever given a foreigner. More than 700,000 people turned out to meet him. In 1961, then Vice President Johnson visited Karachi and captured the peoples' hearts by stopping to talk at length with a camel-cart driver named Bashir Ahmed. The next year, Bashir Ahmed was guest at the Johnson ranch in Texas and returned to Karachi loaded with gifts, including a pickup truck. Both Pakistanis and Americans were touched by the gesture.

Also in 1961, President Ayub made a triumphal visit to the United States and spoke before a joint session of Congress. Americans found him genial, outspoken and obviously a friend. Early in 1962, his visit was repaid by Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy, wife of the U. S. President, who spent five days in Pakistan. As a few Americans and Pakistanis had long before discovered, the peoples of the two nations could easily develop warm and lasting friendships.

But still, Kashmir remained in Indian hands and, in 1963, there were no signs that Pakistan's friendship with the U. S. was helping solve the problem Pakistanis felt was their most important. Indeed, if anything, the friendship had made solution of the Kashmir problem more difficult. Pakistan's anti-communist alliances had hardened India's anti-Pakistan positions. The armies of the two countries still faced each other across the Kashmir cease-fire line, with even greater belligerence.

As though it was designed to weaken U. S.-Pakistani friendship, the invasion of Indian territory by Chinese communist forces in 1962 led both countries to re-examine their policies. The U. S. (and Great Britain) offered to aid India which, in turn, refused to withdraw troops from the Pakistani front to fight China. On April 15, 1963, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Bhutto said that if India should receive massive military assistance from the "Western powers" without a solution to the Kashmir dispute, it would mark a turning point for Pakistan

and the "abandonment of our friends and allies." As military aid began to flow into India—and Ambassador Bowles returned to New Delhi to herald the renewed friendship—Bhutto said that Pakistan's foreign policy was being "reshaped." Later, he and U. S. officials met in Washington. Afterwards, the U. S. announced that it had agreed to "recognize" Pakistan's fear of India, although it was apparent that the U. S. policy-makers did not share this fear. The U. S. also made it clear to Pakistan that it would build its anti-China policy around India, regardless of Pakistani policies. Pakistanis, acting as though any enemy of India's was a welcome friend of theirs, as they did when Pakistan first signed a military pact with the United States, intensified their friendly associations with the communist world.

The Soviet Union

Most of Pakistan's leaders have acted firmly against the growth of communism within the country and opposed the spread of communist power outside the country. With the exception of their unequivocal stands on India and Pashtunistan, few other subjects have brought forth more clearly defined attitudes. Yet these leaders have not generally viewed the Soviet Union or Communist China with the same degree of alarm as has the United States.

Pakistan inherited from British India the geo-political headaches of defending the passes between central and western Asia and the subcontinent. As early as 1713, Peter the Great of Russia indicated a desire to rule India. In 1800 Tsar Paul and Napoleon planned a joint invasion and the British strengthened their forces on India's northwest frontier. During World War I, Germany also made threatening gestures and the British rushed a railroad line from Quetta to Zahedan in Iran and fortified the valleys of the frontier. Marx and Lenin both reiterated Peter the Great's belief that control of India was

essential to the control of Asia. In World War II the British built tank traps in the Khyber and Kurram passes to defend the borders against either Germany or the Soviet Union, whichever enemy decided to attack.

After partition, Pakistan found itself responsible for a 310-mile border with Communist China and a 1,448-mile border with Afghanistan, both potential targets for an aggressor. Pakistanis have usually assumed that the aggressor would be Russian, not Chinese.

Despite this history of strategy, Pakistanis' concern over these borders has been subordinate to their fear of India. Few army units face toward either the Soviet Union or China, much to the distress of U. S. military advisors who have been instructed to re-orient Pakistan's army and air force toward the potential aggressor whom Americans believe is the most sinister.

Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union have only lately become friendly. After partition, the Soviet Union, like most other nations, sought to befriend India. In the context of Prime Minister Nehru's neutralism, Russians found a warm welcome. Thus the Soviet Union gave no support to Pakistan on Kashmir. It openly backed Afghanistan on the Pashtunistan issue. Consequently, Pakistan was able to commit itself to an anti-Soviet military pact—and permit American U-2 reconnaissance planes to take off from Peshawar—without compromising any friendly associations it might have developed with Moscow. It helped Indian aggression in East Paki in 1971 & created Bangla desh.

Communist China

While admitting the expansionist tendencies of Communist China in Southeast Asia—hence, Pakistan's membership in SEATO—Pakistanis have shown little concern over China as a threat to Pakistan itself. Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize Communist China and has always supported

Peking's claims to the Chinese seat in the United Nations. During the Korean war, Pakistan supported the U. N. position, but sent no troops to Korea. Trading between the two countries began in 1950 and each year Pakistan has tried to increase its exports of jute and cotton to China. Apprehension over Great Britain's possible entry into the European Common Market has caused Pakistani salesmen to search for new markets everywhere, particularly in Asia. In 1963, China and Pakistan signed a new trade agreement which, although it called for no change in basic trade patterns of the two countries, alarmed the western world because it coincided with a Chinese-Pakistan border agreement and the heightened fury of Pakistani-India relations.

When Chinese communist troops thrust deep into Indian territory in the fall of 1962 and Indian troops retreated, elation in Pakistan superseded any fear for Pakistan's security. Not only was its greatest enemy under attack, but the part of India which Communist China appeared to covet most was the barren Aksai Chin, or whitestone desert, in the eastern part of Kashmir's Ladakh district. Few Muslims lived in this area and Pakistanis thus were able to exclude it from their own areas of interest in Kashmir.

The brightening of Pakistan-China relations actually began in 1959 when India and China began arguing over the undefined Himalayan borders. It appeared then that Indian refusal to meet China's border demands would result in a worsening of affairs between the two largest Asian nations. In March, 1961, Pakistan approached China requesting negotiations over the borders of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and China. The area involved was approximately 3,400 square miles running some 300 miles southeastward from Gilgit toward the Karakorum Pass. Only months after the outbreak of full-scale mountain warfare between India and China, Pakistan announced that on March 2, 1963 China and Paki-

stan had agreed on a new border. Pakistan claims to have gained about 800 square miles. Large areas of Kashmir, sovereignty over which had never been determined, were confirmed as being under Chinese control. The agreement also stated that "after the settlement of the Kashmir Dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned will re-open negotiations with the Government of the People's Republic of China, on the boundary . . . so as to sign a boundary treaty to replace the present Agreement."

Before long, Pakistan took other steps to strengthen its relations with Communist China. In June, 1963, the head of Pakistan International Airlines visited China to work out details of air service from Karachi and Dacca to cities of China. At the same time, Chinese trade officials began arriving in Pakistan for new talks. Then in February, 1964, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai made an eight-day visit to Pakistan. On February 23, he suddenly announced that Communist China supported Pakistan's demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir.

In the serious business of international relations, the old Machiavellian principle of "my enemy's enemy is my friend" frequently guides a nation's policy. For Communist China, now competing with India for Asian leadership, friendship with Pakistan fits the principle. Besides, the existence of such friendship can be a disrupting influence within the United States-backed anti-communist pacts of which Pakistan is a member, and perhaps strengthen China's hand in its struggle with the Soviet Union for communist leadership. To many Pakistanis, the test of friendship is not whether it results in an improved economy or strengthened military establishment, but whether Pakistan gains vis-à-vis India and, more particularly, comes closer to acquiring Kashmir. In the Chinese, Pakistanis find this kind of friendship—and from Asians for whom many Pakistanis have a particular and natural affinity.

Since independence in 1947, Pakistanis have made giant steps forward in the development of their military, economic, and social institutions. And no one in the country is more aware than President Ayub that this advancement can continue only with the aid of the industrialized countries of Europe and America. But many Pakistanis have lived for years with less materially than they have now; what is more real to them than machines and foreign technicians are the intangibles of life—their religion, their self respect, their independence. Pakistanis seek friends who understand these emotions. They hope that with such understanding will come not only Kashmir, but the tangible tools of progress.

13. *Underdeveloped?*

Pakistan is labeled an "underdeveloped" country. In terms of certain economic and social institutions, such a label is accurate when Pakistan is compared to the countries of Europe and North America. It is accurate when it refers to the distance Pakistan has to go in bringing prosperity to its people. But in fact, the label, like all labels, is neither accurate nor fair. Regardless of how far Pakistan must go, the distance it has traveled in seventeen years is remarkable. If labels are necessary, "progressing" and "developing" are more apt. These labels can also be applied to the most industrialized of nations.

Less than thirty-five years ago, the name "Pakistan" did not exist. Since then, nearly 100,000,000 people have drawn upon their ancient heritage, their deep religious faith and have come together to form the sixth most populous country in the world.

The problems to overcome are colossal. Indeed, when Mohammed Iqbal suggested an independent nation for South Asia's Muslims, many of his countrymen, including the very founder of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, thought he was unrealistic. In 1940, when the grand old man of Bengal, Fazlul Haq, asked the Muslim League to endorse the idea, Pakistan was still only a dream. Yet within seven years, the dream came true.

Even in 1947, there were many who doubted that Pakistan could exist for long. It was, they said, an artificial creation born of tense emotions and British manipulation. Half the people lived 1,000 miles away from the other half and the two groups spoke completely different languages. All were desperately poor. Few could read and write. The means of making a living were primitive and scarce. The institutions for

self-government were foreign and only briefly used. Perhaps in 1947 it was fair to call Pakistan an "underdeveloped" country; it was hardly a country at all.

No Indian should have been surprised that Pakistan survived, if only because in South Asia religion is such a vital part of a person's life. Westerners could be excused for not understanding the depth of an Asian Hindu's or Muslim's devotion to his faith. More than anything else, religion bound these diverse Pakistanis together when logic seemed to demand their disintegration.

Few people, too, understood in 1947 the size and strength of the appallingly thin and emaciated man named Mohammed Ali Jinnah. The Quaid-i-Azam figuratively towered over his people like a Gulliver and gave them a warm sense of belonging. He commanded his people to be a nation and they obeyed.

The ingredients of revolt and civil war in Pakistan have been there, awaiting the proper catalyst. Poverty, hunger, frustration, jealousy, corruption, and insecurity—all have begged Pakistanis to destroy their country. Other nations with similar problems have turned to internal violence. But in Pakistan, the only revolt was a bloodless coup d'état, carried out almost before breakfast. And from it came a new leader, Mohammed Ayub Khan, who, within five years, had become a new "father image" to millions.

The gains Pakistanis have made in their seventeen years belie the depressing statistics of illiteracy, poor health, and insufficient economic growth. They are chiefly in the field of unostentatious groundwork constructed for future progress. Materially, however, they are such things as the Warsak and Karnafuli dams, the new ports of Khulna and Chalna, the massive Indus River development scheme, the blossoming factories and mills on the outskirts of every city, sprawling housing projects, and irrigation canals that wind through the parched farmland.

But more importantly, the gains are in the development of human institutions such as the successful rural cooperative movement in Comilla, the graduates of new technical training schools, scientists from new universities, the active Industrial Development Bank and the provincial Water and Power Development Authorities. They are the graduates of the public service training institutes, men and women who have learned to plan their progress rationally through the various government departments. They are the commercial entrepreneurs who have developed confidence in the future of their country. Such people and institutions have never been there before.

For many Pakistanis, these gains have taken place at the expense of political freedoms, because under the 1962 constitution (and with the backing of the army) President Ayub is eminently powerful. The National Assemblymen are not elected directly by the people, but indirectly by Basic Democrats. And the Basic Democrats voted 95.6 per cent for President Ayub.

But none can ignore the results. In 1963, despite poor crops, Pakistan could boast that consumer prices were stable as was the value of money. Foreign exchange reserves increased, there was tight control over recurring government expenditures and there was no major labor trouble. Politics had not seriously impeded national development. The same conditions prevailed into 1964. Few other countries in Asia, or any place else for that matter, had such a record.

The key to the continuation of Pakistan's progress lies not only with Pakistanis, but with all the people of the South Asian subcontinent. The violence of 1947, when neighbor killed neighbor with abandon, left deep scars of bitterness on Indians and Pakistanis. And the wound of Kashmir is not bound up. Not until that wound is treated and healed and the bitterness dissolved will either people find the progress each seeks. The Pakistani, like his Indian neighbor, waits.

Appendix

SOME FACTS ABOUT PAKISTAN

(based on the 1961 census)

Area 365,524 square miles*

Population: 93,831,982*

Density per square mile: 256.4*

Capitals: Islamabad (future capital under construction), Rawalpindi (provisional capital), Dacca (seat of National Assembly)

Flag: Green field (green is the color of Islam) with a white band near the staff (white represents the minorities) with a white star and crescent (symbols of Islam) in the center of the flag.

Religions: Muslim 88.1 per cent, Hindu 10.7 per cent, other (Buddhist, Christian, Zoroastrian, etc.) 1.2 per cent.

Official languages: Bengali, Urdu, English (until 1972).

Literacy: 19.2 per cent (persons over five), East Pakistan 21.5 per cent, West Pakistan 16.3 per cent.

University Graduates: 82,069 (.08 per cent); East Pakistan 28,069, West Pakistan 54,000.

SUBDIVISIONS OF PAKISTAN

Name	*Area (sq. mi.)*	*Population (000's)*	*Density (sq. mi.)*	*Major city*	*Language*
East Pakistan	54,141	50,854	922	Dacca	Bengali
West Pakistan	311,383	42,978	138	Lahore	Urdu**

* Excludes Junagadh and other territory claimed by Pakistan, but held by India as well as Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas of Kashmir held by Pakistan.

** Although Urdu is the official language, West Pakistan is composed of the following distinctive linguistic-cultural areas:

Baluchistan	134,002	1,384	10	Quetta	Baluchi
Northwest Frontier	38,259	7,563	197	Peshawar	Pashtu
Punjab	79,716	25,643	323	Lahore	Punjabi
Sind	57,259	8,488	150	Karachi	Sindi

MAJOR CITIES OF PAKISTAN

Name	*Population*	*Province*	*Comment*
Karachi	1,916,000	West Pakistan-Sind	Former Capital
Lahore	1,297,000	West Pakistan-Punjab	Capital of West Pakistan
Dacca	558,000	East Pakistan	Capital of East Pakistan
Hyderabad	434,000	West Pakistan-Sind	Former Capital of Sind
Lyallpur	426,000	West Pakistan-Punjab	Fastest growing city
Chittagong	363,000	East Pakistan	Port of East Pakistan
Multan	358,000	West Pakistan-Punjab	
Rawalpindi	343,000	West Pakistan-Punjab	Present Capital
Peshawar	213,000	West Pakistan-Frontier	Former Capital of N.W.F.P.
Gujranwala	107,000	West Pakistan-Punjab	

HEADS OF STATE

Name	*Title*	*Started Term*	*End of Term*
Mohammed Ali Jinnah	Governor-General	August, 1947	September, 1948
Khwaja Nazimuddin	Governor-General	September, 1948	October, 1951
Ghulam Mohammed	Governor-General	October, 1951	September, 1955
Iskander Mirza	Governor-General	September, 1955	March, 1956
	President	March, 1956	October, 1958
Mohammed Ayub Khan	President	October, 1958	In Office

PRIME MINISTERS

Name	*Started Term*	*End of Term*	*Political Party*
Liaquat Ali Khan	August, 1947	October, 1951	Muslim League
Khwaja Nazimuddin	October, 1951	April, 1953	Muslim League
Mohammed Ali (Bogra)	April, 1953	August, 1955	Muslim League
Chaudhuri Mohammed Ali	August, 1955	September, 1956	Muslim League
Hussein S. Suhrawardy	September, 1956	October, 1957	Awami League
Ismail I. Chundrigar	October, 1957	December, 1957	Muslim League
Firoz Khan Noon	December, 1957	October, 1958	Republican
Mohammed Ayub Khan*	October, 1958	October, 1958	

* Mohammed Ayub Khan seized power in a coup d'etat on October 7, 1958, abolished the office of Prime Minister, proclaimed martial law, and declared himself head of government as Chief Martial Law Administrator. On October 27, 1958, Ayub deposed President Iskander Mirza and proclaimed himself President.

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
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
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PAKISTAN and its Neighbors



EAST PAKISTAN

Dorothy deFontaine

IN THE midst of chaotic violence and brutal slaughter that caused the deaths of over half a million people in 1947, Pakistan was born. The events which resulted in this culmination of hope and despair—and the consequences these events have produced—are examined here by a man who, in his capacity as an information officer with the United States Information Service in Karachi, learned intimately of the country and its people.

For example, the author's first hand knowledge shows why the importance and influence of religion in Pakistan *cannot* be emphasized too strongly. Indeed, religion is the very basis upon which the country was conceived and established by Britain at the time of Indian independence: the creation of two nations based on religious distinction.

As a result of this split, the Hindu majority retained most of India while the Muslim minority (25%) created a separate, politically united country from two predominantly Muslim areas—one in the East and one a thousand miles away in the West.

The cross-migration of Hindus and Muslims made necessary by partition resulted, however, in anger, hardship, riot and bloodshed. The resettlement of these millions, along with the basic fact of wide physical separation, has accounted for many of the crucial problems faced by Pakistan since independence.

Within the homogeneous framework of the Islamic religion, Pakistan is a land of great variety and many extremes. Nevertheless, all share the common plight of illiteracy, malnutrition and poverty. How such problems are being met forms one of the chief themes of this comprehensive book.

Mr. Weekes discusses in depth the rise of Pakistan's military dictatorship, and devotes an entire chapter to the explosive Kashmiri dispute with India. In addition, relations with other Muslim nations are carefully analyzed.

This is a thorough, perceptive study of a nation struggling for survival.

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